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741. Enhancing the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership

Author:
Brian Harding and Andreyka Natalegawa
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and Indonesia are natural partners. Despite our geographic distance, we have striking similarities. We are large, diverse, and democratic societies. We both seek an international order in the Indo-Pacific region based on rules that enable all countries to have a voice. Our shores each span two oceans, imbuing our countries with a deep maritime heritage and culture that shapes how we approach the world. When each plays its natural role as a leader in regional affairs, both parties benefit. In recognition of the great mutual benefit that a close U.S.-Indonesia partnership could bring, Presidents Barack Obama and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono launched a comprehensive partnership in 2010 to build closer government-government, economic, and people-people ties between our two countries. Critically, the agreement created a framework for collaboration across a multitude of government departments and ministries under a joint commission co-chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs. In 2016, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the comprehensive partnership was elevated into a strategic partnership, further signaling the relationship’s importance to both countries. Yet despite having many common interests and recent high-level efforts to push the relationship forward, U.S.-Indonesia relations are not meeting their potential. Bilateral economic interaction is limited compared to the size of our economies. Official interaction is often bureaucratic and rarely strategic. And people-people relations, including of education exchanges, are minuscule considering that Indonesia and the United States are the third- and fourth-most-populated countries in the world. President Donald Trump’s political ascent has also created additional headwinds for U.S.-Indonesia relations. Candidate-Trump’s statements regarding the Muslim world caused unease in Indonesia and his policies as president toward Israel and Palestine have damaged Indonesian views of the United States. In Asia, the Trump administration’s framing of great-power competition with China and the administration’s nontraditional economic statecraft have created uncertainty in Jakarta. From Washington’s perspective, the Jokowi administration’s relative disinterest in playing a leading role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in the broader Indo-Pacific region has dampened enthusiasm in some quarters for investing in the relationship. Recognizing the importance of both the U.S.-Indonesia relationship and its continued underperformance, on May 3, 2018, the CSIS Southeast Asia Program convened a first annual bilateral, track 1.5 strategic dialogue in Washington, D.C., to inject new momentum into the relationship and to begin building deeper connectivity between policy experts in the two countries. This report outlines conclusions and recommendations that surfaced during the dialogue. However, the report reflects the opinions of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect those of the dialogue participants.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Culture, Maritime, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Indonesia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

742. Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security

Author:
Michael Wallace, Amy Roma, and Sachin Desai
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry helps the U.S. government meet several key national security objectives. But the industry is struggling to survive. We are not the first to say this and we will not be the last. We are also not the first to call for U.S. government support for this struggling industry—but this call to action is different. We are urging U.S. government action—not with the focus of protecting the commercial sector, but with a focus to protect U.S. government interests impacted by the decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector. This is a key distinction and warrants attention at the highest level of government. This paper is not intended for those in the nuclear energy industry. They know the issues. It is intended for the U.S. government and the U.S. public—to explain the reasons why U.S. government action is critical at this moment, and to explain how we can move forward in a manner that best protects our country’s national security. But what are these national security objectives and how are U.S. government and national security interests undermined by a decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector? In this paper we explain the critical importance of the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry in support of U.S. defense, research, economics, geopolitics, and international nonproliferation. We walk through how the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry arose out of and with the support of the U.S. government—and how President Eisenhower’s reasons for bringing nuclear energy to the world in the 1950s are the very same reasons that the United States needs to continue to do so today. We unravel the web of interconnections between the commercial nuclear energy industry and achieving U.S. government and national security goals. And we explain the impact that a declining commercial nuclear energy sector has on achieving those crucial goals. Moreover, we set forth a recommended path forward to come “back from the brink” and preserve critical commercial nuclear energy sector assets—including technology, knowhow, people, and influence—before they are lost forever, and U.S. national security is damaged as a result. This industry must survive—and it can if the U.S. government and private industry work together, recognizing the government and civilian integrated nuclear infrastructure moving forward. Notably, the response must be U.S. government led to take the approach that is best for the country, rather than any particular company or technology. We recommend five core U.S.-government-led actions to move forward that focus.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States and North America

743. The U.S. Defense Budget in FY2019: Underlying Trends

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The report draws on a wide range of official sources and is designed to provide an overview of official reporting on major trends rather than make an independent analysis. The U.S. provides a vast amount of detail on its annual budget request for military and international affairs spending – much of it in graphic, tabular, and summary form. The material presented here is an attempt to pick the key materials to show where the U.S. is focusing its military spending, how it relates to its strategy, how major force improvements will affect U.S. capabilities, and how the U.S. is dealing with its strategic partners and potential threats. However, the user should be aware that much of the material presented is often uncertain and is not comparable from source to source. There also is no easy or single way to summarize the trends in the U.S. defense budget. The materials that go into just the unclassified portions of the Department of Defense’s annual submission of President’s budget request to Congress, and the subsequent Congressional review of that request, run well over several thousand pages. It is also critical for the reader to understand that only the portion of the report dealing with the National Defense Authorization Act (pages 24-43) represents the final result of Congressional action and the FY2019 budget signed by the President, and not all of the portions of reference action by the key Committees involved were approved in exactly the form shown in the final bill signed by the President. Much of the material is drawn from sources that precede the final Congressional markup because the Department never updates most of the tables and charts in the Department of Defense request until the following year and new budget submission. The material presented also shows that different sources define total defense spending in different ways, and include different expenditures and convert current to constant dollars in different ways. More importantly, most sources report in terms of “Budget Authority” (BA) – the total money the Congress authorizes in a given Fiscal Year that can be spent over a period of years. This is the best estimate of what the Congress is actually approving. However, some sources in terms of “Budget Outlays” (BO) – only the money that can be spent in 12-month period of that U.S. Fiscal Year. (Which begins on 1 October of the year the Congress acts upon, and ends on 30 September of the following year). This is the best way of assessing the impact of spending on how well the budget is balanced, the size of the deficit, and impact on the federal debt. Budget projections for future years present other problems. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides detailed estimates of how the President’s budget request – and the final budgets the Congress authorizes – will impact over time. Many such estimates precede Congressional action on the budget, and it then takes several months for the CBO to estimate the probable future trends in the total federal budget and impact of the final Congressionally approved levels of U.S. defense spending on that total federal budget and the U.S. GDP. This often creates major lags in official estimates of the trends in every aspect of federal spending, the budget deficit, and the national debt. More broadly, the Department of Defense has effectively abandoned any serious effort to create a program budget, and to provide a realistic estimate of the cost of the Future Year Defense Program beyond the fiscal year directly under review. It essentially rolls forward current activities and plans to make estimates of the next four years that are based on the spending levels in the budget year under review. It bases such estimates largely on input categories such as personnel, O&M, RDT&E, and procurement. The Department of Defense does not report expenditures by major mission or command. The Department defines “strategy” largely in terms of broad concepts and goals. It does not tie its “strategy” to net assessments of the balance in terms of threats and strategic partners, to specific force plans, to specific actions and schedules, to specific costs, or to measures of success and effectiveness. Unclassified reporting in “PPB” – or planning, programming, and budgeting– form has become a functional oxymoron. The Congress does hold strategy hearings and directs studies of key strategic issues, but these efforts rarely address any of the practical details of any aspect of the nature and cost of U.S. strategy. Similarly, the outyear estimates of military spending by the Department of Defense, OMB, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) focus on a “baseline” that assumes the United States does not actually use its military forces in any operational form. The limited estimates provided for future Overseas Contingency Operations are “placeholders” and not actual estimates. This is partly inevitable given the inability to predict the future, but it creates a practical problem in a country whose civil plans call for major future increases in mandatory spending on retirement, medical case, and welfare. This means the official U.S. projections of civil spending rise relative to military spending in ways history indicates will be highly unrealistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

744. The Costs of War: Obstacles to Public Understanding

Author:
Steven Aftergood
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
Public access to information about government spending is presumed – and required – by the US Constitution, which directs that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time” (Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7). It is remarkable that, among all of the many categories of government information, budget information is singled out for publication in this way. The ability of the public to “follow the money” expended by its government is understood to be an essential prerequisite to self-rule. Budget data that are secret, unreliable, or otherwise unavailable are incompatible with constitutional democracy. In practice, however, public access to budget information is imperfect and incomplete. In the crucial area of national defense, the scale of spending alone makes it hard to grasp. Public understanding of the costs of war is further limited by secrecy, faulty accounting, and the deferral of current costs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Military Spending, and Transparency
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

745. “Making America Great Again” Against the Backdrop of “Africa Rising”? The Trump Administration and Africa’s Marginalization with U.S. Foreign Policy

Author:
Peter J. Schraeder
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
This article explores what Donald J. Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential elections has meant for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. It is devoted to answering a simple question: What do the policies associated with “Making America Great Again” mean for an African continent in the midst of profound transformations that this special issue of The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations has referred to as “Africa rising”? Despite expectations that a successful businessman would usher in a new era of U.S. trade and investment, the reality of U.S.-Africa relations has been a period of continued White House neglect, intensified by unfilled Africa-related posts throughout the national security bureaucracies and especially the State Department. The Trump administration has instead pursued a militarybased, counter-terrorism approach originally set in place by the George W. Bush and largely continued under the Barack Obama administrations. Other broad foreign policies, especially those related to immigration, have had negative repercussions on the African continent. Africanists have been particularly dismayed by racist, Africa-related statements, most notably by President Trump. The net result has been the exact opposite of “Making America Great Again,” at least within the context of U.S.-Africa relations. The Trump administration has instead marginalized a rising Africa within the regional hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy, in essence ceding the field of maneuver for the immediate future not only to U.S. allies, such as France and Great Britain, but U.S. competitors, most notably a rising China and a resurgent Russia.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Trump
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

746. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

747. Defusing Venezuela

Author:
Julia Buxton
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Venezuela’s status as a conflict flashpoint can only be defused by concerted dialogue and negotiation efforts. However, there are obstacles to a peaceful exit. The “Venezuela issue” became problematic and will remain so because the U.S., as well as the OAS, are out of configuration with the seismic political shifts experienced in South America in the 2000s. The U.S. is a key actor in maintaining hemispheric peace and security, but it has remained locked in traditional, ideological, diplomatic security perspectives and responses. Framed during the Cold War, these are inappropriate for the challenges of the post-Washington Consensus period.5 Inter-American relations require pluralist modes of exchange and engagement, less not more militarized “solutions” to social and political problems, and recognition that China and Russia have heightened financial and political stakes in the region’s political economy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
South America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

748. Documents on Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In September 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced to the House of Commons the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, defining those straits and passages within as historic internal waters of Canada and under full national sovereignty.1 “The policy of this government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago” Clark declared, “and to preserve Canada’s sovereignty over land, sea, and ice undiminished and undivided.” (Document 68). This was the first time Canada had delineated its Arctic maritime space, clearly defining in legislation those waters over which it had sovereignty. It was an important clarification, as Canada had claimed and exercised sovereignty for decades without ever stating with precision where that sovereignty began and ended. In the assertion of sovereignty, precision is important. As the American geographer Isaiah Bowman once said, a boundary line “has to be here, not hereabouts.” While this definition was an important clarification it did not fundamentally change the Canadian approach to its Arctic waters. In making this announcement Clark was not staking a claim, rather he was making official what Canada had long assumed and practiced. In so doing, he marked the culmination of decades of political and legal discussions, negotiations, and debate. It was the logical conclusion to a lengthy political and legal evolution, by which Canadian sovereignty came to be defined and asserted in the way that it ultimately was in 1986. This volume is a documentary history, charting the evolution of Canada’s Arctic maritime sovereignty through government memoranda, notes, communiqués, and other primary source material. In so doing, it offers as unfiltered a look as possible at the political thinking, legal analysis, and international discussions that defined Canadian Arctic policy during its formative period. The material included is necessarily limited and selective – drawn from tens of thousands of pages of archival documents on the subject. These documents were included for several reasons: some are important government studies which shaped policy making, some are records of discussions or communications which illuminate important decisions, while others were selected for the context they provide at key moments in Canadian policy making. The period covered in this compendium stretches from 1950 to 1988 and is, in some respects, artificial. Canadian policy makers certainly considered the question of Arctic maritime sovereignty in the years before 1950, but it was never a pressing consideration, nor was any real policy formed. To reproduce material from this period would also be redundant, duplicating as it inevitably would the thorough collection compiled by Janice Cavell in her 2016 Documents on Canadian External Relations volume on Arctic sovereignty and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s excellent volume in the DCASS series. This volume has also avoided reproducing material in Whitney lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s 2010 book The Canadian Forces a& Arctic Sovereignty, which examines armed forces documents on this subject. This volume ends in 1988, not because the Mulroney government’s declaration of straight baselines – and the Canada-US negotiations which followed – ended discussion on the matter but because, by that point, the internal Canadian debate over the precise nature and extent of Canada’s claim had been settled. Documents 69-74 extend this volume to 1988 to provide some insight into how Canada’s new policy was received both internally and internationally. From a logistical perspective, documentary material on this subject also becomes nearly impossible to secure after this date – even through the Access to Information Act, the vehicle by which the lion’s share of this collection was secured.5 The focus of this volume is on Canadian government material; however, certain key documents from the United States National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) and the Foreign Relations of the United States6 series have also been included. This American material provides context to Canada’s decision making and offers researchers a glimpse at how crucial Canadian policy initiatives were received by the country’s most important partner – and sometimes opponent – in this field. Ultimately, the purpose of the Documents on Canadian Sovereignty and Security is to facilitate new research and new interpretations which can add to, improve, and challenge the existing literature. This collection should provide academics, students, and policy makers with the research foundation to launch new inquiries into the field. Undergraduate students can use this collection as a substitute for extensive primary research, while graduate students and scholars can employ it as a ready jumping off point to undertake more thorough archival work.
Topic:
Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean

749. Journal of Public and International Affairs 2018

Author:
Andi Zhou, Sam Kanson-Benanav, Collin Smith, Yi Xu, Amn Nasir, Sameer Anwar, Saim Rashid, Muqueet Shahzad, Lauren Eades, William O'Connell, Caper Gooden, Paige KW Gasser, Laurie Georges, Seleeke Flingai, and Erika Parks
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Woodrow Wilson School Journal of Public and International Affairs
Institution:
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Abstract:
These are critical times for those who work to further the public interest. Across the globe, divisions and distrust erode the clarity required to tackle the great challenges of our day. Those who advocate for truth find themselves under attack from those who fear what they might lose if the status quo is changed. There is exceptional need today for powerful voices speaking on behalf of sound policy. The 10 articles in this 29th edition of the Journal of Public and International Affairs all reflect a dogged determination among young policy professionals around the world to press ahead in spite of the headwinds. These pages contain fresh ideas on electrifying rural Myanmar, reforming the U.S. banking system, strengthening the Jordanian labor market, and preventing recidivism among convicted sex offenders in Texas, to name just a few. The JPIA was born from the conviction that graduate students have a unique and invaluable voice in key policy debates. The authors of these articles, together with the 45 editors from 13 graduate programs around the world who selected and reviewed them, will shape the future of economic, international, domestic, and development policy in the decades to come. We strive continually, especially at this moment, to amplify their voices.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Affairs, Bilateral Relations, Labor Issues, Business, Mental Health, Accountability, Public Sector, Hezbollah, Services, Electricity, Pollution, and Waste
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, Canada, Brazil, South America, Central America, Lebanon, Mozambique, North America, Mexico, Jordan, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America

750. Contemporary Strategic Trends and the Canadian Army

Author:
Elinor Sloan
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This article looks at key strategic trends, the sorts of missions in which the Canadian army is likely to take part over the next few years, and the implications for the army at the tactical/operational level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Canada and North America