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1161. he World That Awaits President-Elect Trump

Author:
Michelle Nicholasen
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
During the 2016 primaries, Donald Trump claimed he had more foreign policy experience than any of the GOP contenders. In fact, he has traveled widely to meet with presidents, prime ministers, financiers, and developers over the past decade as part of his highly profitable business of licensing the Trump name to large real estate developments around the world. On the campaign trail, Trump’s provocative statements about foreign policy have become part of the public record. From pressuring NAFTA members to bombing ISIS, his pledges have caused a stir in the arena of foreign relations. Publicly, candidate Trump threatened to close borders to Mexicans, slap tariffs on Chinese goods, restrict Muslims in the United States, among other vows. Without a record of public service to draw on, it is difficult to know how these declarations might translate into a Trump foreign policy. To understand what lies ahead for the new president, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs asked its Faculty Associates in international relations to comment on the challenges and opportunities that await in five regions of the world: Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, Europe, and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Elections, ISIS, and NAFTA
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, China, Europe, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and North America

1162. Making Drones Illegal Based on a Wrong Example: The U.S. Dronified Warfare

Author:
Gloria Shkurti
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Abstract:
A concoction between the technology, entertainment and military has resulted in a ‘new’ kind of warfare, which has started to determine the American counterterrorism strategy, the dronified warfare. The U.S. for a long time now has been the leader in the production and usage of armed drones and has attracted a lot of criticism regarding the way how it conducts the drone strikes, which in many cases has resulted in civilians killed. The U.S. dronified warfare has become the main determinant when discussing the legality, morality and effectiveness of the drone as the weapon, as many critics fail in distinguishing drone as a weapon and dronified warfare as a process. This paper argues that if analyzed separately from the U.S. example, drone is a legal and moral weapon. Nevertheless, the paper emphasizes the fact that the U.S. must change its current way of conducting the strikes by being aware of the fact that the irresponsible way it is acting in the Middle East and regions around, sooner or later will backfire
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
United States and North America

1163. Assessment of Israel’s Position in the 1991 Gulf War

Author:
Furkan Halit Yolcu
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Abstract:
The Persian Gulf War was one of the defining incidents that shaped the current situation of the Middle East. There has been a vast amount of studies about this conflict but on a specific case why Israel stayed out of the conflict even though she was attacked continues to be an intriguing question for researchers. Saddam’s decision on invading Kuwait and the war following this is going to be summarized in order to present the structure when this incident took place and also to build an environment in which Israel’s decision on refraining itself from the war is going to be analyzed. Israel is perceived as one of the most agg- ressive countries in the Middle East mostly because of the wars that it included so far and the grand projects that it wants to put in practice in the future. With these assumptions it is rather hard to understand Israel’s passive behaviour during the Persian Gulf War and possible reasons of this is going to be main focus of this study to understand the motivations behind such policy. Israel’s state in that period and its capacity will be analyzed in order to understand whether this decision was taken directly and solely by Israel or it was a result of long-going dependency to another country or any other possible situation. Possible reasons that resulted with Israel’s passive attitude will be under the scope to explain whether what Israel did was rather rational or not. In addition to that, the advantages that Israel enjoyed and disadvantages that it faced will be shown at the last part of the study.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Gulf War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Israel, and North America

1164. Misperceiving U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf: Raising the Hidden Costs of U.S. Dependence on Oil

Author:
Steve A. Yetiv
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
United States foreign policy in the Middle East over the last few decades has been controversial and checkered, and Washington has certainly flexed its muscles in the region. However, the question arises as to how aggressive America has been with regard to oil in the region. I distinguish between two perspectives in how America is viewed, which we can simply call the offensive and defensive perspectives, recognizing that there is a continuum of views. From the offensive perspective, America is viewed as having one or more of these goals: steal or own Middle East oil; control Middle East oil in order to undermine Muslims; dominate Middle East oil to advance global hegemony; or exercise “puppet” control over oil producers like Saudi Arabia to coerce them into charging far lower oil prices than markets would warrant.1 By contrast, from the defensive perspective, America chiefly aims to prevent others from threatening oil supplies in a manner that would spike global oil prices and possibly cause a recession or depression. Muslim opinion polls have revealed that oil issues are a broader source of tension in relations between elements of the Muslim world and the West. The U.S. role in oil-related issues feeds into historical, political, and religious perspectives of an imperialist and power-hungry America. In fact, a not uncommon view in the Middle East is that America seeks to exploit, even steal the region’s oil resources, a viewpoint much in line with the offensive perspective described above. I argue that the history of America’s role in the region suggests that this is largely a misconception, and that this misconception is not immaterial. It seriously raises the cost of the use of oil and of American regional intervention. This misconception not only stokes terrorism and anti-Americanism, but also complicates America’s relations with Middle Eastern countries, affects its image among Muslims, and hurts its global leverage insofar as such views become internationally prominent. Indeed, it is almost a maxim in many capitals in the Middle East that close cooperation with Washington carries a domestic political cost. Recall, for example, that the Saudis were initially reluctant to host American forces after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, even though they felt seriously threatened by Saddam Hussein.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, North America, and Persian Gulf

1165. War and the Oil Price Cycle

Author:
Amy Myers and Jaffe Jareer Elass
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Oil has shaped international conflict for decades. According to one estimate, twenty-five to fifty percent of interstate wars between 1973 and 2012 had oil-related linkages. 1 But the cyclical nature of oil’s contribution to global conflict is not well understood. Not only are oil prices cyclical, but the geopolitics of oil are linked inexorably to the same boom and bust price cycle. Military adventurism, proxy wars and regional pathologies in the Middle East expand and contract with the ebb and flow of massive petrodollar accumulations related to the oil price cycle. The massive inflow of petrodollar revenues when oil prices are high creates disposable incomes that can be easily dispensed on regional arms races, especially since oil consuming countries like the United States are incentivized to increase arms sales as a means of solving oil import related trade deficits. Besides transferring wealth from industrialized countries to oil producers in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region and Russia (and stimulating renewed drilling for oil and gas in North America), high global oil and natural gas prices also slow global economic growth and encourage energy conservation. This causes petroleum demand to slow globally, lowering oil prices. Social and political problems in the region reemerge as oil prices recede. Regional governments have fewer resources to spend on restive populations that have become accustomed to generous handouts enabled by high oil prices. Job creation and visible social programs slow, dissatisfaction rises, and the consequences of economic downturns incite support for militants. Ensuing instability forces governments to use newly purchased arms, which ironically begins the cycle yet again, as new conflicts disrupt oil supplies. In this manner, the world experiences perpetuating patterns of military conflict, followed by oil supply crises, and accompanying global financial instability. In effect, the Middle East resource curse has become globalized. The challenges this is presenting on humanitarian, security and economic fronts have become increasingly dangerous. The arms race that has accompanied the rise of oil prices over the 2000s has been no exception and is now all the more complicated due to the violent participation of sub-national radicalized groups that are less susceptible to diplomatic pressures or initiatives. In this emerging geopolitical context, the rise of violent subnational groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda are increasingly putting oil infrastructure at risk, laying the groundwork for a future oil crisis that may prove harder to solve than in the past. As borders and ruling institutions have become contested, so has control of the region’s major oil and gas facilities. Initially an outgrowth of disunity inside Iraq, the conflict over oil and gas facilities is now accelerating across ungoverned territories, with important long-term consequences for global energy markets. Mideast oil and gas production capacity, along with surface facilities, are increasingly being damaged in ways that will make them hard to repair. Export disruptions, which were once sporadic, are becoming a more permanent feature of the civil war landscape. The level of destroyed capacity is currently estimated at about 2 million b/d and rising.2 The longer Mideast conflicts fester, the more that infrastructure could become at risk. There is an additional element to this oil and war story that links structurally with the oil boom and bust cycle. As oil prices recede, along with a decreased demand for oil and accelerating regional conflict, wealthy oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, are often tempted to use large oil production capacity as a strategic asset. They flood the market with increased supplies in order to lower prices, thereby hurting geopolitical rivals. This price war strategy, which was notably present during the prolonged Soviet war in Afghanistan and the eight year Iran-Iraq War, temporarily ameliorates the short run effects of war on surface export facilities through excessive production rates. In addition, it lays the seeds for the future uptick in the oil market, by discouraging investment in future oil productive capacity outside the Middle East when prices are extremely low. In the case of the 2000s, the destruction caused by ISIS on the oil sector in many locations around the Middle East, combined with expected losses in investment in other parts of the world (like Canada’s oil sands and the Arctic due to current low oil prices), may be creating the conditions for a future oil supply crunch. This has major implications on U.S. policy. This article asserts that the United State would be, in light of these circumstances in the Middle East, unwise to dismantle its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as has been suggested on Capitol Hill. It would be similarly unwise for the United States to lose focus on the importance of conservation efforts in the transportation sector which has both national security and climate benefits. The United States would benefit strategically from a reevaluation of its ban on oil exports. Finally, the United States should place a greater emphasis on conflict resolution in troubled states. By resolving internal conflicts over the distribution of oil revenues, the United States can better pave the way for long-term solutions whereby those same revenues can be integrated into national budgets in ways that brings economic prosperity to populations instead of rising military expenditure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, North America, and Persian Gulf

1166. Exclusion and Violence in Post-2003 Iraq

Author:
Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
This paper examines the origins of political violence in Iraq. It argues that, in the wake of the democratic transition process in from 2004 to 2005, Iraqi exiles, who were chiefly Shiite Muslims and Kurds appointed by Paul Bremer, Iraq’s U.S. civilian administrator, moved to write a constitution and set up a political system that deliberately marginalized minorities. Since then, the Sunni minority began and continues to engage in or support violence against the state. It suggests that violence and instability in Iraq are to be understood in terms of local contexts of meaning, notably the nature of struggle for political power.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Political Power Sharing, and Violence
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North America

1167. Executive Power and the Role of Congress in the Paris Climate and Iran Nuclear Agreements

Author:
Gwynne Taraska and Hardin Lang
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
In recent months, multilateral efforts have produced two historic agreements aimed at improving global security: the Iran nuclear agreement and the Paris climate agreement. The Iran nuclear agreement, which blocks Iran’s nuclear capacity in exchange for a gradual lifting of economic sanctions, was finalized in July and is expected to be implemented imminently. Before negotiations concluded, Congress passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which gave Congress a 60-day period in which it could seek to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. On September 10, all but four Democrats in the U.S. Senate voted to filibuster such a resolution. The agreement, which is nonbinding under international law, therefore proceeded without the need for a presidential veto. Concurrently, the country parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, were negotiating an international agreement to rein in greenhouse gas emissions and improve resilience to the effects of climate change. The agreement, which has force under international law, was finalized in Paris on December 12. It obliges countries to submit and update national climate goals and participate in systems to review national and collective progress. In the run-up to the Paris agreement, Congress held several hearings, but there were no developments akin to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. As these two feats of international cooperation were under negotiation, Congress played an unusually involved role in the case of Iran but a more minimal role in the case of Paris. This brief discusses the status of both agreements and explains why the Iran and Paris agreements differ with respect to triggers of congressional intervention.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Multilateral Relatons, and Paris Agreement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1168. Guantanamo’s Last Year

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
With one year left in his administration, President Barack Obama remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay during his time in office. Congress has prohibited, at least for now, one aspect of the president’s preferred pathway to close the prison—transferring some detainees into the United States for trial or continued law of war detention. Much of this debate has focused on the question of whether President Obama will use executive action to override the congressional transfer ban. Doing so would be impractical and extremely unwise. The Obama administration should state publicly that it will not use executive action to bring large numbers of Guantanamo detainees into the United States in defiance of congressional statute. A better strategy would be to pursue alternative options for closing Guantanamo that, even given current statutory constraints, remain entirely in the control of the executive branch. Amid disappointment at the failure to close Guantanamo, it is easy to forget that President Obama originally believed it was feasible to identify, categorize, prosecute, and transfer all 242 detainees in just one year—the same amount of time he has left for the remaining 91 detainees. While congressional resistance is a new obstacle not present at the time of President Obama’s original pledge, moving the majority of detainees out of Guantanamo is now mostly about the implementation of policies and decisions already made, a much more manageable challenge than the one that Obama faced in 2009. If that goal is to be achieved, however, President Obama must command a greater level of urgency throughout his administration and especially at the Pentagon. The risk is not simply a failure that becomes a stain on the president’s legacy; rather, the much more serious risk is that the next administration could resume sending detainees to Guantanamo, which is on the wish list of many conservatives. The latter would do irreparable harm to American national security—and be a colossal waste of money. Holding a detainee at Guantanamo now costs $4 million per year per detainee, compared with less than $100,000 per inmate in the highest security prison in the United States. And while it is fair to say that the salience of Guantanamo as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups has faded during the Obama administration’s efforts to close it, it is not gone. Hostages held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are not dressed in Guantanamo-like orange jumpsuits by accident. And if new detainees were to be sent to Guantanamo by the next administration, the prison would roar back to prominence in terrorist propaganda and be an enormous self-inflicted wound on the country. We cannot afford to risk this possibility. Guantanamo must be closed during the Obama administration. This can be achieved by completing the following steps: Hold Periodic Review Board hearings for all eligible detainees by July 1, 2016. Accelerate transfers of those detainees designated for transfer or release. Order the Department of Justice to review detainee cases for prosecution and potential plea bargain in federal court. Pursue agreements with countries to prosecute under their laws any Guantanamo detainees accused of serious crimes. Engage the Afghan government to seek an agreement to transfer back to Afghan custody any remaining law of war detainees captured in connection with the war in Afghanistan. Some of these options may not represent the best or preferred method for the Obama administration to close Guantanamo, but this is a feasible and realistic path to close the prison in one year. Some of these choices will be difficult, but when measured against the possibility that Guantanamo could be back in the business of accepting new detainees in 2017, those difficulties should not be disqualifying. A reinvigorated effort from the Obama administration is urgently needed to make 2016 Guantanamo’s last year.
Topic:
Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, Counter-terrorism, and Detention
Political Geography:
Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Guantanamo

1169. The United States and Colombia: From Security Partners to Global Partners in Peace

Author:
Dan Restrepo, Frank O. Mora, Brian Fonseca, and Jonathan D. Rosen
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos visits the United States this week, Colombia stands on the brink of a historic peace agreement that, if successfully reached and implemented, will bring an end to the longest-running internal armed conflict in the Western hemisphere. This reality is a far cry from where the country stood just 15 years ago, when it was on the edge of total state collapse. Although Colombia’s ability to overcome what many believed was a hopeless situation rests squarely upon the sacrifice of blood and treasure made by the Colombian people and its public forces, this promising new chapter in Colombia’s history also stems in part from the most successful, bipartisan U.S. foreign policy effort undertaken to date in the 21st century—Plan Colombia. As the United States encounters growing instability in other regions of the world, it is instructive to look back at the U.S. role in fostering the most successful counterinsurgency effort in recent history to understand what worked and what remains unfinished. President Santos’ visit also provides an important opportunity to look forward to how the United States and Colombia can solidify Colombia’s remarkable gains while becoming true strategic partners.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, North America, and United States of America

1170. Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

Author:
Lawrence Korb and Adam Mount
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
n the next decade, the United States will have to make decisions that will shape its nuclear arsenal for much of the next century. Nearly every missile, submarine, aircraft, and warhead in the U.S. arsenal is nearing the end of its service life and must be replaced. As Congress and the Obama administration continue to wrestle with the effects of sequestration on projected levels of defense spending, the U.S. Department of Defense has begun a series of procurement programs that will nearly double the amount the country spends on its nuclear deterrent in the next decade compared to what it spent in the past decade. Over the next 30 years, the cost of the nuclear deterrent could pass $1 trillion and crowd out defense and domestic investments needed to keep the United States strong and competitive. In addition, it could undermine U.S. credibility on the issue of nuclear proliferation—especially when it comes to dealing with regimes such as Russia, China, and North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America