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1. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:
Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

2. Another Transatlanticism Is Possible: Europe’s Moment in Latin America amid Trump’s Return

Author:
Raffaele Piras
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited his hallmark “America First” agenda, with significant consequences for Latin America. During his inaugural address, Trump emphasised the need to regain US control of the Panama Canal, framing it as a cornerstone of national security amidst heightened competition with China.[1] This rhetoric marks the continuation of a policy approach that relies on coercion and transactional diplomacy to achieve US objectives. While Trump’s focus on Latin America will undoubtedly reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics, it also presents a strategic opportunity for the European Union to strengthen its role as a stabilising force and reliable partner.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

3. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:
Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

4. The State of EU-US Digital and Energy Cooperation

Author:
Federica Marconi, Wolfgang Münchau, and Irene Paviotti
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In a time of rapid technological advancements and changing energy paradigms, the European Union and the United States are trying to coordinate their efforts to navigate the complexities of an ever-evolving landscape. Transatlantic dialogues and cooperative endeavours are key mechanisms for mitigating tensions and fostering a common assessment of the opportunities and risks arising from these advancements. Critical in this regard are the problems of governance emanating from technological development and its consequences in the digital sphere as well as the delicate balance between security, competitiveness and environmental targets in the energy dimension.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Political Economy, Governance, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Digital Policy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

5. Transatlantic Tech Bridge: Digital Infrastructure and Subsea Cables, a US Perspective

Author:
Julia Tréhu and Megan Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The importance of digital infrastructure for global communication and connectivity is only growing. Within this varied sector, subsea cables play a central role in ensuring seamless internet traffic globally. What are the US’s strategic and economic interests in digital infrastructure, particularly subsea cables? Within the context of larger economic and geopolitical competition, US policy is multifaceted, from aiming to secure the physical security of infrastructure and guarding against espionage and technology leakage, to boosting economic competitiveness and supporting domestic firms. Overall, digital infrastructure, and undersea cables in particular, are a key element of a larger US strategy of outcompeting China. Although evaluations among allies of the relative threat posed by China and Chinese-owned digital infrastructure vary, broadly shared goals of resiliency, security, and increased connectivity mean there are potential areas for deeper EU-US cooperation, including partnerships with third countries, that align with their respective strategic visions and represent a solid base for further transatlantic coordination.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Infrastructure, Governance, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Transatlantic Cooperation on Semiconductors: A US Perspective

Author:
Julia Tréhu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Semiconductors are essential for the global economy, but recent supply chain disruptions and geopolitical tensions have highlighted new risks, leading to new policy approaches. US semiconductor strategy centres around three objectives. First, the funding provided through the CHIPS and Science Act is part of a larger push to strengthen domestic industry and manufacturing. Second, the US seeks to deny strategic adversaries of key technology through export controls. And third, it aims to secure the supply chains for critical technologies. The European and American semiconductor sectors are already tightly intertwined, and further coordination has occurred through forums like the Trade and Technology Council. But challenges remain, including the risk of a subsidy race. Further transatlantic cooperation on key aspects of these new industrial policies can ensure the realisation of shared objectives for a more resilient semiconductor sector.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

8. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Author:
Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and North America

9. Anyplace, anywhere, anytime: NATO and multi-domain operations

Author:
Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO is adopting a multi-domain approach to its operations, but faces unresolved challenges that include the following: • Reaching a common understanding of multi-domain operations (MDO). • Developing and staffi ng organizational structures that will enable the eff ective integration of the military instrument of power with non-military instruments. • Achieving consensus on how to reconcile the global nature of the space and cyber domains with NATO’s Trans-Atlantic geographic focus. These challenges could be mitigated if NATO takes a broad view of its role in a comprehensive approach, and serves as the connective tissue among all of the instruments of power.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

10. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America