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121. Averting a Global Calamity? Trump and Xi at the G20

Author:
John Edwards
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The outlines of a trade deal between the United States and China are there. But without a return to the negotiating table, the dispute could rapidly escalate, magnifying the damage to world growth. With the Osaka G20 meeting looming, Chinese analysts and policymakers visited in Beijing are pessimistic about the prospects for a trade deal with the United States. If they are right, global financial markets are in for a much wilder shock than anything yet seen in this quarrel. Yet much of a deal has already been agreed, while the consequences of not reaching a deal have become increasingly dire.
Topic:
International Relations, International Trade and Finance, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

122. Whither US-China Trade War? Impacts on global trade, technology and finance, and strategies to mitigate risks

Author:
Lia Valls Pereira, Tatiana Rosito, and Gabriel de Barros Torres
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
For its twelthth meeting, CEBRI's China Analysis Group organized discussions on the economic and geopolitical causes and consequences of trade frictions between China and the United States, considering its impact on different actors and on the multilateral trading system at large. Despite the original focus on trade imbalances, participants noted that the bilateral rivalry’s underlying drivers relate to competition for leadership in high-tech sectors and, fundamentally, to the conciliation of practices associated with different development models. Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the next steps in the dispute, there was a consensus among participants that a complete decoupling between both economies is virtually unfeasible in the short-term and not likely in the long-term. The speakers at the event were Marcos Troyjo, Jin Canrong, Kellie Meiman and Niu Haibin and comments were made by Lia Valls and Tatiana Prazeres. The event was coordinated by CEBRI Senior Fellow Tatiana Rosito.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Finance, Trade Wars, Risk, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

123. LOST JOB—WILL TRAVEL: TRADE-RELATED JOB LOSSES AND MILITARY RECRUITMENT

Author:
Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A new study shows how trade-related job losses translate into increases in military enlistment. While the study is convincing in its own right, it raises important questions and highlights one potential pitfall of political-economic analysis: focusing on partial equilibrium results in a full-equilibrium world. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA (or “NAFTA 1.1: Same Great Taste in a New Package!”), the trilateral trade, investment, and regulatory agreement that will replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is still working its way through congressional approval in all three member nations. The political wrangling, which consumed most of 2018, was arduous and heated. Eventually, what emerged was a new trade deal that mostly kept NAFTA’s architecture in place and added to it many of the US-Canada-Mexico provisions included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), to which all three countries were parties before President Trump withdrew the United States in January 2017.
Topic:
NAFTA, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade, USMCA, Recruitment, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

124. U.S.-China Economic Relations Under the Trump Administration at the 2-Year Mark

Author:
Peter Harrell
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since entering office in 2017, President Trump has upended longstanding tenets of U.S. trade policy and launched the most aggressive set of new U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions since at least the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Actions include renegotiating the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS) and NAFTA, using “Section 232” of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on most steel and aluminum imports into the U.S. in a bid to support U.S. smelters, using “Section 301” of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose tariffs on approximately half of U.S. imports from China, and threatening to use Section 232 to impose tariffs reportedly up to 25% on U.S. imports of automobiles. The administration’s aggressive stance on trade has upended diplomatic relationships and prompted multinational companies to re-consider aspects of their global supply chains. It has also brought retaliation, including Chinese tariffs on most Chinese imports of U.S. goods. European countries and other U.S. allies affected by Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs have also retaliated with tariffs of their own against imports of U.S. goods, with many of the retaliatory tariffs targeting perceived politically important constituencies in the U.S., such as U.S. whisky distillers, who are heavily concentrated in the home state of Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. But Trump’s aggressive trade policies also began to deliver some successes in 2018, including a successful renegotiation of NAFTA, now renamed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), a renegotiated Korea-U.S. FTA, and at least some willingness by European and Japanese officials to discuss greater market access for U.S. products. While many major U.S. importers and trade associations have complained about the tariffs, the tariffs continue to draw support from several of the key constituency groups that they are intended to assist, such as the U.S. steel industry. While U.S. tariffs against imports from allies are seemingly driven largely by the Trump administration’s general protectionist bent, Trump’s trade actions against China reflect a broader set of concerns that is more widely supported by members of the United States congress and American experts outside of government. These include both longstanding U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and market access barriers, and growing U.S. geopolitical competition with China—what the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, refers to as the return of “great power competition.” These geopolitical concerns have been central to the administration’s recent aggressive efforts to block the deployment of Huawei telecommunications technologies in new “5G” mobile communications networks around the world, and in the administration’s increasingly vociferous opposition to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). And because of increased U.S.-China geopolitical competition, U.S. use of targeted trade controls, investment restrictions, potential targeted sanctions, and other measures against China, will likely continue even if, as is widely expected, Trump and President Xi reach a broad agreement on many trade issues in the coming months and reduce some of the tariffs that are currently in place.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

125. The Trump Impact on East Asia After Two Years

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Trade ties between the United States and many East Asian countries have faced a high degree of uncertainty since Donald Trump took office in early 2017. The world is now accustomed to an atmosphere of sanctions, tariffs, ultimatums, and negotiations under pressure with little left off the table. The centerpiece in this drama is, of course, Sino-U.S. relations. Much is written on that, and the saga of tense talks, occasional breakdowns, and upbeat statements continued as we were proceeding with our analyses of the East Asian region. Instead of trying to unravel where that might end, we concentrate on countries in the region neighboring China. We begin with the Trump economic impact on South Korea, turn then to Japan, switch next to Southeast Asia, and conclude with North Korea. In the first three cases, we identify various similarities as well as some differences, and with North Korea, burdened with “maximum pressure,” we find an outlier. South Korea has already cut a trade deal, Japan is now beginning negotiations for an agreement with the U.S., and the states of Southeast Asia, after Trump’s pullout from TPP and Japan’s leadership in keeping the momentum alive, are striving to hold onto multilateralism. Trump’s thinking is steeped in narrow notions of manufacturing trade deficits subsumed under the slogan “America First,” as well as updated alarm about unfair practices to coerce or steal intellectual property rights. He has rallied Americans with considerable international support behind the need to curb China’s predatory trade practices, while alienating virtually the entire world, including U.S. allies, with overcharged claims of “national security” in imposing tariffs to control imports of selected products, starting with steel and aluminum but threatening to make the sale of foreign-made cars and trucks the ultimate target for reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Concern prevails over what further damage Trump may do to the trade environment in East Asia. In Seoul, despite relief that what was most feared when Trump railed against the KORUS FTA did not come to pass, one hears warnings that Trump may extend barriers already imposed on washing machines and solar panels to automobiles—a large part of exports to the U.S. Just on the precipice of bilateral talks demanded by the U.S., Japan also nervously awaits pressure against its even more massive automobile exports. For Southeast Asian states, the prospect of bilateral negotiations with the U.S .is frightening as well, since it is understood that smaller economies have little leverage in such negotiations. The spillover for all of these countries from hefty U.S. tariffs on China is also feared, since they are deeply integrated into production chains.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Trade
Political Geography:
East Asia, North America, and United States of America

126. Innovation and National Security: Keeping Our Edge

Author:
Adam Segal
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The United States leads the world in innovation, research, and technology development. Since World War II, the new markets, industries, companies, and military capabilities that emerged from the country’s science and technology commitment have combined to make the United States the most secure and economically prosperous nation on earth. This seventy-year strength arose from the expansion of economic opportunities at home through substantial investments in education and infrastructure, unmatched innovation and talent ecosystems, and the opportunities and competition created by the opening of new markets and the global expansion of trade. It was also forged in the fire of threat: It was formed and tested in military conflicts from the Cold War to the war in Afghanistan, in technological leadership lost and regained during competition with Japan in the 1980s, and in the internal cultural conflicts over the role of scientists in aiding the Pentagon during the Vietnam War. Confronted with a threat to national security or economic competitiveness, the United States responded. So must it once again. This time there is no Sputnik satellite circling the earth to catalyze a response, but the United States faces a convergence of forces that equally threaten its economic and national security. First, the pace of innovation globally has accelerated, and it is more disruptive and transformative to industries, economies, and societies. Second, many advanced technologies necessary for national security are developed in the private sector by firms that design and build them via complex supply chains that span the globe; these technologies are then deployed in global markets. The capacities and vulnerabilities of the manufacturing base are far more complex than in previous eras, and the ability of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to control manufacturing-base activity using traditional policy means has been greatly reduced. Third, China, now the world’s second-largest economy, is both a U.S. economic partner and a strategic competitor, and it constitutes a different type of challenger.1 Tightly interconnected with the United States, China is launching government-led investments, increasing its numbers of science and engineering graduates, and mobilizing large pools of data and global technology companies in pursuit of ambitious economic and strategic goals. The United States has had a time-tested playbook for technological competition. It invests in basic research and development (R&D), making discoveries that radically change understanding of existing scientific concepts and serve as springs for later-stage development activities in private industry and government. It trains and nurtures science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent at home, and it attracts and retains the world’s best students and practitioners. It wins new markets abroad and links emerging technology ecosystems to domestic innovations through trade relationships and alliances. And it converts new technological advances into military capabilities faster than its potential adversaries Erosion in the country’s leadership in any of these steps that drive and diffuse technological advances would warrant a powerful reply. However, the United States faces a critical inflection point in all of them. There is a great deal of talk among policymakers, especially in the Defense Department, about the importance of innovation, but the rhetoric does not translate fast enough into changes that matter. The Task Force believes that the government and the private sector must undertake a comprehensive and urgent response to this challenge over the next five years. Failure to do so will mean a future in which other countries reap the lion’s share of the benefits of technological development, rivals strengthen their militaries and threaten U.S. security interests, and new innovation centers replace the United States as the source of original ideas and inspiration for the world.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

127. Understanding the Dispute over the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the Occupied Territories in the Context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

Author:
Oskar J. Chmiel
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
While the European Union (EU) does not recognize any legal Israeli sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, it does not grant preferential access to the EU market for goods produced in the Israeli settlements in this area, contrary to the preferential treatment for goods produced in Israel. This situation is different, however, as regards the United States (U.S.) trade policy, which does not make any distinction between goods pro- duced in Israel and in the Occupied Territories, since it grants the preferential access to both. Furthermore, the currently suspended negotiations of the super-regional trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), spurred the enacting of a law that set the principal negotiating objectives of the U.S. regarding commercial partner- ships, which included some provisions to discourage politically motivated economic actions against the State of Israel. As TTIP embraced the free trade agreement between the EU and the U.S., the EU differentiation policy could become problematic for the two partners, which despite the failure of the negotiations, revealed much about economic diplomacy. Conse- quently, this article attempts to show the different approaches adopted by the two trading powers, in order to deal with the dispute over the treatment of products exported to the EU from the Occupied Territories.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and North America

128. Breaking the Defense Barrier

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The key to strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to better meet regional threats is to increase defense trade and defense industrial cooperation between the two countries. A Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT), a formal agreement between two countries which exempts their trade in certain specified defense and defense-related articles from the arms export regulations of both nations, would be an important way to achieve that goal.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

129. Energy, Trade and Geopolitics In Asia: The Implications for Canada

Author:
Jeff Kucharski
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s growing interest in trade with countries in the Indo-Pacific region corresponds with an ominous growth in geopolitical instability and insecurity in that part of the globe. With Indo-Pacific hunger for oil expected to soar – especially in China, where demand will translate to 80 per cent of imports in 10 years – Canada needs to develop policies to deal with the region’s turbulent realities. The Indo-Pacific comprises countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and includes such unstable and unpredictable players as North Korea and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and long-simmering border tensions. India is an emerging economic and military rival to China. In the next 20 years, China and India are expected to lead the global demand for gas as coal consumption continues to decline, and Canada has a stake in this prosperous future. Along with territorial squabbles in the region, Canada will have to deal with complex issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, transnational crime, piracy and cyber-crime, as well as the struggle for global dominance between China and the U.S. One key area for potential conflict is China’s recent construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Canadian government’s new military strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged does little more than make a plea for peace and the rule of law in the South China Sea. However, more trade crosses the Pacific Ocean from Canada than crosses the Atlantic. And with Canada signing on to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the region’s troubles will need to be resolved by more than good intentions on paper. Canada must shift more diplomatic, security and military resources to the Indo- Pacific; otherwise, its efforts will be spread too thinly to be effective in the region. Trade, especially through a major route like the Strait of Malacca, could easily be disrupted by any one of a number of disputes, such as a conflict between China and Taiwan or if historic resentments boil over among competing territorial claimants in the region. Thus, Canada needs to step up and reaffirm its security commitments to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a partner in the region. Participating in maritime exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations would also help to reinforce to countries in the region the importance of abiding by international law. Meanwhile, Canada should set aside for now any intentions to negotiate a free trade agreement with China. China does not share some of Canada’s key trade and security goals and its aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas clearly signal that now is not the time to talk about a trade pact. China must demonstrate that it is willing to take a more cooperative approach to resolving trade and security issues in the Indo-Pacific and to support and respect the rule of law in the region. Canada has the potential to become a reliable, stable source of energy for Indo-Pacific countries. There is also an opportunity for provinces such as Alberta to strike their own strategic deals to provide energy resources to countries in that region, in return for trade and investment benefits. However, while investing at home in the necessary infrastructure and export capability to expand its role, Canada must also strive to bring its own unique approach to enhancing regional and energy security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

130. Canada’s Progressive Trade Agenda and a Free Trade Agreement with China: Are They Incompatible?

Author:
Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The “non-market” clause in the just-concluded update of NAFTA, now known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would appear to limit Canada’s options in terms of negotiating a free trade agreement with China at the present time (given the de facto U.S. veto over a Canada-China agreement that it provides), yet Prime Minister Trudeau has already reaffirmed Canada’s intention to pursue closer economic ties with China despite this apparent limitation. If negotiations proceed, negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with China will be very different from negotiating one with a country that shares Canada’s Western values. However, a trade agreement with China makes good economic sense, and while there are some unique obstacles to reaching such an agreement owing to differing views of progressive trade, these are not insurmountable. In fact, Canada can use the same models in negotiating with China that it has used with Western countries. Such an approach combines trade goals with respecting Chinese cultural and political differences, particularly those that fall into the category of progressivism. This category includes labour rights, Indigenous and gender issues, and governance. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has been focused on progressive elements in trade deals, while China has made it clear it is not interested in including them in any such pact. Concluding an agreement would mean that China and Canada must both recognize the political requirements and dynamics on the opposite side of the negotiating table, while seeking common ground diplomatically. Side agreements such as those that exist in the original NAFTA and in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are one way to work with the two countries’ differences. Many of the provisions in a side agreement are not binding and thus not subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism or trade sanctions. Instead, they are more aspirational and sometimes lay out a process for civil society groups to raise issues and help the thinking on those issues evolve, rather than simply holding the parties accountable for breaches. Canada is rightly concerned about Chinese stances on human rights, labour, environmental and gender issues. However, instead of including these issues in the main document on trade, they can be dealt with as shared interests between the two countries. Establishing separate but parallel mechanisms to deal with these issues would be a practical way to make progress. Focusing on micro, small and medium-sized businesses as one Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) did, could be another successful approach. Women own many of these businesses in developing countries, so such a focus would make a substantial contribution to their welfare. None of this means Canada should kowtow to China or look the other way on important values and issues. Side agreements and special focuses have formed parts of agreements with other countries that already share Canada’s Western values. This type of give-and-take is present even when Canada negotiates with countries that are not polar opposites. No country’s interests are exactly the same as those of any other and it’s unrealistic to expect unanimity on every issue. Language and firm commitments on progressive issues are still evolving in many of Canada’s free trade agreements, including the USMCA. It would be unreasonable to hope that everything can be achieved in an agreement with China on the first go-around. Rather, viewing a trade agreement with China as a work-in-progress means controversial elements can be brought into the negotiations and language used that reflects the understanding that these issues are evolving. It will require creative thinking, flexibility and joint commitment to find a solution, but—assuming that the USMCA does not rule out Canada-China negotiations toward a trade agreement— it should be possible to find sufficient common ground without having to resort to obfuscation and “creative ambiguity”.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, NAFTA, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America