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21. CTC Sentinel: April 2023 Issue

Author:
Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, Marcel Plichta, Paul Cruickshank, and Lucas Webber
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The late General Wayne A. Downing, a former distinguished chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, used to tell his colleagues at the Center, “Who thinks wins.” In this month’s feature article, Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta argue that smarter counterterrorism in the Sahel, and across sub-Saharan Africa, can pay big dividends for the United States on the field of great power competition. They write that “the United States is at a critical juncture as it looks to adapt its counterterrorism mission. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel region of Africa, where for the past decade, the United States has relied on France to serve as the counterterrorism lead. Those days are over, at least for now, and the United States is left attempting to balance its counterterrorism efforts in the frame of great power competition. However, too often these two strategic objectives are cast as zero-sum. In reality, U.S. counterterrorism in the Sahel, if appropriately reassessed, designed, and implemented, can generate real wins for the United States as it seeks to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Additionally, and most importantly, it can improve the prospects for stability and security for African states in desperate need of both.” Our interview is with two counterterrorism officials at the Catalan Police – Mossos d’Esquadra: Inspector Lluis Paradell Fernandez, head of the Central Analysis Unit, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Service, and Deputy Inspector Xavier Cortés Camacho, head of the Counterterrorism Central Area. They discuss lessons learned as a result of the 2017 Islamic State-inspired attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, the evolving threats Catalonia faces, and the importance of “a joined-up effort in working to prevent violent extremism.” Lucas Webber and Daniele Garofalo write that “the Islamic State’s leadership and central propaganda apparatus have been pushing to boost the Somalia branch’s profile, while pro-Islamic State-Somalia groups have been producing media content to help the movement’s message reach Somali, Amharic, Oromo, and Swahili speakers to boost fundraising, recruitment, and violent incitement efforts as well as to grow grassroot support in regions populated by these ethnolinguistic communities.” They argue that “these developments could have regional security implications if the Islamic State is able to strengthen the Somalia branch using these means. Bolstered transnational connections could enable violent incitement and attacks directed into neighboring countries.” Nodirbek Soliev examines digital terror financing by central Asian jihadis. He writes that “their online financing efforts tend to involve three stages. The first is the dissemination of fundraising propaganda and contacting prospective donors via online public accounts. The second is communication via encrypted messaging apps to identify a suitable mode of transaction and to provide security protocols. The third is the transaction itself. Understanding these mechanisms can help enhance relevant countries’ response strategies against terrorism financing risks.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Spain, North America, Somalia, Sahel, and United States of America

22. China’s Semiconductors Reflections on Sources and Solutions to an Expensive Problem

Author:
Jonathan Liebenau
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The semiconductor industry has been a renewed topic of political debate for over three years. Due to recent US sanctions on the most advanced semiconductors, the industry has quickly become another flashpoint in the competition between the US and China to dominate the 21st century’s strategic technologies. In this Strategic Update, Dr Jonathan Liebenau explains the development of the semiconductor industry in the context of China’s rise to become an increasingly capable technology power. China’s sustained efforts in industrial policy to cultivate a domestic innovation system coincided with Western firms’ offshoring strategies since the 1990s, transforming China into a large producer and consumer of semiconductors. While Taiwan and the West retained cutting edge chip design capabilities, Chinese firms such as Huawei and Hikvision have become competitive providers of mobile phones, surveillance equipment and related infrastructure services. Despite Washington and its partners’ conviction to constrain in China’s technological prowess, industrial policy initiatives such as the CHIPS Act will face an uphill battle when it comes to bringing manufacturing capacity back to Western economies. In this context, the UK must combine short term incentives with a longer-term strategic vision to remain competitive in one of the 21st century’s key strategic arenas.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. The Ripple Effect: A U.S. Diplomatic Strategy for a Changing World Order

Author:
Chester A Crocker and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine upended what policymakers thought they knew about the world and territorial military aggression. The ensuing war has brought destruction to Europe unlike anything since the Second World War. Regardless of how the war ends, several strategic trends, whether entirely new or preexisting and now reinforced, have set in a motion a new strategic environment in which the United States must compete. Ultimately, the new strategic environment is being defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency of middle powers and their importance in solving geopolitical problems rise in tandem. In the spring of 2023, ISD convened two New Global Commons/Schlesinger Strategic Surprise working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group identified key trends and potential strategic surprises emanating from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, honed in on the issues that would affect the strategic environment regardless of the war’s outcome, and put forth policy guidelines and recommendations for the United States as it seeks to navigate a more diverse geopolitical landscape in the coming years.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

24. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

25. Examining U.S. Relations With Authoritarian Countries

Author:
Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Feldman
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although U.S. President Joe Biden and his senior advisers have cast their foreign policy in terms of a global struggle between democracies and autocracies, they have pursued close relations with various authoritarian regimes in different parts of the world, including recent efforts to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. Many people in U.S. policy circles debate the wisdom of the administration’s trade-offs between its stated interest in supporting democracy globally versus countervailing interests that lead it to maintain close ties with some autocrats. But these debates are often confined to a few high-profile cases and rarely draw from a broader understanding of the overall landscape of U.S. relations with authoritarian regimes and the trajectory of such relations across recent decades. This paper seeks to provide such an understanding. Instead of justifying or vilifying U.S. efforts to get along with many authoritarian countries, this paper aims to anchor these debates in a stronger understanding of the ongoing realities of U.S. relations with these countries. It begins with an overview of U.S. relations with authoritarian countries from the presidency of Jimmy Carter through that of Donald Trump. This overview highlights the long pattern of a U.S. approach that is sharply divided between antagonistic relations with some autocratic regimes and a warm embrace of others, while noting some changes across administrations caused by evolving geopolitical paradigms and presidents’ differing personal predilections. The paper then draws on in-depth case research of U.S. relations with nearly sixty undemocratic countries—including their bilateral security ties, economic relations, and diplomatic contacts—to classify the relationships into four categories: 1) close partnerships, 2) adversarial relationships, 3) cooperative relations, and 4) cold, though not actively adversarial, relations. Through the analysis of these categories, the paper highlights the drivers and factors that shape the relationships in question. The United States funds democracy-related assistance programs directed at most undemocratic countries, and the paper analyzes the overall patterns of this aid. It examines both official U.S. democracy assistance and assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy, focusing on the differing amounts and types of aid directed toward countries in the four different categories. The paper reaches three overarching conclusions. First, Biden’s policy with regard to authoritarian countries represents, on the whole, more continuity with than change from most previous U.S. presidents, reflecting deep structures of interest that have shaped U.S. relations with these countries for decades. While the number of friendly and cooperative ties the United States maintains with undemocratic countries has remained relatively constant in recent years, the number and intensity of adversarial and cold relations are growing, primarily as a result of the heightened geostrategic competition between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China and Russia and their allies on the other. Second, security issues are the dominant driver of U.S. relations with authoritarian countries—for both positive and negative relations—and span a wide range of security concerns, including competition with China and Russia, terrorism, and regional instability. Economic interests—such as energy investments, critical minerals, arms sales, or ensuring U.S. market access—do play a role in spurring positive U.S. relations with some authoritarian states, but overall are far less important than security concerns. Democracy and human rights, or more specifically, problems with democracy and human rights, also shape U.S. relations with authoritarian countries but in complex and highly varied ways; they are a backburner issue in some cases, while they loom large in others. Third, the trends going forward appear to be mixed. With U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia tensions continuing to escalate, the United States will have more reasons to put aside its concerns about democracy and human rights in some authoritarian countries as it tries to convince them to move closer to its camp. It will also be motivated to turn a cold shoulder to other countries that align themselves with its rivals. Certain economic imperatives, such as the push to de-risk global supply chains and ensure access to critical minerals, will also create new incentives for friendlier ties with some authoritarian countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. NATO and strategic competition: Time for Allies to step up

Author:
Mark Webber
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
2022 was marked by the publication of a string of high-level strategy documents by the NATO allies: the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in the United States, the National Strategic Review in France, the Dutch Defense White Paper, and the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy. In January 2023, Estonia updated its National Security Concept. A refresh of the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review is due in the spring of 2023. Germany’s first post-Cold War National Security Strategy is expected to be published around the same time. These documents all share a preoccupation with what NATO’s own 2022 Strategic Concept has referred to as “rising strategic competition” in a “contested and unpredictable” world.1 This strategic convergence indicates a strengthening of solidarity in view of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Chinese efforts to extend its global footprint. How NATO responds over the long haul will be shaped by American priorities. The United States, former German Defense Minister, Christine Lambrecht, noted in January 2023, “may not be able to guarantee the defense of Europe to the extent that it used to” as it turned its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. “[W]e Europeans”, would in consequence, need to do more to generate “military strength”.2 This is not a fringe opinion. German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and French President, Emmanuel Macron, have argued essentially the same.3 Actions, of course, speak louder than words. This Policy Brief shows that European commitment is still lagging. In view of the urgency of the challenge, greater effort and prioritization are required.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Rachel E. Brooks, Taro Nishikawa, Ryohei Suzuki, Jonathon Marek, and Koutaka Yuichiro
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Pacific Forum, like the US government and much of the international security community, considers the information space a crucial theater in the United States’ ongoing great power competition with the People’s Republic of China and Russia. To meet the need for fresh policy ideas, as well as Pacific Forum’s long-standing mandate to train the next generation of policy professions in the US and its partners, we present to you this volume. In it, readers will find the finalists of our Young Professionals Essay Contest, as part of our ongoing program, The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation. Open to nationals of the two countries, the contest received numerous entries and the final decision was not an easy one—especially when comparing our finalists. On the Japanese side, Yuichiro Kotaka raises the threat posed by generative AI and poses solutions for how governments can address it, while Ryohei Suzuki suggests putting the public broadcaster NHK to use. On the US side, Jonathon Marek raises the alarm over the threat posed by authoritarian governments who have recognized disinformation as a valuable tool, while Thomas Ramage offers suggestion on how the alliance itself can address the threat that disinformation poses. However, our committee ultimately settled on two essays that stood out above the rest: on the Japanese side, Taro Nishikawa’s essay on counter-disinformation campaigns in the age of cognitive warfare was singled out for addressing the current discourse within China and for its focus on US-Japan responses. Among the American entries, Rachel Brooks’ take on how countering disinformation can be part of school curriculums received praise for its originality, creativity, and for providing both an educator’s narrative and an educator’s solution. We thank all of our contestants for their participation, and for contributing potential solutions in this age of information competition.
Topic:
International Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

30. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America