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1. US Pharma’s Financialized Business Model

Author:
William Lozonick, Matt Hopkins, Ken Jacobson, Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, and Öner Tulum
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Price gouging in the US pharmaceutical drug industry goes back more than three decades. In 1985 US Representative Henry Waxman, chair of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, accused the pharmaceutical industry of “gouging the American public” with “outrageous” price increases, driven by “greed on a massive scale.” Even in the wake of the many Congressional inquiries that have taken place since the 1980s, including one inspired by the extortionate prices that Gilead Sciences has placed on its Hepatitis-C drugs Sovaldi since 2013 and Harvoni since 2014, the US government has not seen fit to regulate drug prices. UK Prescription Price Regulation Scheme data for 1996 through 2010 show that, while drug prices in other advanced nations were close to the UK’s regulated prices, those in the United States were between 74 percent and 181 percent higher. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has produced abundant evidence that US drug prices are by far the highest in the world. The US pharmaceutical industry’s invariable response to demands for price regulation has been that it will kill innovation. US drug companies claim that they need higher prices than those that prevail elsewhere so that the extra profits can be used to augment R&D spending. The result, they contend, is more drug innovation that benefits the United States, and indeed the whole world. It is a compelling argument, until one looks at how major US pharmaceutical companies actually use the profits that high drug prices generate. In the name of “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV), pharmaceutical companies allocate the profits generated from high drug prices to massive repurchases, or buybacks, of their own corporate stock for the sole purpose of giving manipulative boosts to their stock prices. Incentivizing these buybacks is stock-based compensation that rewards senior executives for stock-price “performance.” Like no other sector, the pharmaceutical industry puts a spotlight on how the political economy of science is a matter of life and death. In this paper, we invoke “the theory of innovative enterprise” to explain how and why high drug prices restrict access to medicines and undermine medical innovation. An innovative enterprise seeks to develop a high-quality product that it can sell to the largest possible market at the most affordable price. In sharp contrast, the MSV-obsessed companies that dominate the US drug industry have become monopolies that restrict output and raise price. These companies need to be regulated.
Topic:
Finance, Business, Drugs, Innovation, Pharmaceuticals, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. The Value-Extracting CEO: How Executive Stock-Based Pay Undermines Investment in Productive Capabilities

Author:
William Lazonick
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The business corporation is the central economic institution in a modern economy. A company’s senior executives, with the advice and support of the board of directors, are responsible for the allocation of corporate resources to investments in productive capabilities. Senior executives also advise the board on the extent to which, given the need to invest in productive capabilities, the company can afford to make cash distributions to shareholders. Motivating corporate resource- allocation decisions are the modes of remuneration that incentivize and reward the top executives of these companies. A sound analysis of the operation and performance of a modern economy requires an understanding of not only how much these executives are paid but also the ways in which the prevailing system of executive pay influences their decisions to allocate corporate resources. In the United States since the last half of the 1980s the overriding goal of U.S. corporations has been to “maximize shareholder value,” with corporate performance measured by a company’s “total shareholder return”: percentage stock-price appreciation plus dividend yield. Also since the 1980s, the most important components of the total compensation of senior executives have been modes of stock-based pay in the forms of stock options and stock awards. This stock-based pay is structured to incentivize executives to make corporate allocation decisions that will boost the stock prices of the companies that employ them and reward them for achieving that objective. There are three drivers of stock prices: innovation, speculation, and manipulation. The first critical question that this paper addresses is which of these drivers, individually or in combination, contribute to a company’s stock-price performance. Then we can ask the second critical question: Does executive compensation reflect the success of the company in value creation, or the power of senior executives to engage in value extraction? The “value- extracting CEO” hypothesis posits that, in the United States, a significant portion of senior executive compensation rewards them for making decisions that foment speculation and manipulate stock prices, and thereby extract value for their own personal gain. In section four of the paper, I invoke the theory of innovative enterprise to support this hypothesis and debunk the dominant ideology that companies should be run to “maximize shareholder value.” Finally, I elaborate the policy implications for controlling the power of the value-extracting CEO, including a) banning stock buybacks, b) requiring executive compensation that rewards innovation rather than speculation and manipulation, and c) placing stakeholders representing households as taxpayers, workers, and consumers on boards of directors of publicly listed companies, along with shareholders who represent households as savers. An intellectual precondition for these reforms is the rejection of the ideology that companies should be run to maximize shareholder value, which means replacing agency theory with innovation theory as a mode of analyzing how the operation of an economy, supported by the strategies and structures of the business enterprises within it, can attain the objectives of stable and equitable economic growth.
Topic:
Leadership, Investment, Corporations, Redistribution, Stock Markets, and Wage Growth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. The Mismeasure of Mammon: Uses and Abuses of Executive Pay Data

Author:
Matt Hopkins and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
On April 7, 2016, the Wall Street Journal ran an article headlined “CEO pay shrank most since financial crisis,” while on May 27, 2016, a similar New York Times story declared “Top CEO pay fell – yes, fell – in 2015.” Unfortunately, both the Journal and the Times mismeasured the actual take-home pay of each and every one of these CEOs in 2014 and 2015. The reason for this mismeasure is that both articles relied on “fair value” estimates of the stock-based pay of these CEOs as reported in the Summary Compensation Table of the definitive proxy statement (Form DEF 14A) that each publicly listed company files annually with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Yet the very same proxy statements also report the actual realized gains of these CEOs in the Option Exercises and Stock Vested Table. It is the realized gains on stock-based pay, not fair-value estimates, that enter into the total compensation that a CEO actually takes home and reports as income in his or her income-tax return. Moreover, including actual realized gains instead of estimated fair value of stock– based pay in the measure of total executive compensation can make a big difference. In 2014 average total compensation of the 500 highest-paid executives named on corporate proxy statements based on actual realized gains was $34.3 million, with 81 percent coming from stock-based pay. But average total compensation of the 500 highest paid based on estimated fair value was $19.3 million, with 62 percent attributable to stock- based pay. The excess of total actual realized-gains compensation over total estimated fair-value compensation was greatest in those years when the stock market was booming. Why would the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times report estimates of executive pay when they could be reporting the CEOs’ actual pay? In this paper, we answer this question by explaining the origins of the “fair value” estimates of stock-based pay and how the obsession with these estimates by the SEC, relying on the business-run Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), has relegated to statistical obscurity executives’ readily available, accurate, and actual realized gains from stock-based pay. We use Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database to document that a) stock-based pay, in the forms of realized gains from stock options and stock awards, dominates both the size of and the changes over time in the total compensation of the highest-paid senior executives; and b) the fair-value estimates of stock-based pay tend to understate, often substantially, the realized gains from stock-based pay that these executives actually receive. An irony is that even critics of excessive executive pay, most notably the AFL-CIO on its Executive Paywatch website, use the fair-value estimates when the actual CEO compensation numbers would reveal a much larger ratio of CEO pay to the earnings of the average worker. Indeed, as we discuss in the conclusion to this paper, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, this mismeasure of executive pay has become institutionalized in U.S. government policy in the SEC’s Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule, which beginning in 2017 requires every company to publish the ratio of CEO to median-worker pay. Under this rule, the SEC requires companies to use the fair-value measure of CEO pay. The Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule is supposed to provide the public with a company-level indicator of income inequality. Instead it will tend to underestimate inequality, substituting fictitious estimates for actual known amounts of income that CEOs put into their bank accounts and declare in their income-tax returns.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Inequality, Income Inequality, Stock Markets, and Wage Growth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy and Transmission to Emerging Market Economies

Author:
David Bowman, Juan M. Londono, and Horacio Sapriza
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We investigate the effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policies on sovereign yields, foreign exchange rates, and stock prices in emerging market economies (EMEs), and we analyze how these effects depend on country-specifc characteristics. We find that, although EME asset prices, mainly those of sovereign bonds, responded strongly to unconventional monetary policy announcements, these responses were not outsized with respect to a model that takes into account each country's time-varying vulnerability to U.S. interest rates affected by monetary policy shocks.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, Foreign Exchange, Markets, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy, Interest Rates, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Returns to Active Management: The Case of Hedge Funds

Author:
Maziar Kazemi and Ergys Islamaj
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Do more active hedge fund managers generate higher returns than their less active peers? We attempt to answer this question. Using Kalman Filter techniques, we estimate the risk exposure dynamics of a large sample of live and dead equity long-short hedge funds. These estimates are then used to develop a measure of activeness for each hedge fund. Our results show that there exists a nonlinear relationship between activeness and performance. Using raw returns as a measure of performance, it is found that more active funds outperform the less active ones. However, when risk adjusted returns are used to measure performance, we find the opposite results; that is, activeness is inversely related to returns. Still, we find that a few very active managers outperform the moderately active funds and generate higher returns. We conclude that the most active managers use their skills to manage the riskiness of their portfolios and are, therefore, able to provide higher risk adjusted returns. Finally, we find that compared to the least active managers, the most active managers are less homogeneous and, therefore, due diligence is far more important when selecting an active manager.
Topic:
Markets, Risk, Business Management, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. On Returns Differentials

Author:
Stephanie E. Curcuru, Charles Thomas, and Francis E. Warnock
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Estimates of U.S. returns differentials have ranged from exorbitant to quite small, in part because of their volatility coupled with the relatively short time series available. We shed light on underlying drivers of returns differentials by presenting a number of decompositions: a by-asset-class decomposition into yields and capital gains, the Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) composition and return effects, and further decompositions of capital gains that focus on exchange rate effects. While each decomposition informs thinking about returns differentials, one constant is evident throughout: to date the existing differential favoring the U.S. has owed primarily to one factor, a differential in direct investment yields. We discuss how our analysis informs the income puzzle (of positive net income flows to the U.S. even as its net international investment position is negative and substantial) and the position puzzle (of a sizeable gap between the reported U.S. net international position and cumulated current account deficits), provide an initial assessment of the literature on the dynamics of returns differentials, and present a framework to guide a forward-looking view of how returns differentials might evolve in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Markets, Investment, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. "Fool Me Once . . . " Did U.S. Investors Play it Safer in the European Debt Crisis?

Author:
Carol C. Bertaut, Fang Cai, and Nyssa Kim
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper examines U.S. investors' portfolio investment patterns since the global financial crisis, particularly since the European debt crisis that began in late 2009. The global financial crisis during 2007-2009 was accompanied by an increase in U.S. investors' home bias. U.S. investors experienced significant valuation losses and pulled back notably from their foreign investment, especially from foreign debt. In contrast, while they have also incurred sizable losses on cross-border investment during the European debt crisis, U.S. investors so far have not shown any increase in home bias, and they have not even pulled back from their long-term investments in Europe. Holdings data show that U.S. investors have continued to invest in European securities, particularly in government debt, but have made little new investment in the financial sector. This continued interest in European securities could owe to the fact that most of U.S. holdings of European debt have been concentrated in dollar-denominated debt issued by core euro area countries and the United Kingdom, which are deemed relatively safe. Changes in the composition of holdings over the past couple years suggest that U.S. investors have behaved in a way that reflects their diversity and differing objectives: while investors reached for higher yields in government debt, there also appears to be some shift toward safer investment in the financial sector.
Topic:
Debt, Financial Crisis, Investment, Securities, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

8. U.S. International Equity Investment and Past Prospective Returns

Author:
Stephanie E. Curcuru, Charles Thomas, Francis E. Warnock, and Jon Wongswan
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Counter to extant stylized facts, using newly available data on country allocations in U.S. investors' foreign equity portfolios we find that (i) U.S. investors do not exhibit returns-chasing behavior, but, consistent with partial portfolio rebalancing, tend to sell past winners; and (ii) U.S. investors increase portfolio weights on a country's equity market just prior to its strong performance, behavior inconsistent with an informational disadvantage. Over the past two decades, U.S. investors' foreign equity portfolios outperformed a value-weighted foreign benchmark by 160 basis points per year.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, Investment, Stock Markets, and Equity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America