131. War in Europe: preliminary lessons
- Author:
- Thierry Tardy
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day, the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades. Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the exception of part of the Donbas). For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has displayed a political unity that was admittedly lacking in recent years prior. The United States has demonstrated unequivocal commitment to the defence of Europe, while European Allies have shown both political resolve and a will to take defence spending seriously. Very little dissent or freeriding has occurred in the West. Solidarity with Ukraine has been optimal, both politically and through the delivery of weapons. Still, Allied support is constrained by the imperative of non-belligerence. NATO Allies have made it clear upfront that they have no desire to directly confront Russia, hence the rejection of a no-fly-zone or any other move carrying the risk of inadvertent escalation. That said, NATO has deployed part of its NATO Response Force and activated its defence plans. Allies have strengthened their presence in each of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) four existing battlegroups, and committed to the deployment of four additional battlegroups in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. 40,000 troops are officially deployed under direct NATO command on the Eastern flank as of the beginning of April, together with ships and air assets. Most importantly, the US has staged a comeback in Europe, with an overall deployment of 100,000 troops, among which approximately 20,000 have deployed since the beginning of 2022. The European Union (EU) too has acted swiftly, most notably through the imposition of sanctions on Russia in lockstep with US and UK sanctions. The EU has also flexed its muscle through the newly created European Peace Facility (EPF), which has delivered three instalments of EUR 500 million to finance the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. At the time of writing, EU states had not taken the decision to extend sanctions to oil and gas imports from Russia, unlike the US and the UK. If such a decision is taken, this would lead to a major energy crisis – and therefore economic crisis – in the whole of Europe. The war, then, raises a series of questions about the current and future European security order. First, will Western unity endure over time? What are the risks that the US or some European states will defect once the initial shock of the invasion has faded, once sanctions begin harming European economies, once the possibility of a re-engagement with Russia is floated, or once the Indo-Pacific inevitably regains US attention? Second, how will the war impact European security institutions – most notably NATO and the EU – and to what extent will the current situation positively shape the partnership between the two? Third, how resilient will Europe be in the face of a possible energy crisis provoked by the cessation of oil and gas deliveries from Russia? Fourth, from a military perspective, what lessons can be drawn from the first months of the Russian offensive regarding both Russia’s capacity (or incapacity) as a first-tier military power and in the changing (or unchanging) character of modern war? Finally, what initial lessons should we draw regarding nuclear deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to dissuade harmful Russian nuclear-related actions? This collective Research Paper, authored by NDC Researchers and the NDC Commandant, explores these questions directly, identifying some preliminary lessons from the war. In the first chapter, Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann looks at the war’s potential impact on the distribution of tasks between NATO and the EU. The second chapter, written by Thierry Tardy, examines NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression and outlines implications for both the EU and for NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. The third chapter, co-authored by Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy, analyses Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian battlefield and draws early conclusions about Russian military power. Fourth, Marc Ozawa explores the war’s impact on European energy security and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Finally, Cynthia Salloum assesses how the crisis questions the very concept of deterrence and Allies’ ability to deter the Putin regime. This Research Paper is published alongside a series of related events and publications (notably in the Policy Brief series) that the NATO Defense College Research Division has organized in relation to the ongoing revision of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. To that end, it arrives in tandem with an adjacent NDC study on the strategic shifts impacting NATO’s core tasks and in anticipation of a multi-authored analysis (to be released in September 2022) of the forthcoming Madrid Strategic Concept.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America