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71. Getting Real on Sanctions Is Key to Pressuring North Korea

Author:
Melanie Hart and Renee Ding
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea appears to shift back and forth between saber rattling and hints of diplomacy—with leading administration officials at times sending contradictory signals—it is clear that the administration needs an overarching strategy for addressing the North Korean threat. That strategy must include a tough, smart, and carefully targeted sanctions offensive. However, given President Donald Trump’s fiery exchanges with Kim Jong Un, and the drumbeat of White House statements and media opinion pieces discussing potentially imminent military action, one can be forgiven for having the impression that the United States has already run its best sanction plays against North Korea. In reality, that effort has only just begun, and if the United States can stay the course, it has the potential to turn this crisis around. Chinese diplomats often claim that it is pointless for China to cut off its economic ties with North Korea because Kim Jong Un would rather let his people starve than give up his nuclear program.1 They give an impression that there is no middle ground: If China pushes North Korea economically, the regime will resist until it collapses, triggering a massive security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.2 There is an equal amount of hand-wringing on the U.S. side. American observers tend to view the past decade of apparently ineffective U.N. action as evidence that sanctions are a dead end and military action will eventually become inevitable. In truth, there is a middle road on sanctions and it runs in two directions: through China and through North Korea’s gateways to the international financial system. The reality is that North Korea is much more exposed than many observers recognize, and the United States has only just begun to target the regime’s biggest weak spots. Instead of blowing hot and cold with China and exchanging blustery rhetoric with North Korea—two approaches that give China maneuvering room to avoid action—the United States needs to double down on a strategy that deals an economic blow against North Korea on par with the blow that brought Iran to the negotiation table in 2013.3
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

72. Allies Against Atrocities: The Imperative for Transatlantic Cooperation to Prevent and Stop Mass Killings

Author:
Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
A generation after Rwanda and Bosnia, many of the world powers who apologized for their lack of an early and effective response to genocide during the 1990s have yet to organize themselves sufficiently to act early and effectively to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The horror of Syria is Exhibit A. As responses to past atrocity crimes show, averting and halting atrocities requires a coordinated and sustained effort by local, regional, and international actors. This report argues that a multilateral response is necessary and that the transatlantic region has a critical role to play in shaping and leading these efforts. The governments of the transatlantic community—the United States, Canada, and Europe—already devote significant resources and political capital to the prevention and amelioration of crises and conflicts, as well as to the pursuit of international development agendas. Without better cooperation among themselves and their like-minded cousins, efforts to address mass atrocities will continue to be reactive, slow, and devastating to human life and potential. Individual transatlantic countries should be involved in those efforts, each bringing its unique capacities to the table. From the vantage point of the report's authors, the United States has a particularly important role to play in encouraging greater transatlantic cooperation among states on this issue. Principle Recommendations: Devise and implement coordinated transatlantic atrocity prevention efforts Internationalize atrocity prevention efforts Improve coordination of financial sanctions Develop an international legal framework adequate to the challenge of atrocity prevention Prioritize civilian protection in military responses that include peacekeeping
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sanctions, Peacekeeping, Civilians, Atrocities, Transatlantic Relations, Atrocity Prevention, and Protection
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

73. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
James Walsh
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

74. Intro | Establishing Triangular Talks Among Washington, Beijing, and Seoul

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Of five alternative approaches to addressing the North Korean threat to stability in East Asia and beyond, this section is concerned with the possibility of just one—a diplomatic approach via Three-Way Talks among China, South Korea, and the United States. We single out this approach as the golden mean for reconciling the conflicting interests among the parties best positioned to reshape the calculus of Pyongyang. It represents the path to compromise. Among the alternatives, there is the Chinese appeal for a dual-track approach through Six-Party Talks, aimed at a peace treaty on terms attractive to North Korea and greatly transformative to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. This could hardly be called a compromise, since Seoul and Washington regard this as a win for Pyongyang and evidence that Beijing actually has been siding with Pyongyang. Another alternative is Strategic Patience, which is a misnomer for the policy of the Obama administration, but, in any case, refers mainly to reliance on increased deterrence as pressure is ratcheted up. In fact, Obama was seeking a pathway to three-way talks, giving China time to shift in that direction bolstered by new sanctions, while in 2016 also moving closer to a fourth approach: Unilateral Sanctions targeted at the Chinese firms assisting North Korea. A fifth option is Alliance Triangularity to force change in Pyongyang.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

75. Calling a Spade a Spade: Canada's Use of Sanctions

Author:
Andrea Charron and Paul Aseltine
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s use of sanctions is little studied which means the full scope and effect of this tool are not appreciated. Until 2006, Canada applied sanctions in support of the United Nations almost exclusively. Since then, Canada has also applied discretionary sanctions in support of allies such as the European Union and United States’ measures in addition to those required by the UN Security Council. Lacking extraterritorial reach and with this new tendency to layer sanctions (applying UN and additional measures) requires the navigation of multiple pieces of Canadian legislation. Banks and private companies, which are largely responsible for giving effect to Canada’s sanctions, must navigate this legislation. This has ensnared a few Canadians in the process with little evidence that Canada’s application of sanctions is compelling its targets (people, companies, and states) to change their behaviour. Canada’s application of sanctions is a signal of its desire to support multilateral, collective security efforts – nothing more or less.
Topic:
United Nations, Sanctions, European Union, and Banks
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

76. Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU

Author:
Inken von Borzyskowski and Clara Portelia
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG)
Abstract:
When a country is sanctioned for violating international rules today, it is usually targeted by several different entities. The degree to which sanctions by different senders overlap remains a largely unexplored phenomenon. In this paper, we examine the extent of sanctions cooperation, i.e. joint action among major sanctions senders (the US, the EU, and regional organizations) against identical targets. We then map regional patterns and evaluate one potential explanation for them. Our analysis leads to three major findings. First, sanctions overlap is predominant and has consistently increased over the last three decades. Twothirds of sanctions involve more than a single sender. Targets today are usually subject to punishment by at least three different sanctions senders (up from one in 1980) and sometimes up to six different senders. Second, world regions vary widely in the extent of sanctions cooperation, the profile of sanctions senders, and their interactions. Third, to explain variation in sanctions cooperation, we find that hegemonic stability theory does not provide much leverage. We conclude by outlining avenues for future research on sanctions cooperation relating to sanctions onset and effectiveness.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America

77. Cuba-US Relations: Normalization and its Challenges

Author:
Margaret Crahan, Soraya M. Castro-Mariño, William M. LeoGrande, Soraya M. Castro-Mariño, Jorge I. Domínguez, Claudia Marín Suárez, Susan Eckstein, Jesús Arboleya Cervera, Margaret Crahan, Alberto R. Coll, Geoff Thale, Bárbara Garea Moreda, Ramón Pichs Madruga, Julia Sagebien, Eric Leenson, Robert L. Bach, Ashley Miller, Ted Piccone, Carlos Ciaño Zanetti, Mike Kopetski, John H. Coatsworth, Philip Brenner, and Colleen Scribner
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies at Columbia University
Abstract:
This volume is a result of the dialogue between experts on Cuba-U.S. relations initiated by the Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional of the Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (CIPI/ISRI). Aimed at bringing together scholars and policymakers, among others, with expertise on the topic, the annual meetings in Havana have for years stimulated in-depth discussions by participants primarily from Cuba, the United States, and Latin America. The exchanges represent a wide range of perspectives and even of vocabularies. For example, the Cubans use the word blockade when referring to the U.S. embargo of the island and tend to hear “regime change” when U.S. officials refer to “democracy promotion”. In one respect there has been considerable consensus—that U.S. policy toward Cuba since the 1960s was a failed policy as the Obama administration eventually concluded and many experts have argued. The 2014 annual CIPI/ISRI meeting was in full swing on December 17, 2014 when rumors began to circulate that President Raúl Castro and President Barack Obama were going to make statements at mid-day concerning Cuba-U.S. relations. Tension mounted and at noon there was standing room only in the conference auditorium as the two Presidents announced on TV their commitment to the normalization of relations that had been ruptured in 1961. The room erupted in cheers, sobs, and the singing of the Cuban and U.S. national anthems. The experts were shocked. In panel after panel during the previous two days, they had speculated that there might be some relaxation of tensions, but no one predicted the initiation of a move toward normalization and the resumption of formal diplomatic relations. In the midst of the celebration Wayne Smith, who as a young Foreign Service officer had been tasked with closing the U.S. embassy in Havana in 1961, entered the auditorium and soon chants of “WAYNE—WAYNE” echoed throughout and he was pushed forward and asked to speak. Wayne had been honored the night before for his work to resolve U.S.-Cuban conflicts beginning when he resigned as the Chief of the US Interest Section in 1982 over differences with the Reagan administration’s policies toward Cuba. From that time forward he fought for a reconceptualization of U.S. policy toward Cuba as a scholar-advocate. Wayne simply said that the night before December 17, 2014 he had prayed that normalization would occur before he died and that his prayers had been answered. The moment catalyzed what many conference participants were feeling—a sense that after more than fifty years of hostilities the long road toward normalization could begin. It is the objective of this book to analyze the first two years of the process toward normalization of Cuba-U.S. relations from December 17, 2014 to January 2017. The majority of the chapters are revised and updated versions of papers presented at the 2015 CIPI/ISRI conference. A few of the chapters were commissioned afterwards to cover such topics as sanctions and claims. This volume does not attempt to modify the opinions or conclusions of the authors. Rather it lets the differences stand in an effort to better comprehend what has kept the two neighboring countries apart for so long and the nature of the challenges facing the process toward normalization. The authors analyze the causes of over fifty years of hostile relations interspersed with fitful negotiations that were marked by lack of trust, misperceptions, and miscues, as well as the challenges the process toward normalization currently faces. Since D17 (December 17, 2014) a bilateral Cuba-U.S. commission has been established, as well as technical working groups, in order to devise new agreements and stimulate the unravelling of the substantial accumulation of laws, regulations, and directives in both countries that have slowed the process toward normalization. Progress in introducing new regulations and directives has been slow and arduous. While some advances have been made particularly in terms of easing restrictions on travel to Cuba, as well as encouraging commerce and communications, much remains to be done. In addition, major impediments exist—the principal one being the U.S. embargo/blockade of Cuba which requires action by the U.S. Congress to remove. There are also major issues relating to U.S. preferential treatment of Cuban immigrants, continuing U.S. sanctions, as well as legal claims by both parties for expropriated properties and damages. The identification of mutual interests and agreements to cooperate has been apparent in Cuba-U.S. exchanges on security and environmental issues, among others. Both the Cuban and U.S. negotiators have admitted over the last two years that the process is difficult. Among the challenges are developing a common vocabulary regarding issues of sovereignty. Other questions are related to the direction of each country’s foreign policy particularly given domestic developments in both countries, for example, the level of political and ideological polarization in the United States and the actions that President Donald Trump and a Republican Congress might take beginning in January 2017. Add to this the stated intention President Raúl Castro to end his term as head of state in early 2018 and unknowns abound.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diaspora, Bilateral Relations, Immigration, Sanctions, Regional Integration, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Cuba, Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

78. Full Issue: Money & War

Author:
Sarah Detzner, James Copnall, Alex de Waal, Ian M. Ralby, Joshua Stanton, Ibrahim Warde, Leon Whyte, Richard Weitz, Jessica Knight, John H. Maurer, Alexander Tabarrok, Alex Nowrasteh, Tom Keatinge, Emily Knowles, Karolina MacLachlan, Andrew Lebovich, Caroline Troein, and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Fletcher Security Review: Managed and edited by students at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, we build on the Fletcher School’s strong traditions of combining scholarship with practice, fostering close interdisciplinary collaboration, and acting as a vehicle for groundbreaking discussion of international security. We believe that by leveraging these strengths – seeking input from established and up-and-coming scholars, practitioners, and analysts from around the world on topics deserving of greater attention – we can promote genuinely unique ways of looking at the future of security. Each issue of the Review is centered around a broad theme – in this issue, we tackle “Money & War.” Money influences every aspect of warfare, conventional or unconventional. No nationstate military, insurgent group, terrorist network, trans-national criminal organization, or hybrid actor can be understood, or countered, without knowing where the money is coming from – as well as where, and how, it gets spent. Evolutions and revolutions in financial tools and practices quickly translate to transformations in military affairs, and some cases, vice versa.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Governance, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Finance, Islamic State, Navy, Arab Spring, Maritime, Conflict, Multilateralism, Islamism, Drugs, and Currency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, China, Iran, Sudan, Darfur, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, Mali, Asia-Pacific, Sahel, United States of America, and North America

79. Weak Sanctions Breathe Life Into North Korean Defiance of International Community: FSR Interviews Joshua Stanton

Author:
Joshua Stanton
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington, D.C., has advised the House Foreign Affairs Committee on North Korea-related legislation, including the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, and blogs at OneFreeKorea. His article, "North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions", a legal analysis of North Korean sanctions, refuted the idea that there is nothing left that the world community can do to bring them to the negotiating table. In this interview, he expands further on this idea addressing why people think that nothing more can be done and how the Iranian nuclear deal will affect relation with North Korea. The views expressed are solely his own.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

80. North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions

Author:
Joshua Stanton
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
On December 19, 2014, President Obama publicly blamed North Korea for the cyberattack against Sony Pictures and for the subsequent cyberterrorism against the American people, and promised to "respond proportionally." Almost immediately thereafter, one could hear a familiar narrative repeated, typified by New York Times correspondent David Sanger, who wrote that "North Korea is under so many sanctions already that adding more seems futile." One could have heard similar arguments in 2006, after North Korea's first nuclear test, and in 2013, after its third nuclear test. A variation of this argument is that “Washington … can do little ... without the cooperation of China.” ​ For years, journalists have quoted “experts” who insisted that U.S. sanctions options against North Korea were exhausted and had failed as an instrument of policy. As a matter of both fact and law, however, that is false; it even suggests that these experts have not read and understood the sanctions authorities. Why does this view persist, then? Some scholars may accept and propagate it because they oppose sanctions as a matter of policy. Others have simply ceased to question a myth that has entered the received wisdom. A true understanding of the potential effectiveness of sanctions first requires an understanding of what these sanctions are, what they are not, and how they work. This article will first summarize the sanctions authorities – U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the U.S. sanctions that should be an important part of the effective enforcement of the measures that the U.N. Security Council has adopted. It will also explain the role of the Treasury Department in regulating the international financial system, and the power this gives the United States to isolate the North Korean government from that system. It will explain which U.S. and U.N. sanctions against North Korea have succeeded and failed, and why. Finally, it will explain what current U.S. national sanctions do, and what they do not do. Only after one understands how little the current sanctions do – and how much they could do – can one begin to understand how to strengthen them into an effective part of a coherent foreign policy... ​
Topic:
Science and Technology, United Nations, Sanctions, Cybersecurity, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America