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22. Buy Before You Build: A Decision Framework for Purchasing Commercial Space Services
- Author:
- Peter Cunniffe, Megan Lewis, and Bryan Clark
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- A recent wave of private investment in space creates new opportunities for government agencies to benefit from commercial innovation. Leaders of national security space acquisition organizations regularly express their intention to first buy commercial space capabilities and build government space systems only when they must.1 However, achieving greater use of commercial space services requires overcoming barriers that have thus far prevented the government from fully benefiting from private sector funding and creativity. This report assesses the increasingly wide range of commercial space services available to government agencies, identifies obstacles hindering greater use by the US government, and makes recommendations for overcoming them.2 While the report focuses on the US government use of commercial space services, its analysis and recommendations are relevant for governments of other space-faring nations.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Space, and Investment
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
23. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China
- Author:
- Michael Roberts
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
24. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
25. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses
- Author:
- Ellen Bork
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
26. Avoid a Sequester and Fully Fund a Preeminent Military
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Kennedy Lee
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In early summer 2023, President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling and avert a government default. While compromise is necessary, the deal included caps on overall spending at fiscal 2022 levels and made no exception for national defense. The United States is in the beginning of a tumultuous time: a new cold war with China and Russia. Washington ought to be moving with a great sense of urgency and national purpose to rebuild its defense industrial base (DIB), modernize its nuclear forces to meet the dynamic threats, grow the US Navy, and upgrade critical space systems, among other things. The caps on military spending undermine America’s ability to support its immediate interests in Ukraine and limit its capacity to deter future aggression and expansion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), further violence by China’s junior partner Russia, and rogue action by the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. The debt deal caps US military spending at $886 billion, which may initially appear to be a raise, but effectively flattens the Pentagon budget over the next two years. The dollar amount is 3.2 percent higher than last year’s request and will rise by 1 percent next year for a total of $895 billion in fiscal year 2025. But when accounting for inflation, the cap amounts to a significant cut in real terms over last year’s budget. The projected figures suggest that US defense spending could fall below 3 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since the 1990s’ “peace dividend.” The budget that the Pentagon submitted for this year should be $23 billion higher just to keep pace with the current rate of inflation. This is before factoring in the budget increases necessary to keep up with the evolving threat environment, including an ongoing land war in Europe and a Chinese Communist Party with revanchist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Raising the stakes, the deal also included a provision that triggers an automatic sequester against the budget, including the military: an indiscriminate 1 percent cut if the House and Senate fail to pass 12 annual spending bills by midnight on New Year’s Eve. The military has only now begun to recover from the effects of the sequester that occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Another one now, at a time of acute and immediate threats from multiple adversaries, could have catastrophic effects. Congress would be wise either to urgently amend the bill or to prioritize the imperative of avoiding a second sequester over all other political matters. Then Congress should pass supplemental funding measures to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) has the resources it needs to address the significant shortfalls that already exist and that the Obama-era sequestration only exacerbated.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Military Spending, and Military
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
27. The Future of Civilians in National Security: Challenges and Opportunities
- Author:
- Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Celina Pouchet
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Imagine you’re a high-achieving college student, interested in serving in a national security role in the federal government. You invest years in learning a critical language—perhaps of an ally, perhaps of an adversary—a language for which the federal government has a high demand and a limited workforce. You’re selected for not one, but two prestigious overseas government-sponsored fellowships and are encouraged to participate in both. After returning to the States, you move to Washington, D.C., to pursue a graduate degree at a competitive policy school. You apply for opportunities to serve in a national security position. But because you had fellowships abroad—administered by the federal government—the hiring process takes more than two years.CNAS Focus Group, March 11, 2022.1 The national security workforce is full of stories like this one—which is the experience of someone who successfully navigated into the system. Many others decide not to pursue government service in the first place, whether because they believe the option isn’t open to them, or because the hiring process is so onerous that they lose interest or pursue more readily available options. To meet the challenge of protecting the country and its national interests, the federal government must attract, recruit, and retain experienced, educated individuals with skills specific to national security, including foreign language proficiency, regional knowledge, legal expertise, or a background in engineering, computer science, or data analytics. It also needs people who can lead, manage, and communicate. Fortunately, there are highly motivated Americans—from undergraduate college students through senior-level professionals—who are developing the education, experience, and credentials required for work in national security departments and agencies. This population has a strong interest in serving the country even as other opportunities present themselves. But challenges such as opaque hiring practices, long clearance processes, and limited access to professional networks hinder people’s chances at employment in the federal government. As a result, the government is unable to fill critical national security roles, while individuals with the necessary skill sets and desire to serve are sidelined from a federal career. To attract, recruit, and retain those with the required qualifications and interests, departments and agencies must understand the motivations of the next generation and the challenges they face when seeking government careers in national security. As part of this project, CNAS researchers organized focus groups and conducted a survey to identify the motivations, priorities, and skill sets of those interested in government service, along with the challenges, barriers, and opportunities in taking this path. The project examines the current civilian national security talent pipeline and explores the problems associated with the recruitment and retention of civil servants in national security departments and agencies. What did we find? Improvements to the federal hiring process and the clearance timeline, greater access to talent beyond Washington, D.C., and expansion of initial pathways into government service could ensure that the federal government has the employees it needs to secure the nation. These improvements require action from the executive branch and Congress.
- Topic:
- National Security, Employment, Public Service, and Skills
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
28. The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism
- Author:
- Don Rassler
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- The past several years have been a period of transition for the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise. During this time, the United States has had to navigate, and adapt U.S. CT posture and approaches to, a shift in U.S. national security priorities; a complex, diverse, and ever-evolving threat landscape; and ongoing technological change that is transforming the worlds of extremism, terrorism, and counterterrorism. In addition, the United States has simultaneously been working to define what the next chapter of U.S. counterterrorism should look like and how the U.S. CT community needs to evolve so it can anticipate, understand, and respond to the varied threats it will face in the years ahead. To help drive change, the United States should frame the counterterrorism moment it finds itself as the compound era of U.S. CT. This new era is being shaped by three primary characteristics: multiple priorities; a broad range of threats, including mixed ones; and a more diverse CT landscape. How well the United States responds to and adapts to the change and challenges that are occurring across these three areas will have an important bearing on the future effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism. This report outlines characteristics that define the compound era of U.S. CT and the utility associated with this framing. The body of the report then explores some of the key trends and factors that have been impacting and driving change across the extremism, terrorism, and CT landscapes. The report also discusses some of the implications of these trends and outlines 11 priorities that can help guide the U.S. counterterrorism community’s evolution during this new era.
- Topic:
- National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
29. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?
- Author:
- Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America
30. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America