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Begin New Search Topic Missile Defense Political Geography North America

11. Masterpiece Theater: Missed Opportunities for Missile Defense in the 2020 Budget

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Just over a year ago, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan announced that the 2020 defense budget would be the “masterpiece” that would finally align Pentagon spending with the new direction of the National Defense Strategy.1 The release of the new budget follows the January 2019 release of the Missile Defense Review, which laid out the administration’s vision of how U.S. missile defense policy, programs, and posture should be adapted to contend with more challenging missile threats in an era of great power competition.2 At the review’s release, President Trump declared the “beginning of a new era in our missile defense program,” setting a goal to “detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States—anywhere, anytime, anyplace.”3 Unfortunately, neither the modest language of the Missile Defense Review nor the activities and funding levels in the proposed 2020 budget come anywhere close to achieving that goal. They specifically lack the programmatic and budgetary muscle movements to contribute meaningfully to overall U.S. deterrence and defense goals in relation to Russia and China. The Missile Defense Review nominally widens the scope of missile defense policy from a focus on ballistic missiles to countering the full spectrum of missile threats. Yet these new policy and budget proposals remain remarkably consistent with the program of record that preexisted the National Defense Strategy. Apart from steps within the services for incremental improvements to air defenses and some studies on countering hypersonic glide vehicles, the focus remains on the limited ballistic missile threats posed by otherwise weak rogue regimes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

12. Achilles’ Heel: Adding Resilience to NATO’s Fragile Missile Shield

Author:
Ian Williams
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Tensions with Iran are once again increasing. The slow implosion of the nuclear accord, Iran’s harassment of cargo ships, and the downing of a U.S. unmanned aircraft have made plain the risk of conflict between Iran and the United States. The dispute should also draw attention to the questionable preparedness of the United States and its allies to fight a war with Iran on short notice and deal with that war’s blowback across the Middle East and Europe. Regional missile defense architectures are an important part of that preparedness. Iran has the largest and most diverse supply of ballistic missiles in the Middle East region, and Tehran has shown an ability and willingness to use them in combat operations.1 Iran is also learning to employ other kinds of aerial threats, such as long-range cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In a conflict with Iran, U.S. and allied forces would likely face a wide spectrum of air and missile threats. The biggest U.S. investment in Iran-centric missile defenses has been the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is a phased buildup of U.S. missile defense assets in and around Europe to deter and, if necessary, limit damage from an Iranian missile attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet the EPAA architecture is heavily dependent on the nominal, unencumbered performance of a single radar deployed relatively close to Iran. This produces a single point of failure susceptible to malfunction or operator error. It also presents an Achilles’ heel that a determined or imaginative adversary could exploit. Iran certainly fits both descriptors. In 1958, strategist Albert Wohlstetter wrote that U.S. confidence in its nuclear second-strike ability was achieved only by “ignoring the full range of sensible enemy plans.”2 This same critical judgment should be applied to confidence in the EPAA as currently configured. Inasmuch as a sensible adversary such as Iran relies upon its missile forces to achieve its defense goals, it should be credited with the foresight to target single points of failure that would preclude the effective application of that missile force. Fortunately, there are practical steps that NATO and the United States can take to further adapt EPAA for greater resiliency. Upgrades to existing radars, the integration of allied radars into the missile defense mission, and the addition of air and space-based sensors would do much to improve EPAA’s capability and survivability, improving U.S. and NATO preparedness for an unexpected Middle East conflict.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, North Atlantic, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. Avoiding a Post-INF Missile Race

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On November 7, 2019, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Center for Energy and Security Studies held a forum titled “US-Russia Dialogue on Nuclear Issues: Does Arms Control Have a Future?” Dr. Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, prepared the briefing paper, “Avoiding a Post-INF Missile Race,” to address the concerns about a new arms race in Europe arising after the end of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Though comparisons to the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s are inevitable, the present situation is different in one important respect: neither Russia nor NATO want a new arms race, and both have demonstrated a degree of restraint. “Nevertheless,” Dr. Sokov argues in the paper, “the situation is fragile, and it is difficult to predict how long mutual restraint can hold.” Furthermore, the military balance today includes additional, complicating features, including the replacement of nuclear weapons’ missions with high-precision long-range conventional weapons, the enlargement of NATO and the collapse of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the risk of escalation presented by increased dual-capable delivery systems, as well as the role of Asia in the global strategic balance. The window of opportunity for addressing these rising concerns is relatively narrow. Since “full-scope arms-control negotiations aiming at legally binding and verifiable treaties are hardly feasible in the current and projected political and security environment,” this CNS brief suggests a “more modest” approach to expanding and securing the restraint that exists, before it disappears altogether.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North America

14. IFPA National Security Update 7: The 2019 Missile Defense Review - Strengths and Weaknesses

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review (MDR) and subsequent budget requests, including the key findings of the MDR, a net assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, positive elements and shortcomings. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

15. Insight on Syria: What Are Putin's Motives?

Author:
Rawi Abdelal and Alexandra Vacroux
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Russian President Vladimir Putin has confounded American policy makers with his agenda in the Middle East for at least the past decade. Russia’s stance has varied in its accord with Western policies, at times seeming to align—as in Libya and Yemen—and other times shirking, by showing indifference toward Iran’s nuclear program violations. Western diplomats have long puzzled over Putin’s real aims in the region and whether or not he could ever be a reliable ally. Russian airstrikes in Syria in 2015 marked a turning point in its foreign policy. Taking full advantage of the vacuum created by President Obama’s failure to intervene, Russia stepped in to lead, signaling Moscow’s new commitment to involvement in the region. Just two years prior, Putin had refused to export missiles systems to Syria, raising hopes in the West for a possible partnership that could help to stabilize the region. It was not to be. Russian officials fanned speculation and confusion about its actions in Syria. To the public, they skewed the purpose of intervention, first claiming to target Islamic State, then “terrorists” in general. In fact, Russian bombs fell on anti-Assad rebel groups, some of whom were armed and trained by US intelligence agencies. Thus began a protracted “proxy war” between the United States and Russia that continues today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Syria, and North America

16. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

17. National Security Update 3: The 2018 NDAA, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the New EMP Commission

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update provides information on missile defense issues related to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the soon-to-be-released Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). It also provides an update on several developments regarding electromagnetic pulse (EMP), including Congress’ decision to create a new EMP Commission. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
National Security, Weapons, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. National Security Update 4: The Implications of China’s Actions in the South China Sea and U.S. Options

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update addresses the potential consequences of China’s strategy to control the South China Sea and possible U.S. and allied responses. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Territorial Disputes, Grand Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, South China, and United States of America

19. The Global Exchange (Spring 2018)

Author:
Adam Frost, David J. Bercuson, Andrew Rasiulis, Ross Fetterly, Lindsay Rodman, Lindsay Coombs, Stephen M. Saideman, Eugene Lang, David Perry, Alan Stephenson, Ian Mack, Adam Lajeunesse, Charity Weeden, and David Higgins
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
“Canada is a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.” These were the naïve words of Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand during his 1924 address to the League of Nations. Ironically, his speech took place between the two most devastating global conflicts in human history, and Canada was an active belligerent in both. However misguided Dandurand’s statement may have been, its sentiment has been woven into Canadian psyche by virtue of geographic reality. Canadians enjoy the privilege of a tremendously productive relationship with the United States, which remains the global hegemon. With geographical ties, Canadians and Americans also share a common history and broad cultural kinship. The strength of this relationship has afforded Canada a degree of security that would otherwise be unattainable, which affects Canadians’ perception of national security. It is an exceptional privilege of circumstance that defence is not required to be frequently in the forefront of public dialogue. However, while it is unlikely Canada will be confronted with an existential threat in the foreseeable future, it would be foolhardy for Canada to become complacent about preserving the means to defend its national interests when necessary. The 21st century international arena is rife with instability and change. These conditions create uncertainty. Canada’s armed forces are charged with the task of safeguarding and advancing Canada’s national interests when called upon, often in the most challenging of circumstances and environments. In order for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to be successful, the government of the day must adopt and implement pragmatic defence policy, and provide the CAF with the appropriate resources to meet expectations. This issue contends with the questions of how best Canada can enable the CAF to succeed in its assigned tasks, and outlines what some of those tasks ought to be to defend against contemporary threats in our era of increasing uncertainty. Policy-makers must consider the evolving threat environment in order to enable the CAF to effectively defend Canada’s interests. The proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and offensive cyber capabilities poses significant threats to Canada and its closest allies. Climate change is also exposing Canada to new challenges in our Arctic territories, creating a growing need for surveillance and governance in the high Arctic to protect Canadian sovereignty. These are only a few of the emerging threats addressed in this issue. For the CAF to be capable of adapting to the multiplex of eventualities that it must be prepared to confront, it requires sufficient personnel and materiel. The mix of skills required in today’s armed forces is very different than in bygone eras. Personnel must also be properly equipped if they are to be effective in their roles. Therefore, recruiting and retaining people with expertise in diverse trades and the efficient and timely procurement of vital equipment are paramount if the CAF is to be a capable, adaptable and effective force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

20. Modern assumptions of the American ballistic missile defence system against the background of historical concepts and programmes

Author:
Aleksandra Murat-Bors
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The issue of missile defence has been present in American policy for over 70 years and is constantly subject to research and the search for new technologies. Nowadays, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as the growing threat from the so-called “rogue states” have caused the inevitable development of the missile defence strategy. On the basis of historical programmes and the results of contemporary research, the concept of a Ballistic Missile Defence System was created. The system is based on the principles of indivisibility of the security of the Alliance and NATO solidarity, fair sharing of risk and burdens as well as taking on reasonable challenges. One of the components of the system is the European Phase Adaptive Approach, which was designed to protect American allies and resources in the European region from the growing rocket threat. This paper analyses the genesis of ballistic missile defence and what its development tendencies are. The article contains a presentation of the essence of the US Ballistic Missile Defence System, as well as its history and suspended programmes. The concept of multilayered defence has been outlined, as have the technical details of the system’s components and its location and operational status.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Ballistic Missile
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America