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2. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power
- Author:
- David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
3. Missile Defense Study
- Author:
- William C. Greenwalt, Elliott Branch, Susan Kinney-Perkins, William Philips, and Joseph Westphal
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
- Abstract:
- The Department of Defense (DoD) contracted with the Academy for an independent study of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense components related to missile defense. Pursuant to the FY2022 NDAA Section 1675, the Secretary and the Academy entered into an agreement by which the Academy carried out a study regarding the roles and responsibilities of the various components of the Department of Defense as they pertain to Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). The study includes: A comprehensive assessment and analysis of existing Department component roles and responsibilities for the full range of IAMD activities, including the establishment of requirements, research and development, system acquisition, and operations and sustainment. Identification of gaps in component capability of each applicability component for performing its assigned IAMD roles and responsibilities. Identification of opportunities for deconflicting mission sets, eliminating areas of unnecessary duplication, reducing waste, and improving efficiency across the full range of IAMD activities. Development of a timetable for the implementation of the opportunities identified above. Development of recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the Academy considers appropriate pursuant to developing analysis of the above. The Academy assembled a five-member Panel of Academy Fellows to oversee and guide this study.
- Topic:
- Missile Defense, Public Administration, Organizational Assessment, and Department of Defense (DoD)
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
4. Eleven Myths and Realities about Biden’s Missile Defense Review
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- On October 27, 2022, the Biden administration released the public version of the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The document is commendable in some respects and is concerning in others. Below are some myths and realities about the Biden MDR.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
5. North America Is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland
- Author:
- Tom Karako, Matthew Strohmeyer, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- U.S. air and missile defense efforts have long been characterized by a striking dichotomy. Defenses for the homeland have largely focused on long-range ballistic threats, while cruise missile defense and other air defense efforts have focused on regional and force protection applications to the exclusion of the homeland. This compartmentalization assumes that battles in one place will only consist of certain parts of the threat spectrum, and battles elsewhere will consist only of others. That lingering dichotomy creates a vulnerability that near-peer adversaries now seek to exploit. In a sense, the homeland-regional dichotomy ignores the fact that North America is a region, too. As with any other region, attacks on assets in North America could be designed to shape the political and military calculus of U.S. policymakers. This report explores the strategic significance of air and missile defense for the homeland, considers principles informing defense design, and develops and costs an architecture based on those principles.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
6. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?
- Author:
- Matthew Kroenig
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
7. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
8. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
9. National Security Update 12: Status of 2020 Defense Authorization/Appropriations and NDAA Highlights
- Author:
- Jack Kelly
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
- Abstract:
- Our twelfth IFPA National Security Update examines the current status of the U.S. defense authorization, appropriations, and budget process with a focus on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and assesses its strengths and weaknesses in light of key programs and policies discussed in previous Updates. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include hypersonic missiles, missile defense priorities, nuclear modernization issues, President Trump's Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options, and the military applications of artificial intelligence. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Budget, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, South China, and United States of America
10. Modernizing the Land-Based Leg of the Nuclear Triad: Myths and Facts
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Brandi Jackson
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Across Democratic and Republican administrations over the past sixty years, U.S. strategists have determined that for the United States, a nuclear triad is the most strategically sound means to credibly deter adversaries. In an increasingly complex threat environment—facing nuclear adversaries and nuclear aspirants with different national objectives, military capabilities, and strategies—a nuclear triad provides the President of the United States with necessary flexibility while accounting for possible changes in adversaries’ capabilities and the geopolitical environment. To remain effective, the U.S. must modernize its Cold War legacy nuclear forces. This booklet is intended to dispel myths surrounding the land-based leg of the nuclear triad and explore the advantages of adopting the ground-based strategic deterrent missile system (GBSD) rather than continuing to recapitalize the aging Minuteman III system.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
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