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91. The Future of Strategic Intelligence

Author:
Robert Hutchings
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
We begin with a puzzle: the need for strategic analysis is more important than ever in this period of great flux and uncertainty, but the disdain for analysis of any kind has never been greater than under the administration of President Donald J. Trump. The very premise that leaders need reasonably objective intelligence analysis to inform their policy decisions – a premise that has guided every U.S. administration since World War II – is under assault. If we are to rebuild our capacity for strategic thinking, we need to go back to the beginning. When President Harry Truman created the strategic intelligence function at the end of World War II, he understood that the United States had been thrust into a global role for which it was not prepared. The world was simply too complex, and American interests too extensive, to operate on the basis of impulse or ad hoc decision making. Moreover, when Truman issued National Intelligence Authority No. 5 on July 8, 1946, instructing the Director of Central Intelligence to “accomplish the evaluation and dissemination of strategic intelligence,” he deliberately set up this function outside of the White House, the Department of State, and the military, so that strategic analysis would be kept at a critical distance from policy making. Yet Truman, like every president since, was ambivalent about the role of strategic intelligence and the degree of autonomy it ought to have. ​ The story actually begins earlier, when President Franklin Roosevelt, in a military order of June 13, 1942, formally established the Office of Strategic Services with William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan at its head, and directed it to “collect and analyze... strategic information” and to “plan and operate special services.” The cloak- and-dagger wartime operations of the OSS are the stuff of legend, as are the notable figures recruited to serve, including the poets Archibald MacLeish and Stephen Vincent Benét, the banker Paul Mellon, the psychologist Carl Jung, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, and the movie director John Ford. Less well known is its role in strategic intelligence analysis through its Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, led initially by James Phinney Baxter III, president of Williams College, and after 1943 by Harvard historian William Langer, identified in war correspondence as “OSS 117.”
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, History, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

92. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:
Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

93. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit

Author:
Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence.  Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane.  More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America

94. National Security Update 5: The Trump 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).i This NPR addresses requirements for a U.S nuclear-force structure more attuned to 21st-century requirements in a world of additional nuclear states as well as other actors in possession of such weapons. The NPR focuses on the crucially important nuclear component of U.S national security strategy and capabilities and should be read in the broader context of the recently released National Security Strategyii and National Defense Strategyiii documents. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
National Security, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

95. Challenges and potential for NATO-Egypt partnership

Author:
Adel El-Adawy
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Today, Egypt’s relationship with NATO remains marginal with many challenges affecting the pros- pects of closer ties. In 2014, NATO and Egypt signed an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), and NATO has since pro- vided some support in the field of demining and training. In this context, and at a time when the Alliance’s goal is to project stability in its southern neighbourhood, with efforts being undertaken to increase engagement with countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, there are areas where NATO and Egypt’s interests overlap offering the potential for closer cooperation.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Egypt

96. The Great War legacy for NATO

Author:
Ian Hope
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On 11 November commemorations occurred throughout North West Europe and the British Commonwealth, marking the hundredth anniversary of the Armistice that ended the First World War. A significant commemoration was held in the city of Mons, Belgium, location of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and another in Brussels, location of NATO Headquarters. Many attending these commemorations will have had little knowledge of the direct link between the events of 11 November 1918 and the structure and workings of the Alliance today. This Policy Brief seeks to reveal this legacy by explaining the First World War origins of the North Atlantic Council, Military Committee, Alliance committee structure and the importance of the principles behind supreme command, summit consultations and consensus. These entities and practices, essential to the institutional design and culture of NATO, were established at the inception of the Alliance by civilian and military leaders who had participated in the Second World War and who knew their value to the maintenance of Alliance cohesion, and their importance to effective strategy formulation. These same leaders had derived their knowledge directly from the lessons learned during the final stages of what was supposed to be “the war to end all wars”.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

97. European defence: what impact for NATO?

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The story of the EU’s efforts to acquire some kind of autonomy in the security domain has al- ways been told with reference to NATO. Back in Saint-Malo in 1998, French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair framed the idea of a Eu- ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), part- ly in response to NATO’s primacy in handling the Yugoslav conflicts. The objective at the time was for the Union to be given the “capacity for auton- omous action”,1 with “autonomous” referring to freedom from NATO and the United States. In this endeavour, the perception in NATO has always oscillated between indifference vis-à-vis a process that did not seem credible, and concern that an increased EU role in defence could under- mine NATO’s centrality and the transatlantic link. Over the last few years, the EU has embarked upon a process of beefing up its defence profile, raising anxieties in NATO circles. Most recently, references to the need for Europe to acquire stra- tegic autonomy or to move towards a European army, have added to the concerns. But are there reasons for NATO to worry about what the EU and its member states are doing? Is the EU aspira- tion in defence threatening the transatlantic link? Does the EU have the power to unsettle NATO?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, France, and North America

98. Projecting Stability: Elixir or Snake Oil?

Author:
Ian Hope
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s internal security is intrinsically linked to external stability, and its quest for optimal security for its member states’ citizens therefore requires a presence at its periphery. This is what Projecting Stability is about. With this concept and activity, NATO takes stock of the indivisibility of security that is no longer composed of two distinct spaces. This is probably not new. After all, NATO’s crisis management and cooperative security efforts over the last 25 years have had a lot to do with handling the consequences of the internal-external security nexus. To a large extent therefore, NATO has been in the business of Projecting Stability since the end of the Cold War, just as Molière’s Mr Jourdain was speaking in prose without knowing it. Nonetheless, the Projecting Stability agenda was formalized at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and is now being run in parallel with Deterrence and Defence as NATO’s main effort. This poses at least three sets of questions. First, beyond the above-mentioned internal-external security nexus, what is it that Projecting Stability is really about and aims to achieve? How does stability relate to security, and how can one “project” it? Does it contain a value-promotion agenda, or is the concept a retrenchment from the ambitious democratization goals of the past? Second, to what extent can Projecting Stability be prioritized, given the prominence of the Russian threat and therefore the necessity to “deter and defend”? Can NATO do both? And how much consensus is there among NATO member states on the need for Projecting Stability? Third, where is Projecting Stability supposed to happen, with what local buy-in and level of intrusiveness, and through what sets of instruments? Does the activity carry potential unintended consequences by which, in lieu of Projecting Stability, the Alliance’s presence would bring instability? Are there any past activities that attest to this risk, and about which lessons must be learned? Overall, is Projecting Stability an elixir, i.e. the appropriate response to a well- posed question, or is it rather some sort of snake oil, i.e. a false solution or a concept that is doomed to stumble against innumerable political and operational obstacles? These issues are what Ian Hope’s edited volume Projecting Stability – Elixir or XII Snake Oil? aims to explore. It does so through a collection of chapters, authored by a group of scholars and NATO officials, which offer an open analysis of the potential and challenges of Projecting Stability. This NDC Research Paper is the first issue of a new series created by the NATO Defense College. NDC Research Papers deal with NATO-related issues from a multiplicity of angles that can be historical, political, operational or prospective; they can have an obvious research – or, even more so, policy – angle; they are analytical in nature, and must be relevant to the understanding of NATO’s challenges and policy making. May this NDC Research Paper be the first of a long list of analytically sound, thought-provoking, and academically rigorous publications by the NDC Research Division.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

99. Insight on Syria: What Are Putin's Motives?

Author:
Rawi Abdelal and Alexandra Vacroux
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Russian President Vladimir Putin has confounded American policy makers with his agenda in the Middle East for at least the past decade. Russia’s stance has varied in its accord with Western policies, at times seeming to align—as in Libya and Yemen—and other times shirking, by showing indifference toward Iran’s nuclear program violations. Western diplomats have long puzzled over Putin’s real aims in the region and whether or not he could ever be a reliable ally. Russian airstrikes in Syria in 2015 marked a turning point in its foreign policy. Taking full advantage of the vacuum created by President Obama’s failure to intervene, Russia stepped in to lead, signaling Moscow’s new commitment to involvement in the region. Just two years prior, Putin had refused to export missiles systems to Syria, raising hopes in the West for a possible partnership that could help to stabilize the region. It was not to be. Russian officials fanned speculation and confusion about its actions in Syria. To the public, they skewed the purpose of intervention, first claiming to target Islamic State, then “terrorists” in general. In fact, Russian bombs fell on anti-Assad rebel groups, some of whom were armed and trained by US intelligence agencies. Thus began a protracted “proxy war” between the United States and Russia that continues today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Syria, and North America

100. When Parallel Red Lines Meet: Recent Events in Syria in Various Contexts

Author:
Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
At the strategic level, the convergence in time and space of the events following the chemical weapons attack in Duma by the Syrian regime portend a dramatic development with substantial potential impact for Israel’s security environment. The attack on the T4 airbase, attributed to Israel, falls within the context of the last red line that Israel drew, whereby it cannot accept Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria. The attack in Duma reflects the Syrian regime’s considerable self-confidence at this time. As for Trump, the attack provides him with another opportunity to demonstrate his insistence on the red lines that he drew and take a determined stance opposite Putin. Thus, Israel’s enforcement of its red line and the United States’ enforcement of its red line have met, while Russia finds itself exerting efforts to deter both countries from taking further action that could undermine its achievements in Syria and its positioning as the dominant world power in the theater. However, the strategic convergence does not stop at Syria’s borders, and is unfolding against the backdrop of the crisis emerging around the Trump administration’s demands to improve the JCPOA, or run the risk of the re-imposition of sanctions and the US exiting the agreement. Indeed, the context is even wider, with preparations for Trump’s meeting with North Korean President Kim on the nuclear issue in the far background. Therefore, the clash between Israel and Iran in Syria on the eve of deliberations on the nuclear deal could potentially lead to a change from separate approaches to distinct issues to a broader and more comprehensive framework with interfaces and linkages between the issues.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North Korea, Syria, and North America