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31. ASEAN Centrality?

Author:
Sheldon Simon
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The mid-February ASEAN-US Summit was the Obama administration’s effort to show ASEAN’s central role in the US rebalance to Asia. It was only partially successful. Several new business initiatives were inaugurated to link US and ASEAN entrepreneurs. However, security cooperation hardly advanced. While maritime security was included in the joint declaration, there was no mention of US freedom of navigation (FON) patrols or the South China Sea disputes. In January, the Philippine Supreme Court cleared the way for the Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, allowing US forces rotational access to several Philippine military bases and enhancing interoperability. Washington plans to increase the frequency and “complexity” of FON patrols near the artificial islands built by China, and the US has begun joint patrols with Philippine ships. Washington also announced a Southeast Asian Maritime Security Initiative that includes a $425 million multi-year appropriation for regional capacity to improve maritime domain awareness and patrols.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Rule of/by Law?

Author:
Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The rule of law took a few huge hits during the year’s second trimester, as Beijing chose to ignore the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling that negated many of its South China Sea claims, while Pyongyang displayed its usual disdain for the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2270 with a series of ballistic missile launches, highlighted by a submarine-launched ballistic missile test. There were also a number of significant multilateral forums addressing regional security and economic issues, or both. Most in some form also touched upon the South China Sea and Korean Peninsula, even as ASEAN danced around the Tribunal’s ruling. Meanwhile in the battle of who gets to make trade rules, the Chinese-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) seemed to fare only slightly better than the US-driven Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the objection to which seems to be the only thing the two US presidential candidates agree upon.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, Conflict, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Maritime Non-state Actors: A Challenge for the Royal Canadian Navy?

Author:
David Rudd
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Global security and prosperity depends in part on good order at sea, with its attendant flow of licit maritime commerce. While challenges to that order have existed since the earliest sea-farers, new players have emerged in recent decades that inhibit the ability of nation-states to regulate domestic and international maritime activity. This paper is intended to provide a brief exploration of the nature of maritime non-state actors (MNSAs) and the challenge they pose to national and international maritime security. It will examine the types and motivations of MNSAs and identify some of the ways in which a navy may interact with them. In doing so it will help to shape decision-making on how allied navies in general and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in particular might theoretically align their capability-development efforts with these trends. As the paper is intended to be an overview of a complex and evolving phenomenon, it proceeds from the premise that the strategic/policy, doctrinal, and tactical questions raised herein will require more study.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

34. Full Issue: Money & War

Author:
Sarah Detzner, James Copnall, Alex de Waal, Ian M. Ralby, Joshua Stanton, Ibrahim Warde, Leon Whyte, Richard Weitz, Jessica Knight, John H. Maurer, Alexander Tabarrok, Alex Nowrasteh, Tom Keatinge, Emily Knowles, Karolina MacLachlan, Andrew Lebovich, Caroline Troein, and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Fletcher Security Review: Managed and edited by students at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, we build on the Fletcher School’s strong traditions of combining scholarship with practice, fostering close interdisciplinary collaboration, and acting as a vehicle for groundbreaking discussion of international security. We believe that by leveraging these strengths – seeking input from established and up-and-coming scholars, practitioners, and analysts from around the world on topics deserving of greater attention – we can promote genuinely unique ways of looking at the future of security. Each issue of the Review is centered around a broad theme – in this issue, we tackle “Money & War.” Money influences every aspect of warfare, conventional or unconventional. No nationstate military, insurgent group, terrorist network, trans-national criminal organization, or hybrid actor can be understood, or countered, without knowing where the money is coming from – as well as where, and how, it gets spent. Evolutions and revolutions in financial tools and practices quickly translate to transformations in military affairs, and some cases, vice versa.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Governance, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Finance, Islamic State, Navy, Arab Spring, Maritime, Conflict, Multilateralism, Islamism, Drugs, and Currency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, China, Iran, Sudan, Darfur, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, Mali, Asia-Pacific, Sahel, United States of America, and North America

35. The Littoral World

Author:
Howard J. Fuller
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The role of seapower in nurturing American security and prosperity has long been exaggerated, if not wholly misrepresented. Throughout the nineteenth century, the nation’s first generations of leaders exhibited a healthy skepticism toward free trade and the maritime hegemony of the British Empire. By focusing on domination of the country’s littoral space during the Civil War, the U.S. Navy succeeded in shielding the Union from European interference. It was not the assumption of the British mantle that safeguarded the nation; rather, U.S. preeminence was secured by rejection of maritime overreach. Strong anti-British tariffs and industrial protectionism were the cornerstones of sustained commercial growth and genuine national independence. The unique problem with seapower, even in the contemporary period, is how easily we can glorify it. We love the sea, and mighty ships, and we tend to flaunt what we love, but this relationship has no place in a grand strategy that acknowledges the limited historical contribution of free trade to the American economy.
Topic:
Security, History, Economy, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, Trade, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Britain, North America, United States of America, and Oceans

36. Moving East and South: U.S. Navy and German Navy Strategy in the Eurasian Theater 1991- 2014, A View from Germany

Author:
Sebastian Bruns
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Cold War ended rather suddenly in 1991. With it went the model on which the United States’ maritime strategy of the 1980s had rested. Driven by individuals like John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s long-time Secretary of the Navy, that series of strategic documents promulgated a forward, offensive, counter-force approach and the famous ‘600-ship Navy’ force structure. With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the sole challenger to U.S. naval power vanished practically overnight. Red Fleet warships were rusting away in port or dismantled altogether. In the United States, the military lost significant human capital through a number of force reduction rounds, which reflected how the U.S. Navy could and would take on the post-Cold War world intellectually. In the wake of this strategic recalibration, allied militaries and their navies—such as the Federal German Navy, soon to be renamed German Navy—also underwent substantial transformations. These were often guided by the shifting geopolitical landscape as well as the popular desire to reduce the inflated defense budgets of Cold War days in order to obtain a peace dividend. This analysis will focus on the Eurasian theater—very broadly speaking, the waters that surround the European and Southwest Asian landmasses[1]—in U.S. and German naval strategy between 1991 and 2014. The maritime sphere has become increasingly important as a domain of emerging security since the end of the Cold War, yet comparatively little time and resources are being devoted to research on naval strategy and relationships between allies at sea. As a result, the use of naval force for political and diplomatic ends and the dynamics of maritime geopolitics have suffered. This essay seeks to underline the challenges that have confronted the U.S. Navy in the past generation and analyze their long-term effects. While the U.S. Navy’s geographic focus and operational interests have increasingly shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, and from control of the “blue water” high seas to the littorals, these key interests should not be overlooked. In the view of the author, the fall of the Soviet Union and the implication that allies like Germany would do more to patrol their own maritime neighborhood provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient reason to de-emphasize their previously highly valued naval hub in the Mediterranean Sea. In rebalancing from the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) to other regions of the world, the U.S. Navy accepted the consequences for fleet design and ship numbers, perhaps willingly using it as a bargaining chip for force reduction rounds in Washington, D.C. Implicitly, European allies and the U.S. Air Force[2] were expected to fill the gap left behind in terms of naval presence and crisis response, in particular after the successful campaigns in the Adriatic Sea in responding to unrest and war in the Balkans. European allies, however, were largely uninterested in stepping up to the plate; they considered their near abroad safe enough. Most importantly, they were somewhat wary of delivering a combined ‘pocket Sixth Fleet’ of their own. Finally, they were preoccupied with managing German unification, enlargement of the European Union, and establishing a common market and currency, among other things. Accordingly, this paper sheds a light on some key German strategic documents for a time when the reunited country sought its new place in the security environment of the post-Cold War world. By taking a unique view from Germany, one of the U.S. Navy’s premier NATO allies, this analysis also considers the transformation of the Bundesmarine from an escort navy to an expeditionary navy.[3] It seeks to conceptually explain how Germany’s security policy addressed the maritime challenges of the new era. The German Navy was principally drawn south- and eastward geographically after 1991, usually in close cooperation with other allied and friendly navies (and mandated by NATO, the EU, or the UN).[4] It was increasingly asked to address maritime security challenges to which the U.S. Navy no longer, or only in a supporting role, responded. The German Navy went into the breach with what were essentially Cold War assets and a mindset fundamentally dominated by the inability to think strategically. This paper is split into two sections. The first section discusses the 1991-2001 timeframe and the second section covers the period from 2001-2014. 2001 marked the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January and the terrorist attacks on September 11 eight months later. Each section looks at the strategic developments of the U.S. Navy and the German Navy, their major naval operations, and some areas of cooperation between the two navies in Eurasia...
Topic:
Security, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

37. U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects

Author:
David Griffiths
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
As two great powers that will influence much of the immediate future of our small and vulnerable planet, China and the United States are in a marriage of sorts—united for the purpose of living together, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary. Like it or not, the two societies depend on each other. Environmental degradation, social unrest, economic problems, or pandemic outbreak in one must inevitably affect the other. Both must be active contributors to a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, global community. Both governments emphasize their commitment to a positive and constructive mutual engagement. At sea, however, that engagement is not always trouble free. Confrontation happens—and when it does, events do not always unfold in the way that policy makers might have intended or preferred. Like a married couple, both sides prefer to downplay to the outside world the extent and nature of quarrels. But despite this public posture, those in command of naval and maritime air forces understand only too well the potential risks of damage, injury, and even death at the tactical level. More worrying is the inherent risk of unintended consequences and the potential for an uncontrolled strategic-political spiral of unwanted escalation. It is bad policy and in no one's interest to perpetuate a relationship in which an innocent mistake at sea can trigger an unwanted political crisis. At sea, however, that engagement is not always trouble free. Confrontation happens? and when it does, events do not always unfold in the way that policy makers might have intended or preferred. Like a married couple, both sides prefer to downplay to the outside world the extent and nature of quarrels. But despite this public posture, those in command of naval and maritime air forces understand only too well the potential risks of damage, injury, and even death at the tactical level.
Topic:
International Relations, Armed Forces, Maritime, Engagement, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
In an age of delicate maneuvering among the great powers, coast guards have taken new and leading roles on the world stage. When Washington wanted to demonstrate conviction and bring supplies to beleaguered Georgia without escalating already simmering tensions around the Black Sea, the USCGC Dallas, a large U.S. Coast Guard cutter, was quickly dispatched. The trend has long been visible in Asia. Tokyo's most extensive use of deadly force in the postwar era was an action by the Japanese coast guard against a North Korean surveillance vessel. More recently, a Japan Coast Guard cutter sank a Taiwanese fishing vessel in a collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea, prompting a relatively serious diplomatic incident. These most powerful coast guards are spawning imitators. India, for example, announced a bold new purchase of long-range patrol aircraft for its coast guard in the fall of 2008. South Korea's improving coast guard, meanwhile, has invited foreign reporters to a tour in the vicinity of islands that are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan, accompanying the visit with belligerent rhetoric.
Topic:
Navy, Maritime, Surveillance, and Coast Guard
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

39. Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?

Author:
Veronique de Rugy
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The most terrifying security threat to security experts and the public alike is nuclear proliferation. Once the figment of Hollywood imagination, the ultimate nightmare scenario that is dis- cussed by some as inevitable is the detonation of a nuclear device on American soil. The majority of experts believe that the most likely way weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would enter the United States is by sea, hence a focus on port security.1 Ports offer terrorists vast opportunities to inflict damages. As the primary mode of transpor- tation for world trade goods, maritime commerce is essential to America’s economic vital- ity.2 Every year approximately nine million cargo containers—26,000 a day—arrive at U.S. ports from all over the world.3 The U.S. maritime system includes more than 361 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than 1,000 harbor channels along thousands of miles of coastline.4 In FY 2007, President Bush requested $2.3 billion for port security out of a $57 billion government-wide budget for homeland security.5 However, the important question is not how much money is spent but rather whether the money is allocated toward the most cost- effective programs. In other words, is America getting the maximum level of protection in exchange for our tax dollars? A close look at port security allocation decisions indicates that spending occurs without regard for risk analysis let alone cost-benefit analysis, leading to a large array of misallocated spending. For instance, what should be the highest priorities—preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear devices and material—receive less money than much less cost-effective policies such as nuclear detection in the ports or post-disaster response activities.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, Trade, and Port
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America