Search

Begin New Search Topic Legislation Political Geography North America

21. Adversarial Avenues: Ten Bipartisan Ways to Make a Bill Like S. 1 Close Loopholes Autocrats Exploit to Meddle in U.S. Politics

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In his push for bipartisan efforts on voting rights legislation, Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) warned that “the lack of transparency in many campaign finance rules provides multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” These loopholes might be called the “adversarial avenues” of malign finance. Manchin went on to explain that this is why he supports two campaign finance provisions included within the For the People Act (S. 1): The DISCLOSE Act and the Honest Ads Act. Manchin is absolutely right. The most comprehensive research on covert foreign money classified by legal avenue more than 100 cases—adding up to more than $300 million over the past decade—of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China funneling money into democratic processes as a geopolitical weapon. Strikingly, 83 percent of this activity was enabled by seven legal loopholes that were identified in this research and are now being actively tackled by the European Parliament. Two of those seven vulnerabilities would be addressed by DISCLOSE and Honest Ads, which would impose financial transparency on “dark money” non-profits and online political ads, respectively. But foreign powers do not stop there. As President George Washington warned in his farewell address, they bring “insidious wiles” to their tradecraft of foreign influence. Autocrats invent and exploit cunning ways to secure political power, devising creative tricks to interfere in elections at home and abroad, often through some degree of legal participation by people within the target country. Indeed, a recent U.S. intelligence assessment found that in the 2020 election the Kremlin’s main innovation since 2016 was more collaboration with U.S.-based conduits. That is why, in addition to Thomas Morley’s and my year-long research project on malign finance, Jessica Brandt and I worked with a bipartisan team of legal experts to develop legislative proposals that would outlaw U.S. participation in foreign interference. Drawing from this extensive body of research developed over the past two years, 10 policy proposals would further address the “multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” The first five proposals offer ways to more thoroughly approach interference issues already under consideration in S. 1, while the second five proposals introduce new resilience measures for consideration.
Topic:
Politics, Finance, Legislation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Factsheet: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to prohibit the federal government from burdening a person’s free exercise of religion. Currently, twenty-one states have also passed religious freedom restoration acts. The use of the RFRA in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) drew concerns about the law being used to permit discrimination against communities such as religious minorities, nonreligious people, people of color, women, and the LGBTQ community. In February 2019, Representative John Kennedy III and then-Senator Kamala Harris reintroduced the Do No Harm Act to ensure that the RFRA would not be used to permit discrimination.
Topic:
Discrimination, Legislation, and Freedom of Religion
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

23. Reviewing Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters 2017: What’s new, what’s out, and what’s different from Bill C-51, A National Security Act 2015?

Author:
Michael Nesbitt
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In 2015, Canada’s national security law landscape received some long-overdue attention in the form of Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act. It was the culmination of a series of smaller initiatives that had brought attention to national security law in Canada, but also a direct response to two terrorist attacks that left two Canadians dead in October 2014. Bill C-51 did indeed reinvigorate discussions around national security law in Canada, but it became a lightning rod for criticism. Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters 2017 was not passed until June 2019, but it was nevertheless a direct response to Bill C-51 and the criticisms it faced. Yet for the most part, Bill C-59 amended but did not repeal the important new powers, or even the most controversial ones, found in Bill C-51. Instead, Bill C-59 can be seen, in part, as a technical-legal bill that largely entrenched the powers first conceived of in Bill C-51 by putting them on firmer constitutional footing. But Bill C-59 was also much more than a series of legal/constitutional improvements: its legislative scope went much further afield from the Bill C-51 regime, amending the authorities of agencies – such as the Communications Security Establishment – that had been untouched by Bill C-51, while also greatly expanding national security oversight and review through the creation of important new bodies. The purpose of this paper is to compare these two important pieces of national security legislation with a view to explaining what these legislation reforms did, why the reforms were undertaken, and to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the most controversial of the reforms under each bill. The idea is to explain where Canada stands today, in the wake of this massive legislative overhaul. By identifying what has already been addressed, we can identify next steps and, in particular, where the focus of future legislative reforms in national security should be. Three recommendations flow from this conclusion. First, national security legislation must be reformed with greater consistency than in the past. Second, as an immediate priority, Canada must address its “intelligence-to-evidence” problem; that is, the system by which it converts – or fails to convert – raw intelligence into the sort of evidence usable by courts of law. Third, enforcement of Canada’s national security laws must now take priority, in particular by prosecuting returning foreign fighters and far-right extremists where their activities meet the threshold of a terrorism offence, as well as terrorist financing, to a greater degree than Canada has seen to date.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Terrorism, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

24. Tailpipe Wars: The Presidential Politics of U.S. Auto Emissions

Author:
Ryan Warsing
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite growing consensus that climate change is real, manmade, and pernicious, the U.S. Congress has failed to update old laws – to say nothing of passing new ones – that might mitigate the crisis. State governments have attempted to fill the void, with California setting de facto national policy using powers delegated under the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA). The Trump administration’s 2019 bid to revoke these powers rejects the process of “iterative federalism” and leads one to believe Trump’s agenda is both vindictive in nature and impervious to broad support for environmental regulation. Yet this support (even in electorally pivotal states like Pennsylvania) proves a weak motivating factor next to the needs of vulnerable constituencies, notably autoworkers. Trump’s agenda is rationally set by his need to attract support in states like Michigan where votes are precious and regulatory exposure is high. Long a means for the federal government to enjoy environmental progress at a safe political distance, the “California carve-out” seems to have exhausted its utility with the Trump administration, which deems all environmental regulation anathema to growth and the happiness of its base. Trump’s rationale is best understood using Conditional Pandering Theory (CPT), which predicts that presidents with middling approval numbers are apt to be led by the public as Election Day draws near and policy outcomes can be delayed. In the case of emissions, policy outcomes are immaterial so long as targeted marginal voters deliver the president a second term.
Topic:
Climate Change, Legislation, Pollution, Domestic Policy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

25. Could Congress’ latest Syria sanctions bill backfire?

Author:
Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The congressional bill will exacerbate the economic situation in Syria and ultimately increase Syria’s dependency on Iran.
Topic:
Economics, Military Strategy, Sanctions, Legislation, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

26. Creating an Accountability Framework that Serves the Global Fragility Act’s Mission

Author:
Susanna Campbell, Dan Hoing, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
In the final days of 2019, Congress passed the Global Fragility Act, an ambitious bill that aims to im- prove how the US government approaches stabilizing conflict-affected states and preventing the es- calation of violence in other fragile contexts. Introduced by a coalition of lawmakers from both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate—led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Eliot Engel (D- NY) and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)—a version of the legislation was passed by the House this spring and boasted 26 cosponsors in the Senate. The Global Fragility Act’s final passage, as part of a large FY2020 spending bill, is a testament to bipartisan commitment and cooperation. The Global Fragility Act asks the State Department to create—jointly with USAID, the Department of Defense, and other agencies—a coordinated, coherent strategy to help prevent violence in fragile states and stabilize conflict-affected areas. As overseers of the taxpayer funds that will be used to implement the act, Congress also included several provisions to hold these agencies to account for achieving results. Accountability for results is important, especially when overseers are far removed from implementation. But how accountability is structured matters quite a bit. When accountability frameworks revolve largely around tight controls and reporting against targets, their good intentions can backfire and contribute to ineffective programming, especially in fragile states. To ensure that the Global Fragility Act’s accountability requirements support rather than undermine the act’s laudable goals, the monitoring, evaluation, and learning processes that accompany the act’s implementation must accomplish two linked but fundamentally distinct things. They must be able to satisfy Washington-based overseers’ reporting needs while also providing projects the space needed for locally informed adaptive management and learning (or continuous adjustment aimed at achiev- ing transformative aims in a dynamic context), which is associated with better outcomes in fragile states. The Global Fragility Act offers an opportunity to rethink the tools through which aid agencies pursue accountability. This note explains how tight controls and target-oriented reporting can nega- tively affect outcomes in fragile states and offers some initial recommendations for creating a stron- ger, outcome-oriented accountability framework.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Leadership, Fragile States, Legislation, and Accountability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. Current law constraining the President: a series on Congress’s options to limit arms sales and aid to Saudi Arabia, part 2

Author:
Jacques Singer-Emery
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the second of a three-part essay series on the different paths the U.S. Congress might take to limit Washington’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. As explained in Part 1 of this series, the Trump administration’s continued support for the Saudi coalition’s war in Yemen has triggered a range of Congressional responses. Although Congress faces challenges in passing new legislation to denounce Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen and its killing of Jamal Khashoggi, the White House’s Saudi policy implicates at least four pieces of existing legislation: the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the War Powers Resolution, the Foreign Assistance Control Act (FAA), and the Leahy Laws. These laws were all passed during the Cold War to curtail the executive’s increasing ability to unilaterally sell arms, supply military aid, and order U.S. troops to assist allies in a theater of war. The executive must abide by these laws. If the President refuses or cuts corners, Congress can bring him to heel directly via impeachment, or indirectly through court orders that force executive branch agencies to halt the restricted activity.
Topic:
Government, War, Law, Courts, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

28. Constraining U.S. foreign policy by enforcing current law: a series on Congress’s options to limit arms sales and aid to Saudi Arabia, part 3

Author:
Jacques Singer-Emery
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the third of a three-part essay series on the different paths the U.S. Congress might take to limit Washington’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Credible allegations of Saudi war crimes and human rights abuses in Yemen should trigger the FAA and Leahy Laws to prevent U.S. aid from reaching the Saudi-led coalition, as discussed in part 2 of this series. However, the U.S. Constitution forbids Congress from unilaterally issuing orders to any executive agency, including the Defense and State Departments. Accordingly, both the Foreign Assistance Control Act (FAA) and the Leahy laws place the onus on the executive to identify and respond to gross violations of human rights. Thus far, the executive has turned a blind eye to the Saudi coalition’s actions. Congress could independently find that Saudi Arabia has engaged in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” by commissioning its own investigations. But if the executive remains unconvinced, Congress only has two options to enforce the FAA and the Leahy laws: impeach the President, or obtain a court order requiring the executive withhold aid and arms pursuant to these laws. The first action is unlikely to occur here, but the second is a viable option. To secure a court order, Congress must show that the executive’s refusal to follow the FAA and the Leahy laws uniquely injures the legislative branch in a way that only the courts can remedy.
Topic:
Government, International Law, Law, War Crimes, Weapons, Courts, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

29. Facing a President’s veto: a series on Congress’s options to limit arms sales and aid to Saudi Arabia, part 1

Author:
Jacques Singer-Emery
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the first of a three-part essay series on the different paths the U.S. Congress might take to limit Washington’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Congress is considering a range of options to express its displeasure with Riyadh after Saudi agents murdered prominent Saudi journalist and critic Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in September 2018, and journalists and NGOs around the world continue to highlight human rights abuses perpetrated by Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen. Of these options, the most notable is the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019. Congress has already voted to condemn President Donald Trump’s unequivocal support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: the Senate voted March 13th to end US support for the war in Yemen, echoing a measure that passed the House in mid-February. But, the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act would go further still, sanctioning those in the Saudi government responsible for Khashoggi’s death and curtailing U.S. arms sales and military aid critical to the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen. The White House vehemently opposes the bill. If it passes, President Trump is expected to veto it, just as he is expected to veto the Senate’s March and House’s February resolutions.
Topic:
Government, Law, Military Affairs, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

30. The Battle Heats Up: Climate Issues in the 2020 US Presidential Election

Author:
Arnault Barichella
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Environmental issues have frequently enjoyed bipartisan support in American history: the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1963 under Democratic President Johnson, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 under Republican President Nixon. This began to change in the 1980s under President Reagan, due to the rise of neoliberal economic theories pioneered by Republicans. Conservatives increasingly viewed environmental regulations as economic impediments. Partisanship on this issue then accelerated throughout the 1990s and 2000s, subject to the influence of powerful lobbying groups. President Bush Jr. refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, actively promoted fossil fuels, and his administration attempted to cast doubt about the science of climate change. Climate partisanship somewhat abated during the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections, since both McCain and Romney were ‘moderate’ Republicans.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Elections, Legislation, Donald Trump, and Barack Obama
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America