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41. China Responds to Trade Tensions Responsibly

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
In March 2018, the United States slapped tariffs of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum in the name of national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Then, the Office of the United States Trade Representative released a report on the investigation of China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, claiming China’s acts, policies, and practices regarding technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are “unreasonable and discriminatory, and burden U.S. commerce.” In early April, it issued a list of products imported from China subject to additional tariffs of 25 percent totaling US $50 billion. In June, Donald Trump approved the tariff imposition on US $50 billion worth of Chinese goods, officially starting from Chinese exports worth US $34 billion on July 6. The remaining US $16 billion was to be imposed later. In July, the U.S. issued another trade barrier of 10 percent tariff on imports from China with a value of US $200 billion. On August 1, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said the barriers were suggested by President Trump, who ordered to increase the amount to 25 percent.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

42. “Triple punch” policies to bring years of trade tensions

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
US President Donald Trump has adopted a hard-line trade policy and recklessly instigated the trade conflict with China. This is the result of a combination of adjustments to his trade, foreign, and fiscal policies. These intertwined policies will likely stretch China-US trade frictions throughout Trump's presidency. First of all, the adjustment to the trade policy includes a shift from multilateral free trade to regional free trade and pressuring other countries to open their markets.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Markets, Trade Wars, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. Who Can Win the Possible China-US Trade War?

Author:
Li Chunding
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
This paper uses a multi-country global general equilibrium (GE) model to numerically simulate the effects of possible China-US trade wars. We introduce an endogenous trade imbalance structure with trade cost into the model which helps to explore both tariff and non-tariff trade war effects. Our simulation results show that China will be significantly hurt by the China-US trade war, but negative impacts are affordable. The US can gain under unilateral sanction measures to China, but will lose if China takes retaliation measures. Comparing the effects under mutual trade war, China will lose more than the US. Introducing non-tariff barrier trade wars will intensify the negative effects, and comparatively negative effects to China are larger than to the US. Mexico’s involvement in trade war with the US will strengthen the negative effects and comparatively hurt the US more. Under non-cooperative and cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium, the US can gain more than China in trade war negotiation, which means the US has stronger bargaining power than China. Additionally, trade wars between China and the US will hurt most countries and the world especially in GDP and manufacturing employment, but benefit their welfare and trade.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Can We Prevent A Full-Blown Trade War Speech Delivered at CF40-PIIE Conference

Author:
Yu Yongding
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Abstract:
On March 8, President Trump fired the first shot of a trade war by threatening to impose 25 percent of tariff on steel imports. On March 22, the Trump administration released the report of Section 301 investigation into China’s trade practices, and on the same day President Trump signed a memo slapping China with tariffs on some1300 Chinese products, totaling about $50 billion. On April 4, US Trade Representative (USTR) published the list of 1333 Chinese products of $50 billion that will be subject to the additional 25% tariffs. On April 16, US Ministry of Commerce declared a ban on U.S. companies selling goods and software to Chinese telecommunication equipment maker ZTE for 7 years. Trade friction has been a serious problem between China and the US for long time. But few people had expected that the friction would escalate to a trade war. So how did we get to this point, and can we turn back before it’s too late? This is the biggest question currently we are facing.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Business, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Emerging challenges to international order require cooperation between the United States and China, two countries that share a common interest in preventing the world from becoming more dangerous and disorderly. U.S.-China relations are becoming more strained and antagonistic, however, and the prospects for cooperation appear to be receding. To explore whether there are still grounds for cooperation on issues of common concern between the two countries, in March 2018 the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations convened a group of fifteen experts from the United States and China for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation.” CPA partnered with Peking University’s School of International Studies in Beijing for the workshop and also met with experts at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in Shanghai. During the workshop, President Donald J. Trump announced plans to impose about $60 billion in new tariffs on Chinese imports. While trade was a major topic of discussion, it was by no means the only area discussed. Workshop participants assessed conflicting views of the sources of global disorder and examined areas of global governance such as international trade, development, the environment, and the future of various multilateral institutions. They also discussed the most pressing security challenges in East and Southwest Asia. Participants highlighted the need for a greater understanding between the United States and China on the evolving international order. No major transnational problems will be solved without some cooperation between the two powers. It is therefore imperative that the two countries avoid a further deterioration of the relationship and instead identify areas of potential cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Social Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

46. The Sino-Russian and US-Russian relationships: Current developments and future trends

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark Katz, and Teija Tiilikainen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The great-power system has been in constant change since the end of the Cold War. The US became the hegemonic power, and under its shelter, the European Union was able to transform into a European-wide political body. Soon, a group of leading regional powers started to question the universalist aspirations of the Western-led international order. Two members of this club in particular were not satisfied with the role of a regional hegemon and had more global ambitions. China has already become the largest trading nation globally, and Chinese foreign policy has assumed an assertive tone. China has both the potential to challenge US hegemony, as well as the political will to use it. Russia’s project to achieve a global great-power status, on the other hand, is inspired by its historical identity and its alleged humiliation by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia longs for recognition of its great-power status in particular from the US. This report focuses on relations between China and Russia on the one hand and the US and Russia on the other. It analyses the current developments and future trends in these relationships, as well as their implications for the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

47. The EU and China: Modest Signs of Convergence?

Author:
Gustaaf Geeraets
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Against a background in which the United States is increasingly drawing into question its commitments to free trade and the global commons, the challenge for the EU and China is to deal with a global governance system that is evolving from a multilateral system centred around the US into a more diffuse system resting on the three strong trading poles: China, the EU and the US.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Governance, European Union, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

48. The Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy

Author:
Munk School of Global Affairs
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto
Abstract:
This report highlights the summary of discussions and key policy recommendations from the 2016 Canada-UK Colloquium Report (CUKC) in Edmonton last November 2016, chaired by the Hon. Jean Charest, which brought together fifty high-level policymakers, academics, industry leaders and young scholars.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Canada, and North America

49. What the Trump Administration’s NAFTA Priorities Get Right (and Wrong) About Digital Trade

Author:
Anupam Chander
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Digital commerce and trade are increasingly important to the global economy. Seven of the ten most valuable firms today are technology companies (Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, Alibaba, and Tencent). Data, according to some analysts, is the new oil. A major study concluded that the internet has powered some one-fifth of recent economic growth within the leading economies. Jobs are increasingly dependent on digitization; digital skills are needed for all but two job categories [PDF] in the United States: dishwashing and food cooking. Just as national economies are becoming more digitized, barriers to digital trade are being erected. These barriers limit opportunities for consumers to access global providers and for small- and medium-sized enterprises to reach new customers. It is not only technology firms that suffer; all enterprises with international operations need cross-border data flows to process, analyze, and transfer data about employees, customers, and operations. Global supply chains depend on the flow of goods, data, and services across borders. Moreover, commitment to the free flow of information across borders is essential to freedom of expression. Digital trade is about more than access to markets; it is about access to information. The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an excellent opportunity to set the gold standard for digital free trade. Despite public pronouncements about the harm free trade causes to the steel and automobile industries, the Donald J. Trump administration, to its credit, recognizes the importance of removing digital trade barriers in its stated objectives for the NAFTA renegotiation [PDF]. In its negotiations with Canada and Mexico, the Trump administration should seek rules limiting data localization, promote a balanced approach to intellectual property protections, support cross-border privacy rules, and remove barriers that hinder the trade of services.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, and NAFTA
Political Geography:
United States, Canada, North America, and Mexico

50. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship

Author:
Jennifer M. Harris
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America