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51. Reality Injection: Beyond Masks and Quarantine The True Cost of COVID-19

Author:
Eric D. Achtmann, Raquel Bono, Anita Goel, Margaret A. Hanson-Muse, and Steven M. Jones
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
COVID-19 has had a profound economic and social impact on America, taking over a half million lives—more than all American deaths in World War I, World War II, and Vietnam, combined.1 This article seeks to examine primary and secondary consequences of the pandemic in practical terms for the average citizen and taxpayer, whose personal exposure exceeds 2.5 years of net income based on predictions of a $16 to $35 trillion cost to the nation by 2025. Further, we offer insight into the pandemic’s collateral effects on our citizens and workforce (including often overlooked key stakeholders such as women, children, and minorities), as well as more overt aspects of our national security. History will measure the pandemic’s tragic and overwhelming impact on the world—and our country—in terms of infections, hospitalizations, vaccinations, and deaths. Yet, as COVID-19 extends our quasi-lockdown into its 18th month, we are scarcely beginning to comprehend its profound economic impact. A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates Americans’ costs at nearly $16 trillioni or double its May 2020 projections.2 To a layperson, $16 trillion is the wealth of 16 million millionaires or $110k for each U.S. taxpayer. Analysts expect this number to reach $35 trillion by 20253—a sum that easily exceeds the initiatives Congress has fought over for yearsii. Another study conducted by the Journal of the American Medical Association reached a similar conclusion. “About half of the price tag, $8.6 trillion (about $26,000 per person in the United States), is driven by the long-term health implications and costs for those who contract COVID-19, as well as the statistical estimates for the loss of life.”4 Robert Frost’s words aptly depict society’s effort to overcome the pandemic’s effects, “…miles to go before [we] sleep.” The stock market crash of 1929, in hindsight a predictable occurrence, unleashed a 10-year Great Depression. Likewise, the COVID-19 contagion, an equally predictable event, portends a similar trend. Long term, it compels society to address its socio-economic impact, acknowledge its lack of preparedness, and formulate a realistic action plan for protection against this and future pandemics, as well as potential biowarfare attacks. A similar event is inevitable, whether through malfeasance, rapidly increasing population density, environmental stress, biowarfare attack, or simply bad luck. So is society’s realization of two things: our economy and civilization will struggle to survive another pandemic in the near term, and that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” While one can theoretically shut down the engines and glide a plane to safety in an emergency, there is no substitute for proper planning, operations, and maintenance. Society needs a more proactive and anticipatory approach to national and global security, biodefense, and pandemic prevention and mitigation.5 Leaders need a strategy that leverages the resources of both the public and private sectors, as well as academic and individual initiative. Failure to do this is not an option—it is too costly and could lead to the collapse of entire economies and societies.
Topic:
Economy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

52. The Impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Nayantara D. Hensel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed a number of challenges on countries and industries, some of which have been partially mitigated by government efforts, medical developments, and corporate strategies. Nevertheless, COVID-19, which, in March 2020, was identified as a pandemic by the World Health Organization and was declared by the U.S. government as a national emergency,1 will likely continue to have after-effects in the coming years. The defense sector, as has been the case with many other sectors, has faced challenges in declining production at manufacturing plants, difficulties with key inputs from sole source suppliers, concerns regarding the financial viability of small businesses within the supply chains, and the impact of different variants of COVID-19 within the global supply chains. Companies which had diversified between commercial and military clients often faced a greater negative impact on their financial strength than companies with largely defense-focused products. This was partially due to the decline in demand within the commercial aerospace sector as a result of COVID-19. The financial health of companies across industries suffered due to COVID-19; indeed, this was reflected in the almost 30 percent increase in commercial chapter 11 filings in 2020 compared to 2019, with bankruptcies reaching their highest levels since 2012.2 The sectors with the greatest number of bankruptcies in 2020 were real estate, oil and gas, restaurants, entertainment, and retail.3 While bankruptcies were lower among firms in the defense sector due to stability in multi-year contracts with the government, as well as support of smaller suppliers by larger suppliers and by the government, defense firms with a greater focus on commercial clients suffered more. Consequently, although funding from the federal government under the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, as well as funding from the Department of Defense (DOD), provided support for companies within the defense sector and other sectors, defense firms continue to face challenges in the short-term and, potentially, in the longer-term. Moreover, the impact of COVID-19 relief funding could have long-term effects on government deficits and debt, which may reduce defense spending in future years. Indeed, the potential atrophy in the defense industrial base due to the impact of COVID-19 on the financial health of defense companies and on future government spending could lead to national security risks. Production of key defense products—aircraft, ships, tanks, cybersecurity technology, etc.—is vital in supporting national security strategies in various regions and through various types of warfare.
Topic:
Economy, Manufacturing, Pandemic, Industry, Defense Industry, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

53. Handling "Value" in the US-China Conflict

Author:
Naoko Funatsu
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The escalating confrontation between the United States and China has been one of the most important issues in American foreign policy in recent years. The weight of US foreign policy toward China has increased as China's presence in the international community has grown. This is due to China's remarkable economic growth, and many countries around the world sought to incorporate the booming Chinese economy into the international economy to promote their own economic growth; the United States had been no exception. As globalization and China's economy continued to grow, however, the trade imbalance between the US and China expanded, and the trade deficit with China became an issue in the US. In the US presidential election of November 2016, Republican candidate Donald J. Trump made correcting the trade deficit with China a policy priority and was elected. When the administration took office in January 2017, it was marked by a discourse based on economic nationalism, one of the characteristics of a Trump administration committed to putting "America first".
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Rebuilding the Midwest's infrastructure: Driving equitable economic recovery in a world reshaped by COVID-19

Author:
John Austin and Alexander Hitch
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
In the midst of a national discussion about the need to update our infrastructure, the Midwest is primed for a new round of investment. The agenda for the country and for the Midwest must reflect the realities of an economy and society shaped by longstanding structural, economic, racial, and geographic inequities, accentuated by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, this moment offers a clear opportunity to ensure that a new infrastructure development plan capitalizes on the unique assets and economic opportunities inherent to each region to accelerate economic growth and spread its benefits to more people and places. In the Midwest, this agenda includes several core components. It must adapt to the economic realities of the post-COVID-19 world. It must also contribute to innovation in a host of sectors—from manufacturing to product-delivery systems to health care—while enhancing the ability to organize state- and local-level infrastructure initiatives. Finally, it must dovetail with the urgent need and newfound political will to close gaps in equity and opportunity based on race, income, and geography.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

56. Cooperation or Coercion? The Views of US Opinion Leaders on Foreign Policy Approaches

Author:
Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Joshua W. Busby, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Monten
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Following four years of former President Donald Trump’s “America first” foreign policy, President Joe Biden is seeking to reorient the US approach to world affairs, placing much greater emphasis on international cooperation. This reorientation has already been evident in Biden’s decisions to return the United States to the Paris climate agreement, extend the New START arms control treaty with Russia, remain in the World Health Organization, reengage with the United Nations Human Rights Council, and commit to rejoining the Iran nuclear deal if Iran returns to complying with it. To what extent do Democratic, Republican, and Independent foreign policy professionals support Biden’s international agenda? The results of the 2020 Chicago Council on Global Affairs-University of Texas at Austin survey of more than 900 US executive branch officials, congressional staff, think tank scholars, university professors, journalists, and interest group representatives indicates there is substantial support among leaders of different political persuasions for a greater emphasis on cooperation and less reliance on coercion in foreign policy. However, this consensus also has a partisan tilt: Democrats and Independents are far more likely to agree on cooperative foreign policy approaches the United States should use, while Republicans are more comfortable with coercive measures. Taken together, these findings suggest that Biden should be able to attract strong support for his foreign policy from Democratic and Independent members of the foreign 2 policy community but will find it much more difficult to gain Republican backing for many of his international initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Economy, Business, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and North America

57. Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Lawson W. Brigham, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, the Arctic was largely immune to the geopolitical tensions that play out between Russia and the transatlantic partners in other regions and on other issues. Indeed, the Arctic is one area where the United States and Russia, together with the other Arctic states, have engaged in quiet cooperation on issues including search and rescue, scientific research, and the environment. Such pragmatic cooperation has been possible in part because bilateral irritants are diffused by shared and cross-cutting interests among all eight Arctic states, as well as the region’s multilayered governance regime.1 However, climate change and the Arctic’s melting sea ice have opened access and allowed for increased human activity, which, in turn, has amplified competition in the region. At stake are core national interests for the Arctic states, ranging from economic opportunities to security and stability. The region’s growing importance and level of activity, alongside the lack of trust and limited dialogue on military issues between Russia and the United States, raise the risk of conflict and instability in the region. For Russia, its part of the Arctic, including an increasingly accessible Northern Sea Route, is central to core national security concerns and an important pillar of the economy and future development. To secure its interests, the Kremlin has taken numerous actions, many of them military, in the Arctic that are of shared concern to the other Arctic nations and NATO.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

58. Fragile States Index 2021 – Annual Report

Author:
Natalie Fiertz, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Emily Sample, and Wendy Wilson
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Climate Change, Authoritarianism, Employment, Fragile States, Economy, Political stability, Conflict, Crisis Management, Peace, Resilience, COVID-19, Health Crisis, Early Warning, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Tajikistan, Germany, Armenia, Central America, Spain, Lebanon, Timor-Leste, North America, Ethiopia, Southeast Asia, El Salvador, Global Focus, and United States of America

59. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

60. Another reason to raise the Fed's inflation target: An employment and output boom

Author:
David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
In 2012, the Federal Reserve formally adopted an inflation target and set it at 2 percent, in line with the level chosen by many other central banks. In hindsight, this setting left policymakers with too little room to cut interest rates when they want to fight recessions. Many researchers have noted that if central banks raised their inflation targets—either individually or in concert—they could do a better job in the long run of keeping inflation near its target and the workforce fully employed. Reifschneider and Wilcox highlight an additional and less-noted consequence of raising the inflation target modestly: The economy could enjoy a temporary but substantial boom in employment and output as it adjusted to the increase in the target. Critical to generating this favorable outcome would be decisive action by monetary policymakers to ensure that the higher inflation target is achieved in a reasonably timely manner. In light of substantial transition benefits, as well as the long-run improvement in economic performance, the authors recommend that the Federal Reserve raise its inflation target to 3 percent as part of its next framework review.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Employment, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America