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531. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity

Author:
Seongho Sheen
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

532. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

533. Toward a Smart Alliance: The ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Asia is the region where a quarter of the total of American products is consumed, major bilateral allies exist, various networks of mul-tilateral institutions operate, and new powers are rising. President Obama, during his first Asia trip, tried to emphasize that America is an Asia-Pacific power that will continue its commitment through a renewed East Asia strategy of “power of balance.” Now at the crossroads of China’s foreign policy of “har-mony,” Japan’s new concept of “fraternity,” and South Korea’s catchphrase of “pragmatic for-eign policy,” the United States needs to refresh its role which has been defined as a “regional stabilizer.” People in Asia are eager to see Pres-ident Obama’s new approach to his East Asia strategy, because he inherited from his prede-cessor a triple crisis in the areas of security, soft power, and economy. President Obama’s recent Asia trip has certainly attracted the minds of many people in Asia with his concepts of strong “partnership,” and a positive-sum Asian future, as expressed in his address at the Suntory Hall, Japan. As the communication power of a network becomes more important in 21st century international politics, President Obama’s Asia trip means a lot with his efforts for public diplomacy. Putting aside images and metaphors, the strategic orientation of the United States’ East Asia strategy still needs to be more specified. People in Asia are concerned about four areas: 1) how the United States will cooperate with a rising China in producing a consensus in many sensitive and difficult areas such as mili-tary competition, economic interdependence, climate change, and ideational orientation; 2) how the United States will redefine the role of bilateral alliances which should go beyond the task of military cooperation, stretching to re-gional security and non-traditional security issues; 3) how the United States will facilitate the creation and the development of multila-teral cooperative institutions by actively par-ticipating in them; 4) and how the US will deal with security threats such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, cross-Strait relations, East Asian nationalism, and, most of all, regional power transition. So far, the United States seems to be more focused upon recovery from the economic crisis and getting help from various Asian partners in this effort. That leaves open the question of how to redefine the United States’ role in the rapidly changing environment of Asian international relations. Despite a relatively short stay in Seoul for about 20 hours, President Obama confirmed his commitment to South Korea with renewed words and statements: he underscored the importance of the KORUS FTA not just from an economic perspective, but also from a stra-tegic standpoint; he promised to provide con-tinued extended nuclear deterrence; he basi-cally agreed with South Korea’s approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through a more comprehensive deal; and he highlighted new areas of cooperation at the global level such as climate change, Afghanis-tan, economic recovery, and the development of the G-20. South Koreans expect that the KORUS FTA will be the stepping stone for strengthening bilateral economic and strategic relations, recovery of both countries’ econo-mies, and improving interdependent regional economic relations. Regarding the North Ko-rean nuclear crisis, it seems that there is still a lot more to be done in making North Korea give up completely its nuclear program. This will require more intense and creative dialo-gue between Seoul and Washington. As North Korea has not made any strategic decision regarding its nuclear program and any future national strategic orientation, its return to the Six-Party Talks will only just be the beginning in yet another difficult series of negotiations. South Korea, as a strong American ally and a potential global middle power, will continue to work closely with the United States. The two countries need to search for new tasks and functions for bilateral cooperation in a world of rapidly changing international relations, where “smart” alliance and “21st century international statecraft” are required.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

534. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: President Obama’s First 100 Days

Author:
Randall Schriver and Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Befitting for a prominent ally, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton waited only a day to establish communication with her counterpart in Japan. While the gesture is surely appreciated in Tokyo, and the symbolism was not lost in Washington, the messages revealed little about the Administration’s intentions (if any) to take concrete steps to enhance the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Barack Obama
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

535. Is There Time to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Obama administration has identified September as a time for reassessing its approach to negotiation with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. It is imperative that this reassessment is based on a realistic appraisal of Iran's weaponization capabilities and limitations and not fall prey to politically motivated hyperbole. Iran's nuclear program is undeniably bringing that country closer to an ability to construct nuclear weapons-bad news for the region, the United States, and the world. Yet, a nuclear-armed Iran is years, not months, away, which is ample time for negotiating an outcome that prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state while strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

536. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff

Author:
William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

537. Iran-U.S.: The Case for Transformation

Author:
Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini and John Tirman
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Thirty years of enmity, disruption, and brinksmanship have yielded very little worthwhile in the relationship between Iran and the United States. The policies in both capitals toward the other are essentially bankrupt and dysfunctional. Each clings to their quiver of grievances against the other, letting the past dictate the future to the detriment of both countries. It may be time to turn this animus on its head—seeking a broad accommodation— and an opportunity for transformational diplomacy. While ample sources of suspicion and distrust have fed this simmering hostility, these sources do not warrant the war footing, attempts at isolation, political violence, and rhetoric of a looming Armageddon that mark the U.S.-Iran tangle. Both countries suf- fer high costs stemming from the confrontation. These two major states, one far more powerful than the other, are bound to compete and test each other, but in a region rife with instability, they also need each other. Iranians are weary of the cacophony of hatred. In America, the Iraq war is still a nightmare and the public is in no mood for more. A comprehensive concordat instead would serve the U.S. and Iran and help steady a very rickety part of the world. What the change is and how it is engineered are crucial, however. There is an appli- cable lesson from diplomatic history: bold and sweeping transformation may be prefera- ble—more successful and, paradoxically, easier to engineer—to small, incremental steps. Whether there is the political acumen in the leadership of either country to initiate such transformative diplomacy is arguable. But the logic of a new concordat is powerful, especially if seen through an unemotional lens of national interests and the security of the United States and Iran.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

538. China’s Premature Rise to Great Power

Author:
Liselotte Odgaard
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
China's so-called rise to great power status is usually taken for granted. Still, a convicning argument can be made that Beijing's post-Cold War grand strategy is based on fear of failure rather than management of success. China only qualifies as a great power by the skin of its teeth, if the lower limit of such status is defined as the ability to decide how to do things in either the economic, military or political sectors of the international system.1 China’s position as a political great power is largely determined by the implosion of the Soviet Union. Its ascendancy to this rank has been based on psychology in that a successor challenging U.S. pre-eminence was expected and pronounced before the fact. While Beijing has convinced the surroundings that China is a great power, it is struggling to catch up both economically and militarily with the United States. Contemporary China faces three major challenges: economically and militarily it con- tinues to lag far behind the United States, U.S. grand strategy threatens its rise, and a Chinese alternative to the liberal model of state-society relations has not been developed. Beijing’s foreign policy is therefore based on the premise of how to avoid China’s descent into the ranks of secondary powers.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

539. Understanding East Asian Cross-Regionalism: An Analytical Framework

Author:
Mireya Solís and Saori N. Katada
Publication Date:
06-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
University of British Columbia
Abstract:
A key feature of East Asian FTA diplomacy remains unacknowledged and, therefore, unaccounted for: the activism displayed in seeking preferential trading relations with countries outside the region. While European and North American countries have also pursued cross-regional trade agreements (CRTAs), East Asia is unique in pursuing extra-regional partnerships before consolidating the regional trade integration process. This framework article identifies the common patterns and fundamental factors behind the East Asian governments' moves towards establishing CRTAs. After laying out the conventional arguments—ranging from the extra-regional market dependence, the region's security arrangements, and economic and political motives behind East Asia's extra-regional interests—the article introduces the novel concept of "leverage." This notion highlights how cross-regional and intra-regional FTA initiatives are intimately linked: East Asian countries frequently choose an extraregional FTA partner in order to break regional inertias that hinder integration, to win domestic battles, and to appropriate extra-regional negotiation modalities that they can use in their subsequent intra-regional FTA negotiations. The article concludes with a summary of the findings from the country cases, and the policy implications of East Asia's porous regionalism, with its heavy doses of cross-regional trade initiatives.
Topic:
Diplomacy
Political Geography:
East Asia and North America

540. Russia and America: Is Another Arms Race Afoot?

Author:
Jane M.O. Sharp
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
During the Cold War years we learned that successful arms con- trol agreements with the Soviet Union were those that codified parity, or at least a mutually acceptable status quo. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1991, a much diminished Russia saw all its WTO allies and three former Soviet republics join NATO, making parity harder to achieve. But there are still compelling reasons to shape agreements that satisfy all parties. During the 1990s, under Boris Yeltsin, Russia strove to be represented as an equal to the United States in arms control diplomacy and in negotiations concerning the future of former Yugoslavia. President Bill Clinton tried to meet Yeltsin’s concerns, but there has been little constructive cooperation on arms control between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. Indeed, since 2000, Bush has been hostile to any kind of multilateral diplomacy. He began his presidency with a new generation of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, an agreement that had stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations for two decades. In Russia, an increasingly belligerent Putin, flush with oil money, is now determined to be accorded great power status in his dealings with the West. He is asserting himself in many areas: trying to block independence for Kosovo; countering U.S. sanctions against Iran; and renegotiating arms control agreements concluded when Russia was weak. While Putin is viewed with increasing wariness in the West, on arms control he has some points that need to be taken seriously.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America