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501. The Rebalance Picks up Steam

Author:
Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The big news over the summer is the granting of “fast track” Trade Promotion Authority to President Obama by the US Congress. This keeps hopes alive for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the economic centerpiece of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia. The political and military legs of this multidimensional strategy got a boost as Secretary of State John Kerry attended the annual ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meeting and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter headlined the show at the Shangri-La Dialogue. China continues to make its presence felt in regional affairs as well; President Xi Jinping attended meetings in Ufa, Russia with other BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders and hosted a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) Special Working Group and Senior Officials Committee Meeting and first CICA Youth Council Conference in Beijing, while continuing to pursue his Silk Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiatives, even as China’s economy took a significant hit. Meanwhile, Pyongyang engaged in another round of Russian roulette but backed down when it became apparent Seoul was prepared to pull the trigger. Finally, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II put history on the front pages. That opened the door to the next round of negotiations among TPP representatives in July in Maui, but they couldn’t close the deal. Post-mortems blamed disputes between Japan and North America over cars (Mexico was particularly incensed over “rules of origin” that would impact its access to the US market), New Zealand recalcitrance over trade in dairy items (pique inspired by Canada’s refusal to open its market, which prompted the US and Japan to low-ball their offers), a split between Australia and the US over sugar markets, and US resistance to any cuts in the duration of intellectual property rights monopoly periods for next-generation drugs. US Trade Representative Michael Froman said the talks made “significant progress” – Australian Trade Minister Andrew Robb agreed, adding that “98 percent is concluded” – but the tough issues remained, well, hard to resolve. In his analysis for The Oriental Economist, Rick Katz argued that deals negotiated with Congress to secure TPA reduced Froman’s negotiating room. There is fear now that the failure to reach agreement means that no deal will be concluded for at least another year and a half. Canada holds an election in October and the conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper needs to hold the line on agriculture imports to avoid losing votes. That means that he cannot negotiate a deal until after that ballot – assuming he wins; an opposition victory will raise the bar to any deal – which then pushes any final agreement to 2016 and the midst of a US presidential campaign, which is no time for bold legislative action. If that assessment is correct, then there is the possibility that a final deal won’t be concluded until 2017 or 2018.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, and United States of America

502. History and Other Alliance Constraints

Author:
Charles McClean and Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of a highly successful April visit by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to Washington, the US-Japan relationship seemed poised for a celebration of success in revamping the alliance. Two focal points of alliance policymakers were the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But over the summer, both of these initiatives came under political scrutiny. Beyond alliance priorities, the US and Japan faced additional dilemmas in how to deal with a more assertive and sensitive China. Artificial island building by China in the South China Sea brought the US and Japan into closer dialogue over regional maritime cooperation. At the end of the summer, the much-anticipated commemorations of the end of World War II in Japan and China brought heightened sensitivity to the region. Beyond bilateral alliance priorities, the US and Japan faced additional dilemmas, both related to dealing with a more assertive and sensitive China. Artificial island building in the Spratlys and a cyber attack on the US Office of Personnel Management rattled US-China relations, which brought the US and Japan into closer dialogue over regional maritime cooperation. Senior Japanese military leaders began to speak publicly about the possibility of a larger Japanese role in the South China Sea. At the end of the summer, the much-anticipated commemorations of the end of World War II in Japan and China brought heightened sensitivity to the region. The Aug. 14 Abe Statement and Xi Jinping’s speech at the national military parade on Sept. 3, the day of Japanese surrender in China, demonstrated the distance between the two neighbors. Each revealed a new revisionist gaze on their war legacy, and it was hard to ignore the undertones of contemporary bilateral tensions in both leaders’ remarks. Abe chose not to travel to China, although he did not announce his decision until just days before.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

503. Prospects for a Strategic Partnership?

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
President Park Geun-hye’s participation in China’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of WWII in September affirmed Seoul’s ties with China, while enabling Seoul to go on the offensive to win Beijing’s acceptance of a Seoul-led reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The escalation of inter-Korean tensions in late August revealed the dilemmas underlying Seoul’s regional diplomacy that continue to undermine coordination on North Korea and other security challenges. Nevertheless, both China and South Korea are engaging in parallel efforts to revive commercial ties with the North. Meanwhile, South Korea has made clear for now that its ability to engage China lies firmly on the foundations provided by a strong US-ROK security alliance; however, we expect that Beijing will continuously test Seoul’s allegiances. Although Workers’ Party of Korea Secretary Choe Ryong Hae represented Pyongyang at the war commemoration ceremonies and military parade in Beijing, replacing Kim Jong Un with Park on the rostrum and the absence of direct leadership exchanges between China and North Korea indicates Pyongyang’s continued political isolation. Likewise, nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam “exchanged greetings” with President Xi at Moscow’s own WWII commemorations on May 9 according to the DPRK state media, but both Beijing and Pyongyang downplayed the exchange. DPRK missile tests on May 9 and June 14 demonstrated Kim Jong Un’s growing nuclear drive and his dismissal of Chinese calls for regional stability. At ASEAN meetings on August 5-6 in Kuala Lumpur, PRC and ROK Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Yun Byung-se joined regional partners in opposing North Korean actions. Later, an artillery exchange between the two Koreas on Aug. 20 threatened to escalate tensions on the peninsula and underscored the ongoing deadlock in regional diplomacy. North Korea bristled at Chinese statements calling on the two Koreas to “exercise restraint.” In fact, China and South Korea are conducting vibrant exchanges, while China’s interactions with North Korea are nowhere to be seen. Six months after Presidents Xi and Park declared the end of substantive talks, Commerce Ministers Gao Hucheng and Yoo Sang-jick signed the China-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Seoul on June 1. Gao also met President Park and Foreign Minister Yun. China-South Korean political and military interactions indicate efforts to upgrade their partnership beyond trade. Top legislator Zhang Dejiang made a three-day visit to South Korea on June 10-12, meeting President Park, National Assembly Speaker Chung Ui-hwa, and ruling Saenuri Party leader Kim Moo-sung. On the military side, PRC Defense Minister Chang Wanquan met ROK Army Chief of Staff Kim Yo-hwan in Beijing on May 12, while ROK counterpart Han Min-koo met PLA Vice Chief of Staff Sun Jianguo at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore later that month. PLA Navy Commander Adm. Wu Shengli met ROK Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Chung Ho-seop in Beijing on June 11. Despite agreements on bilateral security cooperation, however, such exchanges did not produce any pledges on how to address immediate security threats from North Korea. South Korea’s military ties with the US emerged as a clear point of friction ahead of meetings between regional defense chiefs in May.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

504. To August 15 – Toward September 3

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The summer months witnessed a parade of senior Liberal Democratic Party figures traveling to Beijing. The visits were aimed at sustaining positive political trends, securing an invitation for Abe to visit China, and anticipating issues related to Abe’s August statement commemorating the end of World War II. Meanwhile, China prepared to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War with a victory parade on Sept. 3. Against this backdrop, each country sought to enhance its security posture in the East China Sea and South China Sea, further besetting bilateral relations.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

505. Alliance, Trade, Climate, and China

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Obama administration and the Abbott government stood together in the new military coalition in Iraq and joined in the trade push for a Trans-Pacific Partnership. Australia’s Defence White Paper, about to be released, will be a strong and detailed statement of support for the alliance with the US. Yet, the discussion of the US-Australia relationship often turned into a debate about China. The notable political difference between Obama and Abbott in the past 12 months was over climate change. The US president highlighted the policy difference in a speech during the G20 Summit that Abbott hosted in Brisbane. The other divergence between Australia and the US was over China’s creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. After initially sharing US fears about the bank, the Abbott government eventually decided to abandon the US and Japan and became a founding member.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

506. US and Russia Can End Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium for Medical Uses

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A new report co-authored by CNS Senior Research Associate Miles Pomper recommends steps for the United States and Russia to cooperate in ending Russian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in medical isotope production, an important step in keeping this nuclear weapons material from terrorists. Great progress has been achieved in recent years in minimizing civilian use of HEU as part of the international efforts to reduce the nuclear terrorism threat. In particular, the leading global suppliers of the molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) isotope, which is widely used in medical diagnostics, are taking steps to reduce and, in the medium time frame, completely eliminate the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Major new steps towards phasing out HEU use in medical isotopes production could be announced at the Nuclear Security Summit that will take place in The Hague on March 24-25, 2014. The Russian nuclear industry has set for itself an ambitious goal of becoming one of the three top global suppliers of Mo-99, used in 80 per cent of the medical procedures involving isotopes particularly as a diagnostic tool. Growing Russian production could help stabilize the global Mo-99 market, which faced severe shortages on several occasions in 2005-2013. According to some estimates, in 2010 during a six month period medical facilities around the world were unable to perform diagnostic procedures for several million people due to the shortage of Mo-99; the shortfall was estimated at 7 million doses. However, until recently, Russia had been bucking global trends by planning to use HEU fuels and targets rather than safer low enriched uranium (LEU) for much of this production. The ‘Ending HEU Use in Medical Isotope Production: Options for Russian-US Cooperation’ report co-authored by the Moscow-based Center for Energy for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) analyses what can be done by Moscow and Washington to harmonize the Russian producers’ plans to win a share of the global market, while at the same time facilitating the Russian nuclear industry’s transition to new market requirements for producing Mo-99 without HEU.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

507. An Independent Review of Foreign National Access Management for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Author:
Dick Thornburgh
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:
Over the last year, security incidents involving foreign nationals at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) research Centers have drawn the attention of the NASA Administrator and other agency leaders, Congress, and the media. Recognizing the growing threat of cyber-attacks and espionage aimed at government agencies by hostile nation-states and foreign adversaries, NASA asked the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) to conduct this review of its foreign national management processes. Having a well-run Foreign National Access Management (FNAM) program is in the best interests of NASA, both in terms of protecting vital U.S. security and proprietary information, as well as capitalizing on the talents of foreign nationals. This Academy review examined the Agency’s entire FNAM process from the initial request from a requestor or sponsor through foreign national vetting, credentialing, information technology security, counterintelligence, hosting and escort procedures, and export controls.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Space
Political Geography:
United States and North America

508. U.S.-Russia Health Engagement

Author:
Judyth L. Twigg
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over the last few years, Russia's relationship with the United States has traveled a swift and seemingly deliberate arc from partner to pariah. The current turmoil in Ukraine and near-certain resulting isolation of Russia culminate several years' worth of deteriorating ties. The Edward Snowden mess, disagreements over Syria and Iran, dismay over the eroding human rights environment in Russia, and now Russian annexation of Crimea have led the previously heralded "reset" to an unceremonious end. What are the implications of these and related developments for U.S.-Russia collaboration in medicine and public health? Should avenues of partnership remain open, even in such a frosty political context? Should the international community support Russia's health sector when ample resources exist within Russia itself? Is it even possible anymore?
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Health, Human Rights, Human Welfare, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and North America

509. Palestinian Public Opinion Offers Abbas Much Room for Maneuver

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A closer look at Palestinian views on prisoner releases, the Jewish state question, economic needs, and other issues suggests diplomatic openings are far from exhausted. As the United States works to salvage the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza is more prepared to accept various diplomatic compromises than official positions or elite attitudes would suggest. A number of new polls by different Palestinian pollsters, and in-depth discussions with Palestinian scholars and others in late March, indicate that Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas has greater latitude to make a deal than is often supposed. The polls cited here are from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), both based in Ramallah, and the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), based in Bethlehem.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and North America

510. U.S. Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, Part II: Assessment and Prospects

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The current impasse in Israeli-Palestinian talks is buffeted by a series of profound global and regional challenges, including Ukraine, Iran, and Syria, among others. In the immediate arena, while Israel and the Palestinian Authority may have dysfunctional political and diplomatic relations, they also have reasonably effective security cooperation and economic coordination. Therefore, a principal challenge for U.S. policy and for local leaders is to find ways to preserve, even enhance, the latter even as disagreement over the former worsens.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and North America