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411. Joaquim Nabuco, A Brazilian Light in Washington

Author:
Bruno Rosi
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
Throughout the 19th century, Brazil and the United States had little intense bilateral relations. This picture changed when the Baron of Rio Branco decided that his country should privilege relations with the United States. As part of his plan the Baron named Joaquim Nabuco as Brazil's first ambassador to Washington. However, Nabuco had an Americanism distinct from that of the Baron. He believed in the possibility of transforming the American continent into a zone of peace. This Americanism was linked to Nabuco's liberal world view, already evident in his struggle against slavery and in his pre-diplomatic intellectual trajectory.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:
United States, Brazil, South America, and North America

412. Hard Times for Soft Power: A Q&A with Joseph Nye

Author:
Michelle Nicholasen
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Last December, the Weatherhead Center recognized the upcoming retirement of University Distinguished Service Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. by dedicating the 2016 Manshel Lecture on American Foreign Policy to him. One of the most influential foreign affairs scholars of our time, Nye served as Center director from 1989 to 1992—though his roots at the Center trace back to its infancy in 1961, when he was a research assistant to Director Robert Bowie. Nye's accomplishments run deep. He began his distinguished career as a Harvard faculty member at the Kennedy School of Government in 1964, and became the school's dean in 1995. He held security appointments in both the Carter and Clinton administrations, and his thought leadership has influenced heads of state and policy makers around the world. He is perhaps best known for coining the term “soft power,” which describes the ability of states or institutions to attract and persuade others through noncoercive means. The Weatherhead Center sat down with Nye to discuss the fate of soft power in the context of current US foreign affairs—and also asked him to share his memories of early days at the CFIA.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

413. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
While relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated in recent years, making it exceedingly difficult for both countries to collaborate in managing a variety of common concerns, emerging challenges to global order make such cooperation increasingly imperative. To explore where U.S.-Russia cooperation is desirable and, in some places, even necessary, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty-three experts at the Tufts University European Center in Talloires, France, on June 9 and 10, 2017, for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation.”
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

414. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship

Author:
Jennifer M. Harris
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

415. Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy”

Author:
Nina Silove
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security Studies
Institution:
Security Studies
Abstract:
The questions of how to define grand strategy and whether it “exists” continue to vex the study of grand strategy, despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term. Scholars broadly agree that grand strategy refers to something that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state's highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). The precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics is less clear, indicating deficiencies in the methods used by scholars—usually implicitly—to define and operationalize concepts. This article traces the intellectual history and contemporary usage of the concept of grand strategy to identify the phenomenon or object to which the concept refers. This analysis demonstrates that there is no single concept of grand strategy. Instead, there are three, which are labelled “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behavior,” respectively. Each concept provides a distinct, valuable framework for research and policy prescription.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
United States and North America

416. Sino-American Preventive Diplomacy During the Cold War

Author:
Bertrand G. Ramcharan
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
From the advent to power of the Chinese Communist Party on October 1, 1949 to the historic visits of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971-72, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) were bitter enemies during the Cold War. China and the U.S. fought a war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and the two countries nearly came to war again on five different occasions: over Vietnam in 1954 and 1965, and over Taiwan in 1954-55, 1958-59 and 1962. However, the two sides were wary to come to blows again and each side engaged in efforts to help avoid this. However, the dangers of miscalculations, recklessness, or accidents were ever present. During the Korean War there was much talk in American circles about using nuclear weapons. A concerned British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, after consulting his French counterpart, went to see President Truman to help reduce the risks of this happening. The full records on this have never been published, but there is an authoritative account on the outcome from a senior American official.1 In 1959, President Eisenhower, concerned about the danger of continuing PRC provocations over Taiwan, sent a message to Chairman to Premier Mao via Premier Khruschev. The minutes of Premier Khruschev’s discussion with Chairman Mao make for fascinating reading.2 Another situation involving the use of preventive diplomacy occurred during the Polish crisis of 1956 when the CCP made strong representations to the CPSU against the escalation of military forces against the Polish demonstrators. There were thus seven situations (two with Korea, three with Taiwan, one with Vietnam, and one with the USSR) that attracted preventive diplomacy and a notable range of methods of preventive diplomacy applied. Among these one can mention the following: overt and covert communications from one side to the other; diplomatic messages; ambassadorial talks; and third party intercessions. This study will be approached from the perspective of the concept of preventive diplomacy while having regard to the concept of historical analogy.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Korean War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

417. Russia and USA: Rhetoric and Reality

Author:
Dmitry V. Shlapentokh
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Moralization is an essential part of any geo-political game, and that is especially the case with countries such as the United States and Russia. Presently, Washington has become especially prone to playing the morality card. At least, that is the case with Hillary Clinton supporters who stated that the ugliness of Donald Trump is clearly manifested by his desire to overlook the noble principles on which American foreign policy has rested since the founding fathers designed it. Consequently, Trump’s desire to befriend Vladimir Putin, the authoritarian Russian President, is a clear departure from his basic principles. Moscow also likes to assure that Russia always follows high moral principles in its foreign policy design. Still, Kremlin residents mostly limited moralizing to an internal audience, whereas people in Washington made the moralization publicly known to an international audience, urbis and orbis, so to speak. A closer look at the Soviet/Russia and the U.S. relationship could reveal that it is not high principles, whatever they might be in the context of the prevailing ideological shibboleth, but rather it is pragmatism that defines their relationship. The image of both countries has followed the pragmatic model. This implies that the U.S. and Russia could well cooperate in the future despite hostile rhetoric that dominated discourse in Moscow and Washington – a rhetoric that might not disappear completely in the future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

418. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
Mark Halchin
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America

419. The United States and Colombia: A Special Relationship

Author:
Juan Carlos Pinzon
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
The world has changed for Colombia. For the first time in more than 50 years, we are a nation building a lasting and stable peace. What has not changed is the special relationship Colombia shares with the United States. As the oldest and strongest democracies in the Western Hemisphere, the relationship between our two countries is deeply rooted in our steadfast commitment to the shared values of democracy, freedom and equality. It is an alliance built on a solid foundation of bipartisan support, and that too will not change. Successive Colombian governments have worked with Republican-led con­gresses and those controlled by Democrats, and we look forward to continuing to engage with the new Administration and Congress as we work to build sustainable peace. It was strong bipartisan support that made Plan Colombia the most successful U.S. bilateral initiative with a foreign nation—benefitting both countries and the entire region— and it is bipartisan support that will make the next phase of Plan Colombia—the Peace Colombia initiative—successful as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Democracy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
United States, Colombia, South America, and North America

420. U.S.-Ghana Relations Are Strong Following December 2016 Elections

Author:
Robert Jackson
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Ghana is one of the leading democracies on the African continent, with multiple peaceful interparty transitions since the return of multi-party democracy in 1992; a good record on human rights; an apolitical military; and a lively, free media. Ghanaians often note that whenever the Republican Party wins the White House, Ghana’s New Patriotic Party (NPP) wins Jubilee House—a coincidental tradition that held true again in 2016. Ghana’s presidential and parliamentary elections were peaceful, transparent, and credible; U.S. engagement played a critical role in that success, as well as in the resulting peaceful transition of power.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Elections, Democracy, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, North America, and Ghana