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191. US and Russia Can End Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium for Medical Uses

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A new report co-authored by CNS Senior Research Associate Miles Pomper recommends steps for the United States and Russia to cooperate in ending Russian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in medical isotope production, an important step in keeping this nuclear weapons material from terrorists. Great progress has been achieved in recent years in minimizing civilian use of HEU as part of the international efforts to reduce the nuclear terrorism threat. In particular, the leading global suppliers of the molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) isotope, which is widely used in medical diagnostics, are taking steps to reduce and, in the medium time frame, completely eliminate the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Major new steps towards phasing out HEU use in medical isotopes production could be announced at the Nuclear Security Summit that will take place in The Hague on March 24-25, 2014. The Russian nuclear industry has set for itself an ambitious goal of becoming one of the three top global suppliers of Mo-99, used in 80 per cent of the medical procedures involving isotopes particularly as a diagnostic tool. Growing Russian production could help stabilize the global Mo-99 market, which faced severe shortages on several occasions in 2005-2013. According to some estimates, in 2010 during a six month period medical facilities around the world were unable to perform diagnostic procedures for several million people due to the shortage of Mo-99; the shortfall was estimated at 7 million doses. However, until recently, Russia had been bucking global trends by planning to use HEU fuels and targets rather than safer low enriched uranium (LEU) for much of this production. The ‘Ending HEU Use in Medical Isotope Production: Options for Russian-US Cooperation’ report co-authored by the Moscow-based Center for Energy for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) analyses what can be done by Moscow and Washington to harmonize the Russian producers’ plans to win a share of the global market, while at the same time facilitating the Russian nuclear industry’s transition to new market requirements for producing Mo-99 without HEU.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

192. A Strategy for US Engagement in the Middle East: Contain Threats, Embrace Dignity

Author:
Michele Dunne and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In President Barack Obama's first term, his administration withdrew US forces from Iraq, ratcheted up pressure to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions, began the adjustment to relations with post-authoritarian governments in Arab countries including Egypt, struggled with how best to handle an increasingly bloody rebellion in Syria, and attempted to restart diplomacy on the Israeli/Palestinian problem. At the beginning of his second term, US interests are at significant risk as the region continues to undergo profound changes, and Arab and European allies are asking for greater US engagement. The region also presents the United States with unanticipated opportunities, such as the development of Arab democracies and a reduction in Iranian influence. The challenge facing the United States is how to lead without dominating, and how to protect and promote US interests without absolving other actors of responsibility. Thus, the task for this administration is to develop a strategy: to match the president's positive rhetoric with meaningful follow-up in terms of diplomacy, assistance, and security cooperation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and North America

193. US-Iran Cultural Engagement: A Cost Effective Boon to US National Security

Author:
Barbara Slavin and Ramin Asgard
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief of the Atlantic Council's Iran Task Force outlines the 179-year history of US contacts with Iran, which have experienced periods of breakdown but currently are continuing at a low level despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties. It also recommends actions to advance these exchanges as a national security imperative—especially as the nuclear dispute with the Iranian government could well persist.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Middle East and North America

194. The Arctic policies of Canada and the United States: domestic motives and international context

Author:
Kristofer Bergh
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic ice is melting. If current trends continue, there will be dramatic changes in the region, with far-reaching implications. At the same time, the receding ice opens the region to economic development, including through the exploitation of previously inaccessible hydrocarbons and minerals. In September 2011, both the Northern Sea Route (along Russia's north coast, formerly known as the Northeast Passage) and the Northwest Passage (along the northern coasts of Alaska and Canada) were open for some time, potentially creating shorter shipping routes between Asia, Europe and North America. Increased human activity in the sparsely populated and in hospitable Arctic requires new initiatives to achieve safety and security for the region's environment and its inhabitants and visitors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Political Economy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, Asia, and North America

195. Missile Defense System Negotiations: Washington-Warsaw-Moscow Triangle

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
When in March 1983 Ronald Reagan announced the initial plans to build a missile defense system purported to be able to “intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our [U.S.] own soil or that of our allies,” he in reality proclaimed the end of the deterrence and so called “balance of terror” doctrines which had formed the basis of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during what is known as the Cold War. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known at the time as "Star Wars," reformulated the power equation that had underpinned the “détente" period (1971-80). This project was abandoned with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in1991, which marked the end of the Cold War. However, more than ten years later, President George W. Bush reactivated it, signing bilateral agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland for the deployment of a radar system and advanced land based missile interceptors. With the election of President Barack Obama, the missile defense system was transformed from a bilateral project to a multilateral one, directly involving European allies and the very structure of the NATO alliance. The Kremlin strongly opposed the Euro-American missile deployment project, first in the 1980s and again into the 21th Century. Today as in the past, Russia’s complaints and rhetoric remain basically unchanged. It claims that the shield would compromise the effectiveness of the Russian long-range nuclear arsenal, thus drastically alter the balance of power with the West. A turning point seemed to have taken place at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Following a lively debate among diplomats, the European allies unanimously signed an agreement for the deployment of a missile defense system, which would provide “full coverage” of the Alliance area by 2020. More importantly, the final declaration of the summit heralded the birth of “cooperation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence.” However, such good intentions and noble sentiments are regarded as mere words by some, as there is no serious likelihood that both sides will cooperate on a joint defense project of this nature.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Poland, North America, and United States of America

196. The Foreign Policy Case For Senate Reform

Author:
Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
In a famous story about the creation of the Senate, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington were debating a possible upper legislative chamber over tea, and Jefferson wanted to know why it was necessary to create an undemocratic body like the Senate. In response, Washington asked Jefferson why he had poured some of his tea into a saucer. “To cool it,” Jefferson answered, to which Washington replied “Even so, we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.” The story (even if it might be apocryphal) illustrates that the slowness and deliberation of the Senate were intentional and designed to offset the popular passions that might govern the House of Representatives. The Senate’s rules were designed to emulate a gentleman’s club (such as the filibuster, which originated from the idea that gentlemen would have the good sense to limit the length of their speeches and that it would be rude to cut them off) but have become archaic as the body changed from a club to a typical legislative chamber. The rules of the Senate as they are currently designed have resulted in giving the opposition a trump card that is usually disproportionate to their legislative power. While its original structure incentivized moderation and compromise, the electoral system that populates its membership has incentivized partisanship. As a result the Senate has changed its form but not its function. The Senate can be deferential and deliberate or it can be factional and partisan, but it can’t be both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

197. What a Tangled Web: India Caught Between U.S. and Iranian Interests

Author:
Felix Imonti
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
India is caught between the consequences of provoking a United States driven by its fixation upon the Iranian nuclear program and by an Iran that is a major supplier of oil, providing India with access to its vital interests in Afghanistan. The best that the Ind
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

198. A Gilded Alliance: Global Korea’s G-20/Yeonpyeong Moment Revisited

Author:
Haejong Lee
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Alliance is an instrument for national interest, which is dependent upon the international environment and defined by domestic, democratic political processes. This commonsense notion of alliance was not fully embraced by the incoming South Korean administration of Lee Myung Bak in 2008. For the Lee administration, South Korea’s alliance with the United States was much more than an instrument of foreign policy. The alliance embodied South Korea’s political identity and was severely damaged by the preceding Roh Moo Hyun administration’s anti-American, pro–North Korean policies. The restoration of the Republic of Korea (ROK)–US alliance was both the goal and key to its national security strategy of Global Korea to enhance South Korean’s influence, contribution, and stature on a global scale. Thereafter, in a circle of the alliance’s cheerleaders in both Seoul and Washington, the alliance has almost taken its own life: the alliance should be protected from disruptive political forces and modernized/adjusted/expanded into new dimensions for the preservation of the alliance itself. In the post–Cold War years, the United States has tried to modernize its military alliances in order to preserve its influence at reduced costs. The Barack Obama administration had to mend US alliances strained during the George W. Bush administration’s war on terror. In 2009, Presidents Lee and Obama agreed on “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust.” The so-called Great Recession, triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, has both brought to power and bedeviled the Obama administration; 9/15 has become a new historical marker, replacing 9/11. The very “common values” of the ROK-US strategic alliance—democracy and market economy—have been put to the test; the worries and cries over the decline of the US have arisen once again. In May 2010, the Obama administration published its national security strategy of national renewal and global leadership. Nation-building at home was the primary goal of and imperative to national security. Along with moral leadership to “live” American values, global architecture to embed both allies and challengers in US-centered institutional networks became a new feature of American global leadership. “The United States can, must, and will lead in this new century,” asserted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2010 at the Council of Foreign Relations, the oldest bastion of American global leadership. She went on to declare that “the complexity and connection of today’s world have yielded a new American moment, a moment when our global leadership is essential, even if we must often lead in new ways.” Confirming that “the 21st century will be another great American century,” President Obama argued at this year’s Air Force Academy graduation ceremony that “we have laid the foundation for a new era of American leadership.” Global Korea, with a comprehensive strategic alliance and a free trade agreement with the United States and hosting of a G-20 meeting and nuclear security summit, has been an integral part and a success story of American global architecture. The Lee administration was awarded with the first two-plus-two (foreign and defense ministers) meeting in 2010, which had been previously held only with Japan, and a state visit to Washington in 2011. “The relation between our two countries has never been stronger,” commended Secretary of State Clinton in this year’s second two-plus-two meeting. Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin confirmed the 2015 operation control plan and expressed commitment to make “the alliance the best alliance in the world.” American Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lauded an ongoing trilateral collaboration, including Korea and Japan, to deter North Korea as “another way to strengthen and modernize our alliance.” It is widely disputed that the Obama administration has seized a new American moment and laid the foundation for a new American century. The Obama administration has been beset with rampant unemployment and snowballing deficits. “The Moment of Truth,” a bipartisan commission’s report on the financial crisis, issued a warning in 2010 that it is imperative to raise revenues and to cut both defense and nondefense spending—in short, a complete overhaul of the existing American national security state and social welfare system. However, the political polarization of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street and resultant partisan gridlock have foiled nation-building at home and led to the first downgrading of the US credit rating and a self-made financial cliff of sequester—mandatory across-the-board budget cuts in the next ten years beginning January 2013. Against its lean and mean years, the Obama administration’s rhetoric of a new American moment or century rings hollow. In contrast, the positive—it couldn’t be better—evaluation on the state of the ROK-US alliance is widely held. Nevertheless, the alliance’s success does not resonate with a (far from positive) strategic reality facing South Korea; nor does the alliance translate into a smooth-working component of American global architecture. The Lee administration has doubled down on its alliance with the US. With the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” or no policy toward North Korea, the Lee administration has succeeded in punishing/isolating North Korea but failed to prevent the latter’s development of nuclear capacity, not to mention the latter’s denuclearization. Or, to put it differently, when it comes to nuclear issues or power transition, North Korea has been on its own, with no South Korean leverage over the latter. Most critically and tragically, Global Korea’s prime moment of hosting a G-20 meeting in November 2010 (in the midst of the final renegotiation of a Korea-US free trade agreement) was followed by North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which in turn led to a joint Korean-US military exercise including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier and which was opposed by China. In the G-20/Yeonpyeong moment, the Lee administration succeeded in synchronizing its strategic and comprehensive alliance with the US and global contribution but rather miserably failed to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and manage its relationship with China. On the other hand, the ROK-US comprehensive and strategic alliance does not dispense with politics among allies; nor does it develop into a trilateral cooperation of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The Lee administration has been at odds with the United States on the issues of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and missile development, albeit much out of public scrutiny. In addition, the Lee administration has recently confronted Japan with the territorial issue of Dokdo and Japanese colonialism, along with a public relations campaign, including President Lee’s visit to Dokdo in August 2012. This was an abrupt turnabout from its attempt to share information with Japan on North Korea through a military accord—a trilateral collaboration that Panetta mentioned as a way to modernize the ROK-US alliance. Faced with a public uproar against the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Lee administration canceled the latter’s signing ceremony at the last minute and turned to confront Japan, which reciprocated with its territorial claim and disavowal of historical responsibilities for colonialism, and even a threat to halt financial cooperation. In sum, despite of (or because of, if you will) the much touted success of the ROK-US alliance, South Korea is now in a diplomatic wilderness, isolated from all of its neighbors—North Korea, China, and Japan. Why? It is, I argue, because President Lee’s Global Korea was a vision for a bygone, pre–Great Recession, and pre-G-2 world. As long as the United States confronted an assertive China with allies and new partners, South Korea’s strategic alliance with the United States could serve both the former’s security interests and the latter’s regional architect. The sinking of the Cheonan happened in the context of such confrontations of the United States and China over the South China Seas, which led to the rescheduling of transfer of operational control (from the United States to South Korea) from 2012 to 2015 that had been requested by the Lee administration. However, as the United States began to embrace China and both deemed it necessary to contain security tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an assertive South Korea against North Korea and China became a liability to the United States, and South Korea’s strategic, global, comprehensive alliance with the United States became superfluous, if not necessarily inimical, to South Korea’s local and regional interests. Such was the case after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Following is a reconstruction of an anticlimax of Global Korea in the historical contexts of the Obama administration’s struggles to forge a new American global leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, G20, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

199. Stuck in the Middle? U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Not since the visit of Deng Xiapoing in 1979 has a Chinese state visit attracted so much attention as President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States on January 19, 2011. After a rocky year in U.S.-China relations following President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009, attention naturally focused on the future direction of the relationship between the two countries. Further attention imbued with curiosity also centered on how a relatively declining United States and a rapidly rising China would shape the world order in the long-run. Also following North Korea’s provocations in 2010, the world carefully looked for any strong emphasis on the issue of the Korean Peninsula as a regional challenge. There have been two different interpretations in regards to the results of the U.S.-China summit: an optimistic outlook that the two countries will become cooperative partners and move forward as underscored in the Joint Statement, and pessimistic views that the two powers will merely continue the repeated pattern of conflict and check that they have been doing since November 2009. A similar mix of opinions prevails in regards to the Korean Peninsula. Some expect immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while others criticize the U.S.-China summit for barely papering over the cracks. However, neither hasty optimism nor gloomy pessimism is appropriate at this time. There is a need to utilize a comprehensive response strategy, which goes beyond narrow political understandings, based on a precise analysis of the results of the summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Summit
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

200. Hitting the Reset Button on U.S.-Russia Cooperation

Author:
Stephan M. Minikes
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For many years, I have been engaged in debate with other foreign policy practitioners over the question of whether the United States and Russia should work together. An improved U.S.-Russian relationship offers the prospect not only of improved cooperation on areas of mutual bilateral interest, but also enhanced cooperation within multilateral institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) where I was the U.S. Ambassador between 2001 and 2005.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and North America