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151. Where are the Carriers? U.S. National Strategy and the Choices Ahead

Author:
John F. Lehman
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to prepare for a potential conflict with a peer-level adversary, the debate around the utility of the aircraft carrier—and its role in such a contingency—once again has resurfaced. Since the carrier’s adoption over 100 years ago, policymakers and servicemembers have argued over the ship’s mission, size, vulnerability, and—of course—cost. These arguments have become increasingly more pointed as the armed services compete over diminishing financial resources. Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, with the assistance of Center for Naval Analyses Analyst Steve Wills, evaluates aircraft carrier options as he has done numerous times in the past. These choices include: Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered, large carrier; Light carriers based on amphibious warfare ships of the Wasp and America class; French nuclear-powered carrier Charles de Gaulle or conventionally powered British Queen Elizabeth-class carrier; A new medium carrier the size of the Cold War Midway-class ships. Lehman and Wills analyze these choices with fact-based criteria by considering a number of questions. What are the missions for air power at sea as the United States again confronts great power rivals in the form of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation? How “survivable” is the carrier in conditions of “modern” combat? How many carriers are needed for a global conflict? How big or small should that flattop be? How many and what type of carrier-based aircraft should it support? Can carrier aviation survive as an effective component of U.S. power projection and sea control capabilities without the kind of longer-range strike aircraft that it possessed during the Cold War? Where are the Carriers examines a wide range of sources, including those from Congress and the Defense Department, as well as carrier studies from both federally and privately funded research institutions, to develop a surprising conclusion on what the next U.S. carrier choice should be.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

152. Resilient Aerial Refueling: Safeguarding the US Military’s Global Reach

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US military’s aerial refueling enterprise is a critical component of its ability to project power globally in defense of American interests. As the US military adopts new concepts to enhance its lethality and gain decision advantage, aerial refueling is increasingly necessary to enable a more distributed and dynamic force. However, with an aging inventory of tanker aircraft and stiff budgetary headwinds, it is an open question whether the US Air Force is capable of fielding the aerial refueling force that the nation needs. This study assesses the current and programmed US aerial refueling enterprise and has found that it likely would be unable to support US strategy and operational concepts at scale against peer adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. However, the US military could address these shortfalls and improve the operational resilience of its aerial refueling enterprise by adopting new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

153. Advancing Decision-Centric Warfare: Gaining Advantage Through Force Design and Mission Integration

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Advancements in digital communication and virtualization are creating opportunities and challenges for integrating military capabilities similar to those associated with the emerging Internet of Things. Contemporary discussion in the Department of Defense (DoD) frames the military use case for integration as multi-domain operations, in which capabilities from different services and operating environments are combined to achieve a common objective. However, this paradigm merely perpetuates long-standing approaches to joint operations and misses the fundamental shift underway toward the centrality of information and decision-making in warfare. Attrition is receding as a mechanism to achieve national security objectives as computing and communication innovations enable military forces to gain a decision-making advantage through capability arrangement and orchestration that improves their own adaptability and creates uncertainty for opponents. To exploit this emerging opportunity, commanders in the field will need the ability to identify and implement new force combinations, communications paths, and courses of action. This report describes a new model for joint force design and integration, where elements of military capability are able to be composed and tailored to the needs of specific operational challenges close to the time of use. Combined with appropriate command and control processes and systems, this model of mission integration has the potential to provide military advantage against capable adversaries through the surprise generated from force composition and recombination. Mission integration could also reduce the cost of operations and modernization by enabling aggregation of less-expensive weapons systems to realize capabilities provided today by large multimission platforms or formations. However, institutional challenges will hinder implementation of mission integration. The plodding, supply-side processes of the Department of Defense are built on predictability and homogeneity of forces, in which weapon system performance and quantity are critical parameters. Supply-focused capability development and integration worked when the US military was broadly superior to its potential opponents following the Cold War. Today, US forces face peer competitors and must adopt more agile approaches to deliver and deploy capabilities. In addition to supply-side improvements in interoperability and decision-support tools to recompose forces, achieving mission-tailored adaptability will require demand-side customization of military capabilities such as radio waveforms, sensor packages, decision aids, warhead characteristics, or electromagnetic warfare algorithms to address evolving threats. Unfortunately, the Pentagon’s centralized industrial base and forecast-centric requirements and budgeting processes do not afford the flexibility to deliver this kind of heterogeneity at scale. This study uses an operational challenge vignette to describe a plausible pathway to implement mission integration that illustrates how clever and sustained force recomposition could fundamentally alter an adversary’s strategic calculus without developing a new weapon system. The vignette and associated analysis highlight specific recommendations for the Department of Defense to fund and explore the concept of mission integration, and to take an evolutionary approach to modernizing its institutional processes to exploit the opportunities afforded by changing technology and the emerging character of warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

154. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

155. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

156. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

157. Making Sense of Cents: Parsing the U.S. Department of Defense’s FY 2022 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report contextualizes the Biden administration’s discretionary funding request for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in fiscal year (FY) 2022, referred to as the “skinny” budget request. The report considers what this initial request—which has not yet been touched by Congress—may mean for the full FY 2022 Presidential Budget Request, given the identified priorities and available resources. The only detailed figure included in the defense budget request is the topline of $715 billion, which is higher than former President Donald Trump’s $705 billion FY 2021 budget request. However, when adjusted for inflation, it amounts to a flat budget. This report identifies several strategic objectives from the skinny budget request, the Biden administration’s interim national security strategic guidance, and the priorities publicly laid out by DoD leadership for which the U.S. government will need to allocate resources. These objectives have implications for ongoing departmental efforts and resourcing. The authors assert that: The continued prioritization of China means the DoD must simultaneously modernize its conventional and nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. The budget prioritizes additional missions for the DoD, like countering transnational threats—particularly climate change and biothreats such as COVID-19—but it does not resource these missions. There will be fewer resources for modernization due to pressure from the growing military personnel budget, as well as the operations and maintenance budget. The department will undertake these activities with fewer resources and less budgetary flexibility since the overseas contingency operations account has been terminated. However, this move will enhance long-term planning and should make it easier to align future budget requests with the strategy. The FY22 defense budget request identifies a number of planned activities and areas of emphasis, but it does not specify how much money will be allocated toward each area. This report focuses on six key areas of interest—the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), long-range fires, naval shipbuilding, research and development for technological innovation and readiness, nuclear modernization, and transnational threats—where the United States will need to make the greatest investments or tradeoffs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, Finance, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

158. Phantom Empire: The Illusionary Nature of U.S. Military Power

Author:
Richard Hanania
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has become a “Phantom Empire,” a country that appears to be powerful because it has a robust military presence abroad but cannot use garrisoned forces to achieve geopolitical objectives. More than 225,000 U.S. troops and DoD personnel are stationed abroad in more than 150 countries. The largest deployments are to wealthy U.S. allies (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) capable of defending themselves. U.S. leaders often justify military commitments by arguing they preserve “influence.” But because American leaders are committed, in most cases, to maintaining troops abroad as a good in and of itself, the U.S. squanders most of its leverage to influence hosts. Threats to withdraw troops are not credible, making them irrelevant for most U.S. geopolitical goals. The sources of U.S. power and influence are ultimately rooted in economic prosperity and soft power. A foreign policy that cultivates these sources of strength over maintaining military commitments would better achieve U.S. geopolitical goals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

159. Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid

Author:
Arthur Herman and Alexander Butler
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Millions without power; stores and banks shut down; vital services running on emergency generators, if at all; lines of hapless people awaiting food and water. The experience that the state of Texas underwent during February 2021 is only a preview of what we would all face should the United States’ ever-vulnerable energy grid be subject to a major cyberattack. For years, experts have been warning us of the national power grid’s vulnerability to attacks by such malicious actors as Russia, China, and Iran. A major task force within the US Department of Energy—the North American Energy Resiliency Model (NAERM)—has been tasked with determining how best to protect our energy grid from damage caused by not only natural disasters but also terrorism and cyber assaults. NAERM’s purview, however, encompasses only existing, conventional cyber threats and does not extend to quantum computer attacks, whose effects would be far more protracted and far worse than those of a conventional cyberattack. Indeed, the “smarter” a grid is, that is, the greater the extent to which it relies on computer supervision and control, the more vulnerable it would be to such an attack. The shutdown resulting from an attack by a future quantum computer, with its unprecedented power to easily decrypt existing encryption systems, could be the most catastrophic disaster our country has ever experienced. Using data supplied by global econometrics firm Oxford Economics, researchers at Hudson Institute’s Quantum Alliance Initiative are conducting a quantitative study designed to model the impact of a hypothetical future quantum cyberattack on the US power grid, and preliminary results indicate that protection of our power networks needs to be an urgent national priority. The study’s preliminary results offer important clues as to the areas on which policymakers should focus, not only to secure our power and energy grid from a large-scale quantum computer attack but also, in the event this were to be unsuccessful, to mitigate such an attack’s impact on our infrastructure, both in terms of economic and national security. As Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn wrote in his 1962 book Thinking About the Unthinkable, “Even the most utopian of today’s visionaries will have to concede that the mere existence of modern technology involves a risk to civilization that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years ago.” Today, we must once again consider the unthinkable, not the nuclear apocalypse that haunted Kahn and his generation in the 1950s and 1960s but a quantum apocalypse that, if not as physically and permanently destructive as a nuclear attack, could cause catastrophic harm to our economy and society unless proper steps are taken now to mitigate such an attack’s attendant risk.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Electricity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

160. Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U.S. War on Terror

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Congress passed a use of force authorisation that successive presidents have used to expand military action ever further. As part of our series The Legacy of 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, we argue that Washington should enact a new statute that promotes transparency and narrows the war’s scope
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America