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21. Resilient Alliance: Moving the U.S.-Philippines Security Relations Forward

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel and Carl W Baker
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.- Philippines Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, through the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Philippines bilateral security relations. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective organizations and affiliations. Pacific Forum’s publications do not necessarily reflect the positions of its staff, donors and sponsors.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, International Cooperation, Natural Disasters, Cybersecurity, Maritime, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

22. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kalberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Sharing cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi-domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

23. Sharpening the Blunt Tool: Why Deterrence Needs an Update in the Next U.S. National Security Strategy

Author:
Kyle J Wolfley
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy appeared to bring deterrence back: departing from its predecessor, the document prioritized the concept by including “preserving peace through strength” as a vital national interest. From nuclear weapons to cyberspace, the strategy emphasized the logics of denial and punishment, which were hallmarks of the classical deterrence theory that emerged after World War II. However, recent thinking on deterrence has evolved beyond these simple logics. Now emerging concepts such as tailored deterrence, cross-domain deterrence, and dissuasion offer new ideas to address criticisms of deterrence in theory and practice. Therefore, the most vital question for the new administration is: how should the U.S. revise its deterrence policy to best prevent aggression in today’s complex environment? A review of the problems and prospects in deterrence thinking reveals that in addition to skillfully tailoring threats and risks across domains, U.S. policymakers should dissuade aggression by offering opportunities for restraint to reduce the risk of escalation.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

24. Trying to govern the ungovernable: International Law on cyber and information operations in Russian

Author:
Asbjørn Thranov and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia has proposed an international regime governing the use of cyber and information operations. However, ‘digital sovereignty’ means something very different in Moscow than it does in Washington. In September 2020, the Russian authorities launched a new initiative to regulate the use of cyber and information operations by states. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, introduced the debate by suggesting that Russia and the USA lead the way by signing a bilateral agreement restricting their activities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The two states, so Putin suggested, should establish regular dialogue and set up a ‘hot line’. Putin also proposed a new agreement on cyber and information operations that should ‘exchange guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of the other side, including into electoral processes, inter alia, by means of the ICTs and high-tech methods’. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, added more details. In a statement, he drew a dark picture of the world ‘facing a real cyber pandemic’, pointing to the risk of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the interference by some states in the internal affairs of other states. ‘It is high time’, so he claimed, that the international community agreed on a regime to regulate the use of ICTs. Russia has proceeded to promote the new initiative at the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which has responded with a decision to renew the mandate of the open-ended working group on the security and use of ICTs in 2021-2025.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

25. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid

Author:
Arthur Herman and Alexander Butler
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Millions without power; stores and banks shut down; vital services running on emergency generators, if at all; lines of hapless people awaiting food and water. The experience that the state of Texas underwent during February 2021 is only a preview of what we would all face should the United States’ ever-vulnerable energy grid be subject to a major cyberattack. For years, experts have been warning us of the national power grid’s vulnerability to attacks by such malicious actors as Russia, China, and Iran. A major task force within the US Department of Energy—the North American Energy Resiliency Model (NAERM)—has been tasked with determining how best to protect our energy grid from damage caused by not only natural disasters but also terrorism and cyber assaults. NAERM’s purview, however, encompasses only existing, conventional cyber threats and does not extend to quantum computer attacks, whose effects would be far more protracted and far worse than those of a conventional cyberattack. Indeed, the “smarter” a grid is, that is, the greater the extent to which it relies on computer supervision and control, the more vulnerable it would be to such an attack. The shutdown resulting from an attack by a future quantum computer, with its unprecedented power to easily decrypt existing encryption systems, could be the most catastrophic disaster our country has ever experienced. Using data supplied by global econometrics firm Oxford Economics, researchers at Hudson Institute’s Quantum Alliance Initiative are conducting a quantitative study designed to model the impact of a hypothetical future quantum cyberattack on the US power grid, and preliminary results indicate that protection of our power networks needs to be an urgent national priority. The study’s preliminary results offer important clues as to the areas on which policymakers should focus, not only to secure our power and energy grid from a large-scale quantum computer attack but also, in the event this were to be unsuccessful, to mitigate such an attack’s impact on our infrastructure, both in terms of economic and national security. As Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn wrote in his 1962 book Thinking About the Unthinkable, “Even the most utopian of today’s visionaries will have to concede that the mere existence of modern technology involves a risk to civilization that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years ago.” Today, we must once again consider the unthinkable, not the nuclear apocalypse that haunted Kahn and his generation in the 1950s and 1960s but a quantum apocalypse that, if not as physically and permanently destructive as a nuclear attack, could cause catastrophic harm to our economy and society unless proper steps are taken now to mitigate such an attack’s attendant risk.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Electricity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

28. Taking Action on Cyber Enforcement: Assessing US Legislative Progress in the 116th Congress

Author:
Michael Garcia and Pat Shilo
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The 116th Congress experienced events like no other in American history, including unprecedented levels of malicious cyber activity. Global estimates say that ransomware attacks have increased by 148% since February 2020, with many US hospitals and schools falling victim and having their operations suspended.1 Leading up to and during the pandemic, Members of the 116th Congress responded and drafted cybersecurity legislation, introducing 316 bills to tackle the issue—a 40% increase from the previous Congress. This memo presents a comprehensive analysis of the cybersecurity legislation introduced in the 116th Congress and is a successor to our memo assessing the cybersecurity legislation in the previous Congress. Unlike the 115th Congress, the two chambers of the 116th were each under the control of a different party. Still, more than half of the introduced bills were bipartisan, including 85% of the bills signed into law. However, only 11% of the introduced bills focused on imposing consequences for the human actors behind cyberattacks, such as imposing sanctions or strengthening laws to prosecute criminals to hold them accountable for their actions. Following the trend of past congresses, most of the bills focused on protecting data and securing critical infrastructure. But while defending data and infrastructure is important, the lack of legislation to address the challenges of imposing consequences on the human actor suggests that Congress should prioritize introducing and passing bipartisan legislation that reduces the impunity with which malicious cyber actors, particularly cybercriminals, act. Here are the main takeaways from the bills introduced last Congress: Cybersecurity-related legislation increased by 40% since the 115th Congress. Of the 316 bills introduced, 14 became law, with nine related to appropriations or agency authorizations legislation. However, only 36 of the 316 bills introduced in the 116th Congress, and just three of the 14 provisions signed into law, focused on imposing consequences on the human actors behind cyberattacks. Cybersecurity remains a largely bipartisan issue. Over 50% of all legislation and 85% of all bills signed into law had a bipartisan co-sponsor.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

29. Follow the Money: Few Federal Grants are Used to Fight Cybercrime

Author:
Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Like traditional crime, not all cybercrime rises to the level that requires a federal response. And like other crimes, victims will call upon state and local law enforcement to respond.1 They are unprepared. The 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States lack the tools, personnel, and resources to respond to cybercrime effectively. State and locals have turned to federal funding to fill these gaps, but federal government grants do not prioritize combatting cybercrime. The Justice Department (DOJ) has never identified cybercrime as an “Area of Emphasis” for their main criminal justice grant that awards state and local criminal justice agencies $400-$550 million annually.2 And while DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided nearly $2 billion that state and local officials could use for cyber enforcement purposes in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, data from DHS implies that very little is used for cybercrime. Only 2% of all DHS preparedness grant programs were used for all cybersecurity needs in FY 2019.3 Moreover, just three grants in FY 2019 were solely dedicated to cybercrime with a total budget of $12.7 million.4 As a result, only 45% of local law enforcement agencies have access to adequate digital evidence resources, according to one survey. This leads to a backlog of un-analyzed evidence needed to investigate cybercrime and a sense of futility about law enforcement’s ability to close cases.5 While Members of Congress have introduced several bills to create dedicated cybersecurity grant programs for state and local entities, these proposals tend to not include cyber enforcement needs as an eligible expense.6 Moving forward, Congress should: Call on DOJ and DHS to prioritize combatting cybercrime as a main law enforcement issue within their grants. Require prioritization of cyber enforcement needs in grant programs administered by DOJ and DHS in annual appropriations bills; and List cyber enforcement spending as an eligible expense in any bills creating new cybersecurity grant programs for state and local governments.
Topic:
Crime, Law Enforcement, Cybersecurity, Police, Justice, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Digital Currencies' Role in Facilitating Ransomware Attacks: A Brief Explainer

Author:
Kristine Johnson and Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
This paper details how Bitcoin—the most popular digital currency—is used to facilitate ransomware attacks and how criminals try—and sometimes fail—to cover their tracks. Understanding how criminals use digital currencies for ransomware attacks can lead policymakers to solutions in thwarting and enforcing cybercrimes.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Bitcoin, Digitalization, and Digital Currency
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America