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1. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

3. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security

Author:
Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

4. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

5. Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army

Author:
Stefan Forss and Juha Pyykönen
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
With enhanced cooperation from the U.S. Army, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Nordic partner nations could combine efforts with each other and with the Alliance to deliver effective and visible regional deterrence against a resurgent Russia in the Nordic-Baltic region. This monograph by two leading Finnish defense academics explores the regional defense environment and optimum roles for the United States.
Topic:
NATO, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, North America, Nordic Nations, and United States of America

6. Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Defence Committee of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) commissioned ICDS to conduct a study on the strategic balance in the Baltic Sea region with aim to contribute, in the run up to the Warsaw Summit, to the discussion on the optimum Alliance military posture in the region. Assumptions: Russia follows an increasingly aggressive anti-Western policy of revisionism and has become a direct and open threat to NATO. It is implementing an ambitious military modernisation programme and has demonstrated a tendency to use force against weaker neighbours. NATO´s overall superiority vis-à-vis Russia is not reflected equally in the Baltic Sea region, especially by taking into account geography and force postures. The Alliance military power is not sufficiently available in the region. Russia will strive to avoid a full-scale war with NATO, but it could be tempted, nevertheless, while being guided by misperceptions, to provoke and exploit a “local conflict” to test and undermine the Alliance. Key findings: Credible NATO deterrence in the eastern flank of the Alliance requires an optimum balance between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Present NATO defence posture in the Baltic Sea region is inadequate for the effective deterrence by denial. Notable capability gaps exist as regards air and missile defence and naval presence. Russia has the ability to impose an A2/AD “bubble” over the Baltic states and large parts of the Baltic Sea. The major concentration of Russian forces in the areas surrounding Baltic states clearly exceeds defensive needs. Many of these units are offensive in their nature. Russia is frequently exercising military actions against Baltic states and their separation from the rest of the Alliance In military terms Belarus is an extension of Russian armed forces and performs an important geopolitical role, especially with regard to the “Suwalki gap”. The most likely worst scenario is not a “hybrid crisis” or limited incursion, but the separation and possible conquest of the Baltic states by conventional military means. Conclusions and recommendations The Russian threat has to be clearly acknowledged, treated as a strategic long-term challenge and taken fully into account in NATO’s defence planning and future posture in the Baltic Sea area. Effective deterrence requires a clearly increased presence of Allied forces in the region. NATO’s forward defence has to move from a symbolic to a meaningful presence. The Alliance’s forward presence must balance two key aspects: military effectiveness and multinationality. Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready. The United States should exercise leadership by providing the framework and certain key capabilities, which would then be complemented by contributions from other Allies. In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized units. A continuous presence of two brigades would be necessary, in addition to the indigenous forces of the Baltic countries. An increased presence of air assets, including transition from Air Policing mission to Air Defence, and maintenance of a robust naval presence in the Baltic Sea, is required. The Baltic countries will need to allocate additional resources for the Host Nation Support, including the development of necessary infrastructure. Alongside the strengthening of the forward presence component, the Alliance needs to refine capabilities for the deployment of reinforcements and follow-on forces, and for the neutralization of Russia´s A2/AD capabilities. The Allies should demonstrate their ability, in collective defence exercises, to rapidly move large numbers of troops to the Baltic region.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

7. Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap

Author:
Wesley K. Clark, Juri Luik, Egon Ramms, and Richard Shirreff
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report was prepared as an input to the forthcoming NATO’s Warsaw Summit by three former NATO commanders with considerable experience of Allied strategy, operations and capabilities: a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a former Deputy SACEUR and a former Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum. Political experience and context are provided by a former ambassador to NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

8. Nordic-Baltic Security and the US Role

Author:
Mark Seip
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and the Nordic states enjoy a strong, productive relationship. However, stability in the Nordic-Baltic area is under increasing stress, which has implications for both NATO and its partner members, Finland and Sweden. In "Nordic-Baltic Security and the US Role," the Atlantic Council's US Navy Senior Fellow Mark Seip argues that the United States must prioritize bolstering assurance among NATO members, principally the Baltic states. Additionally, the United States and NATO should enhance its capabilities through collaboration, leverage soft power instruments, and find mutuality between NATO and its key partners, Finland and Sweden. In doing so, the United States and the Nordic nations stand to solidify the gains of the thriving region and strengthen European security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Politics
Political Geography:
Nordic Nations

9. Cooperation and Conflict in the Arctic: A Road Map for Estonia

Author:
Metthew Bryza, Kalev Stoicescu, and Natalja Jegorova
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The strategic value of the Arctic region is increasing as sea ice diminishes and previously inaccessible regions become open for exploration and exploitation. The Arctic has the potential to provide various natural riches and economic benefits—such as minerals, hydrocarbons, fisheries, and shorter shipping routes—alongside opportunities to strengthen international cooperation. However, the wealth of the region brings with it a potential threat to international stability. The mix of countries and international organizations with growing interests in the Arctic represent a diverse subset of the international community, stretching from Europe to the Far East. Furthermore, it brings a new dimension of confrontation to historical adversaries. For instance, four of five Arctic Ocean littoral states are members of NATO—and the fifth is Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Climate Change, International Cooperation, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic States

10. Connecting the Baltic States to Europe’s Gas Market

Author:
Emmet Tuohy and Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
More than two decades after the end of the Soviet occupation, and eight years after they joined NATO and the European Union, the Baltic republics remain disintegrated from the rest of Europe in one crucial way: their natural gas infrastructure isolates them into “energy islands.” But, for the first time in their histories, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania now have a chance to secure their energy independence by connecting their natural gas systems with those of their European allies and evolving them into market-based trading systems. This will require the Baltic republics to work with their EU Allies to develop physical and regulatory infrastructure required for liquid trading hubs and spot-market pricing of natural gas to emerge in the Baltic region. By achieving these objectives, these three small countries on the EU’s periphery will help the EU achieve two key strategic goals: to establish a single European energy market; and to complete the full integration of the EU’s easternmost member states into a Europe that is whole and free.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Energy Policy, Markets, and Gas
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States