Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Nigeria

51. R2P Monitor, Issue 41, 15 September 2018

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 41 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Yemen, Cameroon, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Nicaragua, Nigeria and South Sudan.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Community, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Syria, Nigeria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, and Central African Republic

52. R2P Monitor, Issue 40, 15 July 2018

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 40 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Burundi, Cameroon, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Nigeria.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Syria, Nigeria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, and Central African Republic

53. The Challenges of Reintegration in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta

Author:
Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War shifted the focus from international wars between states to internal wars with immense consequences for unarmed civilians, such as occurred in the African countries of Angola, Burundi, Central Afri- can Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, So- malia, and Sudan, to mention a few.1 The nature of these wars makes these countries susceptible to further wars. To avoid such conflict traps, peace- building measures such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have been introduced to pave the way for an easier transition from conflict to peace, by minimizing risks from ex-combatants as possible spoil- ers and, restoring hope and security to victims of conflict while developing their communities.2 Evidence from countries that have utilized DDR, such as Angola, DRC, So- malia, and Liberia, suggests that while disarmament and demobilization may be essential, reintegration remains the most critical component of post-conflict peace and security.3 Debate continues over the notion that while disarmament and demobilization entail short-term security opera- tions, they do not by themselves bring sustainable benefits; reintegration focuses on extensive long-term development efforts that are critical to avoiding the conflict trap and sustaining peace in the long run. Short-term security does not bring about sustainable benefits unless it is coordinated with long-term community development strategies. Reintegration address- es the economic and social transformation of both ex-combatants and the overall communities they are joining, yet the full implementation of this pro- cess is generally ignored in DDR programs in post-conflict countries. This paper focuses on the extent of implementation of the reintegration phase in the Niger Delta region’s post-conflict (usually called post-amnesty) period and its impact on peace, security, and development in the region. The Nigerian federal government embraced the post-amnesty DDR concept in June 2009 to set the pace for gradual resolution of the violence that had embroiled the region for almost a decade. During the execution of the disar- mament and demobilization phases, the Niger Delta region recorded initial progress in peace and security demonstrated by an increase in oil produc- tion from an estimated 700 barrels per day (bpd) to an estimated 2,500 bpd in early 2010. However, the implementation of the reintegration phase has raised several questions due to the region’s relapse into violence and crime. There is, therefore, a need to investigate the factors working against suc- cessful implementation of the reintegration process. A critical analysis of the process will enhance the understanding of schol- ars and policymakers alike on what constitutes sustainable reintegration and at the same time, how it may be achieved in post-conflict societies. The focus on reintegration is meant to facilitate a specific consideration of its importance as the point of intersection between short- and long-term peacebuilding processes.
Topic:
Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

54. Leadership Targeting as a Counterterrorism Strategy: The Nigerian Experience

Author:
Gbemisola Animasawun
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
This paper examines the implications of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism tactic using as case studies, the killings of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by the US and Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf by Nigeria. It is based on Alex S. Wilner’s method of comparing the number of attacks a group successfully carried out before and after the removal of its leader as a means of ascertaining its weakness, demise, or renewed ferocity due to the death of its leader.12 This study gives an account of the unprecedented increase in the number of Boko Haram attacks and the high level of fear and attention—both local and international—due to the high-level targets chosen by the group after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf. This is complemented by primary data gathered through semi-structured interviews with selected security operatives who had contact with Yusuf and his successor Abubakar Shekau. For al-Qaeda, data was collected from secondary sources only. This study begins by summarizing the origin and agenda of violent Islamism, followed by arguments for and against leadership decapitation. Next, it considers accounts of the evolution of al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, their experience of leadership decapitation, and the ferocity of both groups in the aftermath of leadership decapitation. Finally, it examines the overall implications of leadership decapitation for counterterrorism efforts in light of the post-decapitation recovery and increase in reach of both al-Qaeda and Boko Haram. The two cases of leadership decapitation examined in this article are telling cases that invite closer attention to the implications of counterterrorism strategies.13
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Refugee Crisis, Leadership, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, Middle East, and Nigeria

55. March 2018 Issue

Author:
Jacob Zenn, Bryan Price, Christopher Anzalone, Heni Nsaibia, Caleb Weiss, Markus K. Binder, Jillian M. Quigley, and Herbert F. Tinsley
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This issue focuses on counterterrorism challenges in Africa. Next month marks the four-year anniversary of Boko Haram’s kidnapping of as many as 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria. The hostage attack created global outrage and sparked the social media campaign #BringBackOurGirls. In our cover article, Jacob Zenn outlines the internal dynamics within Boko Haram that led the group to eventually enter into negotiations and release many of the girls. Zenn compares and contrasts the terrorist calculus in this earlier hostage crisis with the kidnapping of 111 schoolgirls in Dapchi, Nigeria, last month, which also resulted in many of the girls being released. Our interview is with Lieutenant Colonel Kent Solheim, commander of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, which is currently focused on security challenges in Africa. Christopher Anzalone documents how al-Shabaab has continued to take advantage of turmoil in Somalia to sustain its operations and maintain itself as the dominant jihadi group in the country. In the wake of rising jihadi violence in Burkina Faso, including an attack on the French embassy and the Burkinabe army headquarters earlier this month, Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss profile the recently established al-Qa`ida-aligned Burkinabe terrorist group Ansaroul Islam and the threat it poses to the country. Markus Binder, Jillian Quigley, and Herbert Tinsley examine the Islamic State’s development and deployment of chemical weapons. They note that while the group has used such weapons on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq, it has featured little in its propaganda, calling into question how useful the group sees these weapons in advancing its strategic goals. While there has been much alarm about the threat of chemical terror attacks in the West, the authors note the only evidence so far that the Islamic State has transferred its chemical warfare expertise from the battlefield to its foreign terrorism activities is the summer 2017 Sydney hydrogen sulfide plot.
Topic:
Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso

56. ‘Land Bandits’ or ‘Land Grabbers’: Fulani Herdsmen and Local Farmers Incessant Bloody Clashes in Nigeria

Author:
Seun Bamidele
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
Incessant bloody clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in Africa have resulted in deaths and displacement. Different parts of Africa including Nigeria have experienced clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers throughout the colonial periods in Africa and even beyond (Abubakar 2012). The dire need for Fulani herdsmen to increase the productivity of their livestock farming in the midst of unfavourable climatic conditions have necessitated the search for adequate pasture for cattle grazing. In Africa, the Fulanis are about twenty million in number; they are one of the most widely dispersed and culturally diverse people scattered across Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. The Fulanis, also known as the “Fula people or Fulbe” are the largest pastoral nomadic group in the world with root in West Africa, Northern part of Central Africa and Egypt (Adisa and Adekunke 2010). The common business of Fulanis is livestock production, they move from one region to another for grazing purposes. Livestock account for one third of Nigeria’s agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes 16% of agricultural GDP; it is an important component of general agriculture and a key contributor to economic growth and development of any nation (Ojiako and Olayode 2008, 114). [...] The failure of the government policy on grazing reserve has left Fulani herdsmen to their fates, in determining where and how to raise their livestock. Amidst this situation, some medium and large corporate livestock farms have emerged, while many other Fulani herdsmen maintain their nomadic lifestyles. The latter live a sort of jungle life, characterized by selfhelp, in the search of grazing fields across the states, trying to protect their lives and properties from wild animals and cattle rustlers. These, among other things, have led to Fulani herdsmen being armed with dangerous military weapons like AK 47 and other dangerous ammunitions, which in turn have led to series of incessant bloody killings involving the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in different rural communities across the country
Topic:
Agriculture, Conflict, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

57. Chinese Investment and Its Implications for Nigeria’s Economic Security

Author:
Shiitu Adewole Raji and Adenike Ogunrinu
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The international system consists of different nations which pursue their national interests within the global arena having put into consideration the benefits they stand to gain from such relationships (Ampiah and Sanusha 2015, 8). The explosive growth of China’s economic interests in Africa, which is part of the sustained global interactions discussed above, is an important trend in the continent’s foreign relations arena. China’s rapidly expanding ties with Africa has superseded the United States’ since 2010 as Africa’s top trading partner because of its massive investments in the continent , which is largely aided by China Investible Export loan assistance of $150 billion to its multinational corporations (Brautigam 2009, 22). Between 2001 and 2011, Chinese exports to Africa were raised from $4.4 billion to $56.3 billion. Though China is still regarded as a third world country, the country is the second biggest economy in the world. [..] Although there is a vast body of literature on the bilateral relations between Nigeria and China, little is known about the implications of China’s increasing FDI for the economic security of Nigeria, a gap this paper intends to fill. The study is anchored on descriptive research methodology, consisting of qualitative data, which relied primarily on the existing literature.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Nigeria

58. Post-Conflict Peace-Building in a Contested International Border: The Nigeria-Cameroon Border Conflict Settlement and Matters Arising

Author:
Kenneth Chukwuemeka Nwoko
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The political solution under the Green Tree Agreement which led to the handover of the contested Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by Nigeria following the International Court of Justice (2002) ruling signaled the end of the protracted Nigeria/Cameroon border conflict, at least on the surface. However, some analysts believed that it marked the beginning of what may result into a future conflict (Agbakwuru 2012; The Guardian 2006). From the analysis of the verdict of the Court, it would appear that while the interests of the two states involved in the conflict appeared to have been taken into cognizance, the interest of the indigenes and inhabitants of Bakassi was not. Apart from alienating these local people from their ancestral homes, cultural sites and livelihood opportunities, activities such as fishing; interstate water transportation, trading etc, which were operated as early as the precolonial days by the local inhabitants, appear to have been disrupted, thus, endangering their means of livelihood and survival. The Anglo-German agreement of March 1913 which the ICJ ruling relied on for its verdict on the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict represents the earliest milestone in the process of alienation of the inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula, the causus bellum; especially since the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar exercised sovereignty over the Bakassi3 , a title which was subsumed in that part of Nigeria as the sovereign state during the period of this conflict. While the ICJ ruling gave precedence to contemporary western constructions of the notions of boundaries and sovereignty to the detriment of the historical consolidation (Sama & Johnson-Ross 2005-2006, 111), “protectorate treaty made without jurisdiction should not have taken precedence over a community title rights and ownership existing from time immemorial” (Nigerian Information Service Centre 2002; The Guardian 2002, 1-2) In other words, Germany transferred to Cameroon what it did not derive from Britain, since the right to title ownership lay with the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar. The focus of this article is not to delve into the juridical issues relating to legal ownership of the territory since the ICJ ruling had put that to rest. Rather the objective is to analyse matters arising from the settlement that could jeopardise the “cold peace” between the two countries; issues relating to psychological, socio-economic and political fallouts which the method of settlement of the conflict and its application brought on the indigenes and inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula as well as proffer recommendations for lasting peace in this troubled region.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Border Control, Conflict, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, and Cameroon

59. The EU Migration Partnership Framework: Time for a Rethink?

Author:
Clare Castillejo
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Development Institute (DIE)
Abstract:
The European Union’s (EU) Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) was established in June 2016 and seeks to mobilise the instruments, resources and influence of both the EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries in order to “sustainably manage migration flows” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). Its strong focus on EU interests and positive and negative incentives mark a departure from previous EU migration initiatives and have generated significant controversy. This Discussion Paper examines the politics, implementation and impact of the MPF more than one year on from its establishment, asking what lessons it offers for the future direction of EU migration policy. The paper begins by introducing the MPF and examining the different perspectives of EU actors on the framework. It finds that there is significant disagreement both among EU member states and within EU institutions over the MPF’s approach and priorities. The paper explores the political and ethical controversies that the MPF has generated, including regarding its ambition to subordinate other areas of external action to migration goals; its use of incentives; and its undermining of EU development and human rights principles. The paper assesses the implementation and impact of the MPF in its five priority countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. It argues that the concrete achievements of the migration partnerships have been limited; that the MPF has largely failed to incentivise the cooperation that the EU was seeking; and that the EU’s migration programming in MPF partner countries has suffered from serious flaws. The paper takes an in-depth look at the Ethiopia partnership, which has been the most challenging. It describes how the interests and goals of the EU and Ethiopia have not aligned themselves, how the issue of returns has come to entirely overshadow engagement, and how the relationship between the partners has been soured. The paper goes on to examine how the MPF relates to African interests and how it has affected EU-Africa relations, arguing that the MPF approach is seen by many African actors as imposing EU interests and undermining African unity and continental ambitions. Finally, it explores how the EU can develop engagement with Africa on migration issues that is more realistic, constructive, and sustainable, with the aim of fostering intra-African movement and economic opportunities; ensuring protection for refugees and vulnerable migrants; and allowing both continents to benefit from large-scale, safe and orderly African labour migration to Europe. However, it warns that any such shift will require a change in mindset by European leaders and populations.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Migration, Labor Issues, Refugees, and Economy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and European Union

60. Climate Policy And Finance

Author:
Precious Chukwuemelie Akanonu
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA)
Abstract:
Carbon pricing has been recognized not only as the most efficient economic policy instruments to internalize the social cost of emissions, but also as a major tool to generate public revenues that can be used to offset the potential adverse distributional effects of climate policy. However, in many developing countries, there is a widespread reluctance to commit to climate policy, largely due to financial constraints, a lack of public support, and concern over its regressive effects.This paper makes recommendations towards the design of an effective carbon pricing system that not only discourages air pollution but also encourages the gradual uptake of climate-friendly technologies by the private sector in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, while supporting public investment in sustainable infrastructures and projects that offset the distributional effect of the climate policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Finance, Climate Finance, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria