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Begin New Search Topic Counter-terrorism Political Geography Niger

1. A security dilemma during Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Lake Chad Basin

Author:
Mariana Llorens Zabala
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The security crisis in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region has been of great concern since its turning point in 2009 due to the expansion of Boko Haram (BH) as one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the continent. This crisis is characterised by complex causes, including a development deficit, the lack of a social contract between the state and the population, weak governance structures, and a consequent violent extremist insurgency that has emerged and grown from and within the instability. While the efforts of those tasked to fight against the spread of these threats are numerous and commendable, much still needs to be done to ensure a safe and secure environment for all populations in the region. Through kinetic operations and non-kinetic interventions, the four governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, with the support of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) agencies, and other critical partners have scaled up their interventions in the region. The scaled-up interventions include the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes as part of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR) of the Boko Haram-affected areas. However, it is common knowledge that these four countries are faced with challenges in the handling and treatment of individuals associated with BH – and other affiliated groups – when they surrender or exit these groups. First and foremost, these challenges include the lack of pre-conditions for traditional DDR to take place. A further challenge is the proliferation of arms and ammunition in the region among the civilian population due to a lack of security and safety provision.
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Disarmament, Boko Haram, African Union, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Lake Chad Basin

2. Cautious Pragmatism: What is thе potential outcome of Washington's approach to thе Nigеr crisis?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 8, 2023, US Sеcrеtary of Statе Antony Blinkеn announcеd that diplomacy is thе prеfеrrеd way of rеsolving thе crisis causеd by thе coup in Nigеr. Following thе coup on July 26, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan strongly condemned any effort to detain or subvert thе functioning of Nigеr's dеmocratically еlеctеd govеrnmеnt, led by President Mohamеd Bazoum. Thеsе statements reflect thе ambiguity of Washington's stance regarding thе crisis in Nigеr.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Counter-terrorism, Crisis Management, Coup, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Niger, and United States of America

3. Niger Coup Threatens U.S. Strategy on Counterterrorism and Russia

Author:
Ben Fishman, Anna Borshchevskaya, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 26, Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was detained by members of his special guard and put under house arrest, where he remains under harsh conditions. Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani has since declared himself head of the so-called “National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland” and appointed a twenty-one-person cabinet on August 8. The coup comes in the wake of military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan over the past three years, demonstrating regional anti-democratic trends amid trans-regional instability. Diplomatic efforts to quell the crisis have failed to date. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has made repeated calls to Bazoum, reflecting a commitment to securing his release and returning to “constitutional order.” Bazoum was a close American security partner prior to his arrest and was accorded a prominent role during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December. Blinken has also reached out to former president Mahamadou Issoufou, who has better personal ties to the junta; he was once an ally of Bazoum but had recently broken with his successor’s anti-corruption initiatives. This call followed Acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland’s unsuccessful August 8 visit to Niamey, where she was prohibited from meeting with Bazoum or Tchiani. Instead, she spoke with Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, a longtime U.S. security partner who serves as the military’s new chief of staff but would not offer so much as an assurance of Barzoum’s safety, let alone his release or restoration. With the junta rejecting all U.S. and regional diplomatic initiatives, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention. The alliance’s leaders met on August 10 and agreed to deploy a standby force, though how quickly it can be assembled remains unclear. In neighboring Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune strongly condemned the junta but said any military intervention in Niger would represent “a direct threat” to his country, declaring, “There will be no solution without us. We are the first people affected.” In Libya—another neighbor keenly attuned to Niger’s stability given persistent smuggling—the Government of National Unity condemned the junta, while the eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar condemned the threats by ECOWAS. Elsewhere, Egypt has remained largely silent about the crisis, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly denounced the coup and called for Bazoum’s restoration (in part because he is Niger’s first Arab president). The UAE also sent some military vehicles to neighboring Chad, providing additional border security and signaling their growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, West Africa, Niger, and United States of America

4. Berlin’s Hesitation: Implications of German Foreign Minister’s tour to Mali and Niger

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, on April 12 and 13, made an important visit to Mali and Niger that is set to determine the future of Germany’s military presence in Mali. The German government is divided into those who support a continued presence in Mali and those who push for complete withdrawal of the German troops from the African country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Germany, Mali, and Niger

5. Working Case Study: Congress’s Oversight of the Tongo Tongo, Niger, Ambush

Author:
Loren DeJonge Schulman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The tragic 2017 killing of four U.S. Army personnel caught in a surprise ambush in Niger offers very few positive lessons for congressional oversight. Indeed, when speaking with experts, there is little agreement on whether Congress was kept appropriately informed or was even in a position to understand the mission of U.S. forces in Niger. Superficially, there are blunt facts—years of War Powers notifications detailing increasing numbers of combat-equipped personnel and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) posture statements highlighting the counterterrorism mission in the Sahel—stood against blunt statements from senior members—“I didn’t know there was 1,000 troops in Niger,” Senator Lindsey Graham said shortly after the incident.1 Explored in more detail, inconsistent mission and authority reporting from the Department of Defense (DoD) confronts, and combines with, variable expectations from Congress. At the heart of this friction is the by-with-and-through counterterrorism strategy, how it is implemented in practice, and whether key stakeholders have a common understanding of its rule sets and risks. Some of the gaps the Tongo Tongo ambush highlighted—between the Pentagon and operational units; between AFRICOM and Special Operations Command Africa (SOC-AF); and between Congress and the DoD—have been addressed, but others remain. This incident offers multiple lessons to both sides of the Potomac River in improving oversight relationships, both in informal interactions and in formal understanding of authorities and oversight responsibilities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, Niger, and United States of America

6. Possible Rivalry: What is the Impact of al-Baghdadi Video Message on Boko Haram?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Mutual escalation has come to define the constant confrontations between the Nigerian movement Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force, formed by some West African countries, to confront its activity and weaken its ability to expand beyond the national borders, namely to Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This escalation may continue over the coming period, as the movement becomes one of the main branches of ISIS, on which the latter relies to stage counter-strikes in response to the losses sustained in Syria and Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Middle East, West Africa, Syria, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger

7. The Niger-Libya Border: Securing It without Stabilising It?

Author:
Mathieu Pellerin
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Often described as an “ungoverned area”, the Niger-Libya border is nevertheless at the centre of major economic, political and security challenges. Both the Libyan authorities and the Nigerien state are struggling to establish tight control over this particularly isolated area. However, local actors who live there are making their own modes of governance, based on individual and so far, barely institutionalised relationships. These local forms of regulation provide states in the sub-region and their international partners with the opportunity to consider the possibilities of indirect administration. The current priority appears to be for outsourced forms of security, as the agendas of these actors are geared towards anti-terrorism and the fight against so-called irregular immigration. Indeed, this area is nowadays facing unprecedented militarisation, raising a key question: does excessive militarisation not risk producing more insecurity than it fights in the medium or long term? The stability of this border area is partly based on maintaining economic, political and social balance which risks being challenged by a purely security-based approach. Designing a holistic governance of security requires states being able to arbitrate sovereignly on the cornerstone of long-term human security.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Border Control, Counter-terrorism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, North Africa, and Niger