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2. Losses and Potential Gains of a Would-Be “Maghrebi Union”
- Author:
- Anouar Boukhars
- Publication Date:
- 08-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Social Science Research Council
- Abstract:
- “The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is dead,” thundered King Mohammed VI at the twenty-eighth Annual Heads of State Summit of the African Union (AU). Its flame has faded, he added, because faith in a common interest has vanished. Unless the Maghreb follows the good example of neighbor- ing African sub-regions, the king warned, the AMU will soon cease to exist. Stalwart integrationists fear that Morocco has abandoned the Maghrebi dream altogether. The depressing truth, however, is that the King’s lament on the demise of the AMU is simply a reflection of the mood of resignation increasingly palpable in the Maghreb. Everyone knows that the AMU is an empty shell, ensnared in decades of neighborly parochial animosities, petty jealousies, and perverse rivalries. The two countries consequential enough to anchor the Maghreb remain at each other throats. Morocco and Algeria see eye-to-eye on almost nothing, and their bickering and recrimination have only gotten worse.1 Sadly, the demons of their discord seem to grad- ually possess their respective publics who intermittently hurl insults at each other in social media forums and during sports and entertainment events.
- Topic:
- Regional Cooperation, Sports, Social Media, and African Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Algeria, and Morocco
3. Morocco's Return to the African Union: Strengthening the Continent's Future
- Author:
- Edward M. Gabriel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Ambassador's Review
- Institution:
- Council of American Ambassadors
- Abstract:
- From a strategic perspective, Morocco’s decision to join the African Union (AU) 33 years after quitting the bloc illustrates King Mohammed VI’s vision of his country’s role on the continent as a platform for regional economic, political and security cooperation. It followed almost two decades of personal diplomatic efforts by the king to further Morocco’s goal of supporting greater regional and continental stability through common economic and political interests. Although some observers in the United States may have been surprised, the move—announced by King Mohammed VI in the summer of 2016—is a natural next step in his South-South economic diplomacy. Because of that diplomacy, at the African Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa this past January, Morocco not only gained admission to the African Union, but it did so with the support of an overwhelming majority—39 of 54— member states. Morocco’s desire to play a stronger leadership role is seen by the king as rooted in the country’s historic ties throughout the region, as well as its long-standing outreach to build ties beyond its existing network in francophone and African countries on the Atlantic. For him, the move has a cultural and economic logic, as well as a strategic one. The AU decision also comes at a time when the United States is, according to various news reports, considering repositioning North African countries (except Egypt), as part of the Africa division at the National Security Council and the Africa bureau of the State Department, rather than as part of the Middle East departments. In the Near Eastern Affairs bureau, Morocco policy was not a high priority, mainly because it was a non-problem in a very troubled region. With the new configuration, I hope attention to Morocco will better reflect its role as one of Africa’s top economic and security powerhouses, with one of the continent’s most democratic governance structures and most liberal economies, as well as its potential position as the preferred economic gateway to Africa for the United States and other world powers. This could have a profound impact on Morocco’s importance to U.S. policy and raise the value of our longstanding partnership with this key African nation.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Culture, and African Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa, North Africa, and Morocco
4. Towards a Continental Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism in Africa
- Author:
- Tarek A. Sharif and Joanne Richards
- Publication Date:
- 12-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Global Peace Operations Review
- Abstract:
- Violent Extremism is now recognized as a growing threat to peace and security in Africa, as exemplified by the recent terrorist attacks in Garissa, Abidjan, and Ouagadougou. While much of the policy discussion on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) focuses on the return of radicalized foreign fighters to the West, less attention is directed to those foreign fighters who may eventually return from Iraq, Syria, and Libya to other areas of North Africa, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa. Tunisia is one of the world’s largest contributors to the Islamic State in terms of foreign fighters, with smaller contributions from Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Sudan and Somalia. Issues concerning the return of foreign fighters to Africa are particularly salient not only because these individuals may return to their communities, but also because they may link up with other extremist armed groups present across the continent. These include groups affiliated to either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Attempts to counter violent extremism began in Europe in the 1980s with the advent of programs to dissuade and disengage right-wing extremists in Norway, Sweden and Germany. Although no common definition exists, since that time CVE has come to be associated with a range of measures designed to prevent and reverse the radicalization of individuals and groups, and to forestall the participation of these groups and “lone wolves” in acts of terrorism. Given that CVE is preventative and reactive, different CVE strategies are necessary for different stages of the radicalization continuum, including for individuals and communities with no exposure to extremist networks, those with some exposure, and those already radicalized. The latter is often associated with attempts to shift extremists towards acceptance of more moderate ideologies and is known as “deradicalization.” In some ways, CVE is difficult to distinguish from conventional counter-terrorism, which often includes traditional military measures and the sharing of intelligence between nation states. However, because conventional counter-terrorism does not address the root causes prompting radicalization, policy interventions under the rubric of CVE have more recently been designed to focus attention on the grassroots factors, which may render certain individuals more susceptible to radicalization than others. Social exclusion, poverty, and a lack of education are often named as typical contenders in this regard, although CVE practitioners generally acknowledge that no single causal pathway to radicalization can be identified. Reflecting these general trends, this essay charts the development of African Union policy, from its roots in conventional counter-terrorism, to efforts to devise a continental strategy for CVE in Africa. It also outlines a number of policy measures, which any such continental strategy should take into account.
- Topic:
- Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and African Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Iraq, Sudan, Middle East, Libya, Syria, Morocco, and Somalia