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71. Can Assad win the peace?

Author:
Nour Samaha
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council On Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As Syria transitions into a post-conflict phase, its government is trying to survive in much the same way it has over the last eight years. This involves a series of short-term fixes, heavy reliance on foreign allies, and a process of endurance it calls the “long breath”. Damascus wants to create a functional system that serves its ambitions, particularly its desire to re-establish strong central control rather than succumb to external demands. Crippling Western sanctions have led to increasingly drastic shortages of fuel and electricity, disrupting the supply – and increasing the price – of essential goods such as food. As a result, the state is increasingly relying on an array of racketeers, oligarchs and war profiteers to circumvent the sanctions, further entrenching Syria’s corruption networks. The West’s expectation that an economic war will eventually force the regime to acquiesce to its demands is short-sighted and counterproductive.
Topic:
Corruption, Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

72. Slow and Steady: Improving U.S.-Arab Cooperation to Counter Irregular Warfare

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Since 9/11 the United States has struggled with how to respond to the challenges posed by ungoverned spaces in the Middle East, from which terrorist attacks and destabilizing mass refugee flows emanate. The collapse of state authority in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya has created security vacuums that extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda have used to develop local presence, to organize, and eventually to conduct attacks both inside these countries as well as in Europe and the United States. Meanwhile, the refugee flows that have resulted from these conflicts have put tremendous pressure on neighboring countries and also caused a massive wave of refugees into Europe. The question facing the United States and other Western allies is how to deal with these challenges without getting sucked into complex and costly civil wars that the United States has little ability to end on its own. Full-scale American-led counterinsurgency, stabilization campaigns, or other resource-intensive nation-shaping interventions attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven to be unsustainable models given the high costs, indecisive outcomes, and lack of political support at home. However, completely withdrawing U.S. forces and counting purely on intelligence collection to monitor threats and local partners to address them has been ineffective, as this approach leaves the United States vulnerable to attacks. The most successful effort the United States has launched to deal with these challenges in recent years has been the counter-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria, where it has succeeded in protecting U.S. interests at a reasonable cost by working “By, With, and Through” local actors. In this model the United States generally: (1) uses a comparatively small number of troops to train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany local forces with legitimacy on the ground; (2) provides airpower and some enablers and logistics; (3) uses its limited military investment as leverage for a broader diplomatic effort; or (4) invests in building local governance and providing aid on the ground.
Topic:
Civil War, International Cooperation, Counterinsurgency, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arab Countries, Syria, North America, and United States of America

73. Solving the Syrian Rubik’s Cube: An Instruction Guide for Leveraging Syria’s Fragmentation to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives

Author:
Kaleigh Thomas and Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Eight years since the start of the Syrian crisis, the conflict in that country has transitioned from a war between the government of President Bashar al-Assad and its rebel opponents into an interstate competition among different foreign actors that have intervened in the war. The United States is a party to this competition because, through the campaign to counter the Islamic State group known as ISIS, Washington and its coalition partners have assembled a zone of control in northern and eastern Syria that encompasses nearly one-third of the country’s territory. Through this coalition zone, the United States has strong influence over the distribution of several key natural resources—oil, agricultural land, water, and electricity production—that are essential to stabilizing Syria and that are coveted by the Assad regime and its allies. Syria’s fragmentation therefore provides the United States and its partners with significant leverage to influence the end state that emerges as the outcome of the conflict. This potential leverage would be a powerful complement to the current American strategy to work toward the irreversible progress in the Geneva process through sanctions and maintaining an international consensus to deny Assad’s regime reconstruction assistance. Currently, the United States has committed to retaining a residual military presence in northern and eastern Syria to combat the re-emergence of ISIS or a successor organization, but without the United States investing financially in the rehabilitation and stabilization of those areas. Simultaneously, Washington seeks to force changes in the Assad regime’s behavior, policies, or composition by applying economic pressure via U.S. sanctions and closing off the regime’s access to reconstruction funding. This study examines how the United States can leverage Syria’s fragmentation to achieve U.S. policy goals through several policy options. The options are based on two key metrics: first, the level of U.S investment in Syria, and second, whether the United States should seek to change Assad’s behavior, remove Assad, or resign itself to the reality that he will stay and to re-engaging with him.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

74. Minor Misery: What an Islamic State Registry Says About the Challenges of Minors in the Conflict Zone

Author:
Daniel Milton and Don Rassler
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
One of the much-discussed aspects of the Islamic State’s caliphate project was the opportunity it provided for families to travel and live under the control of the organization. While various studies have provided a somewhat clear picture of the more accountable population of those travelers—the men and women who decided to join the group—less clear-cut information has appeared regarding the minor population that lived under the organization’s governance. Using a portion of a spreadsheet captured by U.S. military forces, this report offers an examination of the minor population that lived inside the Iraqi portion of the Islamic State’s control in late 2016. It reveals a diverse population of over 100,000 minors, mostly from Iraq but also from 56 other countries around the world. This report provides important context and data for current discussion regarding what to do with those left in the conflict zone and those being repatriated to countries throughout the world.
Topic:
Children, Islamic State, Youth, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

75. A Hollow Victory Over the Islamic State in Syria? The High Risk of Jihadi Revival in Deir ez-Zor's Euphrates River Valley

Author:
Hassan Hassan, Paul Cruickshank, Stephen Hummel, F. John Burpo, James Bonner, and Ross Dayton
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In Syria, the Islamic State has now been reduced to a few vanishing pockets in Deir ez-Zor’s Middle Euphrates River Valley as a result of two separate military offensives on opposite sides of the river by Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and forces loyal to the Assad regime. But while Deir ez-Zor has now been essentially liberated from the Islamic State, securing and stabilizing the region will likely prove much harder. In our cover article, Hassan Hassan writes the “long period it took the overstretched SDF to liberate the east side of the Euphrates afforded the Islamic State time to create sleeper cells.” He argues the fact that the west side is again under Assad regime control will likely provide opportunities to both the Islamic State and the al-Qa`ida offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to tap into local Sunni anger to rebuild their operations. Hassan warns there will be even more opportunities for jihadis to rebound if the Assad regime exploits what will likely be a vacuum left by soon-to-depart U.S. forces to take control of the areas liberated by the SDF. All this, he warns, creates a very real risk that the border region between Syria and Iraq could emerge as a long-term threat to global security, just like the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. Our interview is with Shaun Greenough, the Case Strategy and Mentor Supervisor at The Unity Initiative (TUI), a specialist intervention consultancy based in the United Kingdom that focuses on rehabilitating individuals convicted of terrorist offenses and tackling absolutist mindsets in the wider community. Greenough previously served in a variety of counterterrorism roles including managing aspects of the U.K. police investigation into the 2006 transatlantic airline plot. Major Stephen Hummel, Colonel F. John Burpo, and Brigadier General James Bonner, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army’s 20th CBRNE Command, warn there is a high risk that profit-minded suppliers within vast, transnational IED networks may in the future expand into WMD proliferation. They write “the convergence of these two seemingly separate networks does not mean that an IED facilitation network will suddenly market WMD, rather that non-state actors could employ these networks to gather the knowledge, people, materials, finances, and infrastructure required for WMD development and employment.” Ross Dayton assesses the threat posed by the ELN terrorist group, which in January 2019 carried out an apparent suicide bombing on the national police academy in Bogotá, Colombia, that killed over 20 police cadets. “The ELN now operates in 12 Venezuelan states with virtual impunity under the Maduro government,” he writes, allowing “ELN fighters to escape the jurisdiction of Colombian security forces and exploit opportunities for illicit financing and recruitment.”
Topic:
Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Syrian War, Police, Jihad, and IED
Political Geography:
Middle East, Colombia, South America, Syria, and Global Focus

76. October 2019 Issue

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O'Farrell, Seth Loertscher, Damien Spleeters, Michael Shkolnik, and Alexander Corbeil
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our cover article, Seth Jones examines the Russian military campaign in Syria. He writes: “Russia has done what many thought was impossible in Syria. It has helped Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reconquer most of the country’s major cities and nearly two-thirds of its population. Moscow adopted a military approach that combined well-directed fires and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy. But it also used extraordinary violence against civilians and provided diplomatic cover when Syrian forces used chemical weapons. Moving forward, Russia faces considerable challenges ahead. Syria is a fractured country with an unpopular regime and massive economic problems; terrorist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida persist; and Israel and Iran remain locked in a proxy war in Syria.” Our interview is with Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan. He discusses DHS’ recently published new Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence and how DHS is intensifying efforts to counter the threat of far-right terror. Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O’Farrell, and Seth Loertscher examine a recently declassified collection of 27 personnel records for Islamic State fighters, both local and foreign. The forms were acquired by the Department of Defence in Syria in 2016 and are now available to view on the Combating Terrorism Center’s website. According to Milton and his co-authors, the forms “demonstrate how extensive the breadth of information collected was in some cases … [and] show that the Islamic State acquired information useful for understanding the radicalization process, encouraging accountability among its fighters, managing the talent in the organization, and vetting members for potential security concerns.” Damien Spleeters outlines how his organization Conflict Armament Research helped prosecutors secure a guilty plea in the prosecution of Haisem Zahab, an Australian extremist with contacts into the Islamic State and whose research in Australia into rockets “indicates [according to the prosecution] significant commonality” with the Islamic State’s weapon production program in Iraq and Syria. Michael Shkolnik and Alexander Corbeil examine how Hezbollah “virtual entrepreneurs” have in recent years used social media to recruit Israeli Arabs and West Bank-based Palestinians to attack Israelis.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Syrian War, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria

77. Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees in the Higher Education Systems of Host Countries and How to Overcome Them. Lessons Learned from Jordan

Author:
Francesca Ruisi
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
The Syrian crisis has had a significant impact on most of the countries hosting Syrian refugees. Considering the lack of political solution to the war, host countries have started to develop new approaches and response frameworks to deal with the consequences of the prolonged stay of refugees. In this line, and following the London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region in February 2016, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has shifted the approach of its refugee policy from humanitarian assistance to one oriented to empowerment (Shteiwi, 2017a). Against this backdrop, this policy brief aims to analyse whether and to what extent Syrian refugee students have access to higher education in Jordan. The article discusses the main challenges faced by Syrian refugees to enter, continue and conclude higher education in Jordan. Lastly, and based on lessons learned from Jordan, it provides policy recommendations on how to promote more inclusive education policies for young Syrian refugees in the host countries. Due to the political stalemate regarding the Syrian conflict, the common framework in terms of standard laws, regulation and inclusive practices appears to be needed not only in the Hashemite Kingdom but also in the European countries hosting and integrating young Syrian refugees in their respective social and economic contexts. The Jordan model might be considered a key case from which to take lessons and employ them in other countries facing the new challenges related to Syrian refugees entering, performing in and concluding higher education. Challenges discussed in this article and related policy recommendations are based on research conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) in 2018 in Jordan (Center for Strategic Studies [CSS] - University of Jordan, forthcoming). The research was based on a mixed-methods approach consisting of a survey conducted among Syrian refugee university students and a series of focus group discussions with key stakeholders (policymakers, practitioners, higher education providers, experts and NGOs involved in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis).
Topic:
Refugees, Syrian War, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

78. The Alevi / Alawite Factor in Turkey - Syria Relations in the Light of the Syrian Crisis

Author:
Mkrtich Karapetyan
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The Syrian civil war exacerbated sectarian divisions between the Alawite-ruled Syrian government and Syria’s Sunni population, straining also the relations between the Sunni majority and Alawite and Alevi minorities of neighboring Turkey. The Alawites and Alevis of Turkey were predominantly supporting Syria’s President Bashar al-Asad, while the Turkish government greatly supported the Sunni insurgents of Syria. The paper aims at examining how Alawites and Alevis have influenced the relations between Turkey and Syria in the light of the Syrian civil war, the reasons behind the sympathy of Alevis for the Syrian government, and the implications that Turkey’s Syria policy has had domestically. It finds that the Alevi / Alawite factor has had some restraining effects on Turkey’s antagonistic policy towards Syria. In the introductory part, the article touches upon the differences and the similarities between Alevis and Alawites, then it analyzes the developments in regards Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian crisis that were also reflected in Ankara’s domestic policy vis-à-vis its Alevi and Alawite minorities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sectarianism, Syrian War, and Alawites
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

79. Charities and Terrorism: Lessons from the Syrian Crisis

Author:
Rodger Shanahan
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Terrorists have manipulated the humanitarian crisis in Syria to create a cover for foreign fighters and to raise funds for terrorist groups under the guise of charitable donations. While terrorist abuse of charitable donations is a limited problem, even small amounts of funding can have disproportionately large effects. Early government intervention in setting due diligence standards for humanitarian aid groups operating in, or raising funds for use in, high-risk conflict zones is essential. The Australian Government should use the ‘declared area’ legislation more widely to raise the risk threshold for those seeking to use humanitarian assistance as cover for supporting terrorist causes overseas.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Australia, and Syria

80. The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia

Author:
Gregory Waters
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces' capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria