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11. Survival strategies in the Middle East: Foreign policy in the service of regime security. The cases of Egypt and UAE.

Author:
Johannes Späth, Carsten Minh Vo, and Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This policy analysis examines foreign policy making in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It highlights how internal power dynamics and the interaction between formal institutions and informal networks shape foreign policy making in these two different types of Middle Eastern autocracies. The study identifies the politically relevant elite coalitions and their impact on decision-making. In both regimes, the circle at the top of the power pyramid is rather small and characterized by informal and family ties. A small and homogeneous elite promotes cohesion, but also limits the diversity of opinions. The royal elite in the UAE and the military and intelligence elite at the core of the al-Sisi regime in Egypt pursue their own economic interests in the service of regime security and stability. The paper identifies areas where the regional and foreign policies/interests of the two friendly countries and their elites diverge.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Autocracy, Regional Politics, and Regime Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Egypt, and UAE

12. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

13. How Syria, Ukraine and Gaza are transforming power dynamics in the Caucasus

Author:
Ilya Roubanis
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In 2017, Iran, Turkey and Russia met in Astana in a bid to determine the future of the Syrian Arab Republic without Western participation. As a byproduct of this episode, they started to develop a strategic policy understanding between themselves regarding the Levant: especially Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Since then, the war in Ukraine has broadened Iranian, Russian and Turkish cooperation to include the Caucasus. No longer able to ensure regional security but in need of effective sanction bypasses, Russia’s diminished profile created scope for a tighter web of economic partnerships between itself, Iran and Turkey. Using their 2017 Astana collaborative playbook, these three countries have now embarked on a process of creating new value chains, infrastructures, transport routes and regulatory arrangements in the Caucasus, which are no longer grafted onto the global liberal market economy but intend to form a subsystem of their own. The aim is to turn the Caucasus into an economic hub that ties the three partners together. This requires the establishment of stable security relations. The unresolved issue of control over southern Armenia’s Syunik region, a tense relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan and the war in Gaza are important tests for the nascent economic arrangements between Russia, Turkey and Iran. The brief intends to help Western policymakers understand the impact of sanctions on Russia/Iran, and of their support for the Israeli destruction of Gaza, on the prospects for stability and growth in the Caucasus.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Power Dynamics
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Caucasus, Middle East, Gaza, and Syria

14. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Rivalry that Remade the Middle East

Author:
Hassan Hassan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Observers often liken Iran’s strategic policy thinking to the intricate and patient process of crafting a Persian rug.1 The analogy illustrates how Tehran’s strategies, like the rug’s final inscriptions, only become clear upon completion, as seemingly random daily actions gradually reveal a coherent pattern. The comparison is apt for Iran’s traditional approach to power projection but may also be appropriate considering recent changes that have affected both Iran’s coveted rug market and the country’s regional and international outlook. Iran has successfully emerged from a series of geopolitical challenges beginning with the war against Iraq in the 1980s, followed by the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003, and culminating in popular uprisings after 2011—which were backed by its adversaries and threatened its allies in the region. In spite of Iran’s emergence from such challenges, factors such as the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Donald Trump presidency have crippled the Iranian economy and undermined Tehran’s ability to project power effectively.2 In the four decades following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been a prominent player in regional conflicts, particularly against Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 3 Iran has largely maintained the upper hand in the wake of these confrontations, contrary to expectations after the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 The Islamic Republic outlasted Saddam Hussein’s 1980-1988 war, extended its influence via proxies across multiple nations, and cemented its presence in four Arab capitals, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This apparent dominance peaked on 14 September 2019, when two major Saudi oil facilities—the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil field—were attacked using drones. 5 The attack roughly halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production and affected around 5 percent of the global oil supply. 6 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Although Iran denied any involvement, Saudi Arabian officials and the United States nonetheless suggested that drones and cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Rivalry, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

15. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative

Author:
Mansoor Moaddel
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
Topic:
Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

16. False Dawn: Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Amidst Improved Saudi-Iranian Relations

Author:
David Wood
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
On 17 October 2019, furious protests erupted across Lebanon as citizens came to a shocking realization: the country’s leaders had destroyed the economy. Decades of corruption and mismanagement had emptied the state’s coffers, trig- gering a domestic banking collapse and frittering away many Lebanese residents’ life savings. Now, almost five years later, the situation has only grown worse. The Lebanese lira (LBP) has been devalued to the point of irrelevance, crashing from 1,507.5 LBP for 1 USD to over 140,000 LBP in March 2023. House- holds give up essentials like health insurance to pay for diesel power generators and solar panels, as public electricity provisions—along with many other key state services—barely function.1 Meanwhile, the country’s leaders stubbornly resist implementing much-needed economic reforms, blaming the economic crisis on a wide range of factors, from Syrian refugees to general instability in the Middle East. A regularly proffered excuse emphasizes the role of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry has periodically played out on Lebanese soil. This theory argues that Lebanon is a “penetrated society,” inextricably tied to and paralyzed by geopolitical competition, including the Saudi–Iranian con- frontation.2 Thus, Lebanese leaders cannot resolve their disputes until these two regional heavyweights, amongst other foreign powers, reconcile their conflicting interests in Lebanon. Regional competition overlays a domestic political structure already prone to deadlock, which rigidly apportions power between Lebanon’s frequently feuding sectarian communities. Accordingly, various Lebanese politicians hoped that improved Iranian-Saudi relations—facilitated in March 2023 by Chinese mediation—would lead to a breakthrough in their ability to tackle Lebanon’s economic meltdown. Yet, this optimistic reading overestimates the extent of Tehran and Riyadh’s cautious détente, which is unlikely to translate into constructive engagement in Lebanon any time soon. It also downplays the true obstacle to Lebanon’s economic reform process: corruption in the country’s own political and financial elite.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Economic Crisis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon

17. Mending fences: Europe’s stake in the Saudi-Iran detente

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey and Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Saudi-Iran rivalry has long deepened conflict lines in the Middle East. But growing mutual vulnerabilities prompted a quiet rapprochement, culminating in the 2023 Beijing de-escalation agreement. While it hasn’t led to conflict resolution, this detente has helped contain regional escalation. Dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran remains frequent amid the Gaza crisis and could become even more important after the Israeli killing of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Europeans should actively support Saudi-Iran engagement as a vital diplomatic path to regional stability, rather than viewing it as Iran’s attempt to evade US sanctions. If Iran’s new leadership is willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue and other files, Europeans should see Saudi Arabia as a channel to help facilitate necessary economic relief to Iran as part of any new deal. Europeans could help both countries navigate tension around America’s regional involvement, ensuring Saudi-Israel normalisation does not undermine Saudi-Iran diplomacy. If Iran refuses to enter negotiations and relations with the West deteriorate further, Europeans should still consider Saudi Arabia as a valuable mediator between the West and Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Rapprochement, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

18. Proxy battles: Iraq, Iran, and the turmoil in the Middle East

Author:
Hamzeh Hadad
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza has deepened the Middle East’s fault lines. Iran and its proxies and the US and Israel have engaged in a cycle of tit-for-tat attacks across the region, with the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Syria and Iran’s direct retaliation against Israel threatening to escalate into a regional war. Iraqi paramilitaries operating as part of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ have also attacked US forces in Iraq, who responded with reprisals of their own. This, and the increasing risk of a wider war, imperils the relative stability Iraq has enjoyed over the past few years and the country’s fledgling role as a regional mediator. Iran’s influence in Iraq increased following the US invasion of 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein – but their relationship is far from being a simple agent-proxy arrangement. Iran’s strongest influence is through its paramilitaries’ presence in Iraq’s security apparatus, but Iraq has also exhibited some political independence from its neighbour and maintains financial leverage over Iran. Europeans can help increase Iraq’s autonomy. In the economic sector, they should strengthen its financial institutions through global integration and digitisation. European countries can also work alongside Gulf states to broaden their ties with Iraq, including in foreign investment and a shift from a development or humanitarian aid framework towards normal bilateral ties. However, for any European policy to be successful in Iraq, it must be designed within a broader framework of ending the war in Gaza and resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – without which the dangerous escalation across the Middle East may continue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

19. Turkey’s Anti-PKK Operation and “Development Road” in Iraq Are Two Sides of the Same Coin

Author:
Idris Okuducu
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Turkey's intertwining of its mega project and its anti-PKK operation improves the chances of success for both elements. But this interconnection can be a double-edged sword—if one element fails, it may potentially hinder the success of the other. Turkey’s recently announced comprehensive military operation against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)—which will be launched this summer, potentially in coordination with Baghdad—is not just about security. Ankara’s offensive will be part of a wider strategy, which heavily features the proposed “Development Road” connecting Turkey and Iraq, to strengthen economic and political relations with Iraq’s central government. These efforts will counter growing Iranian hegemony in the region, particularly in the face of the looming U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but Turkey will likely need to secure Iranian aquiescence to the two plans in order for either to be successful.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, PKK, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

20. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 1)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Having observed two decades of instability across its southern borders and anticipating U.S. withdrawals, Ankara is planning steps to end the volatility, including potentially wide-ranging agreements with the Assad regime. Events in the Fertile Crescent since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have not been in favor of Turkish security interests. The ensuing Iraqi civil strife, the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), and Syria’s civil war collectively resulted in regional instability for over two decades, including numerous terrorist attacks against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a NATO-designated terrorist entity that has been fighting Ankara for decades, took advantage of Iraq’s decentralization to establish itself along the border in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region. On Turkey’s other southern border, the multinational campaign against IS led to a U.S. partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the PKK’s armed Syrian wing that later took a leading role in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and gained control over a large swath of the frontier. This partnership became the greatest impediment to a reset in U.S.-Turkey ties. Today, anticipating that the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria will decrease significantly, Ankara aims to promote soft recentralization in both neighbors, toward the broader goals of curbing instability across its borders and denying operational space to the PKK. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discusses how these goals affect Turkish policy in Syria; Part 2 addresses the implications for Iraq.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, PKK, Regional Politics, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria