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21. Russia’s Strategy and Interests in MENA Conflicts: An Overview

Author:
Luigi Narbone
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As 2019 comes to close, Russian mercenaries are allegedly shifting the balance of forces in Libya, helping General Haftar to reignite his efforts to take Tripoli. Only a few weeks ago, Russia’s brokered ceasefire had successfully stopped Turkey’s advances in the Syrian northeast, pushing Kurdish forces away from the Turkish border and allowing the return of Bashar Al Assad’s forces to the region from where they had been absent since the beginning of the conflict. Similarly, in Idlib, Russia’s position will be essential to determine the course of the conflict.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, Syria, and Idlib

22. Don't Write Off Iraq

Author:
Bilal Wahab and Barbara A. Leaf
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Even as Baghdad works to rein in militias that invite outside attacks, Washington needs to be patient with the country’s contradictions in the near term and give space for it to exert sovereignty in the long term. As President Trump met with Iraqi president Barham Salih today on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, they were no doubt buoyed by their governments’ mutual conclusion that the recent attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq did not originate from Iraq. Initial concerns about that possibility were well founded—a previous attack on a major Saudi pipeline was carried out from Iraqi territory this May, and multiple Iraqi militia facilities have been struck since June, reportedly by Israel. Each of these developments was linked to Shia “special groups” with known ties to Iran. On July 1, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi ordered these and other militias to fold themselves under state authority, but so far he has been unable to impose order on them. The government has also failed to prevent them from threatening neighboring countries at Iran’s presumed behest—an especially dangerous lapse given that Iraqi authorities cannot protect the territory these militias hold from external retaliation. To keep other countries from turning Iraq into a proxy battleground, Baghdad needs to rein in the unruliest militias. This is a tall order because Tehran has spent fifteen years building them into a parallel force of its own. Given the willingness these “special groups” have shown when asked to attack U.S. troops, fight on the Assad regime’s behalf in Syria, or secure other Iranian interests, they risk implicating Iraq in Tehran’s regional confrontations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and/or Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

23. Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part of an intense revisionist campaign or during war. For example, the current conflict in eastern Ukraine might be viewed as an example of hybrid warfare that is taking place within a wider Russian campaign of regional revisionism and global influence. Likewise, Iranian proxy militia fighting hybrid wars in Syria and Iraq, and against Israel, are part of a wider regional revisionist challenge. Alternatively, any future large-scale war is likely to involve hybrid warfare operations, in parallel with hybrid threats to the homeland. The challenge will be to fight both in parallel.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Proxy War, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

24. Social Capital in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Huseyin Emre Ceyhun
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Levels of social capital, which is often operationalized by measures of trust, have changed significantly in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 15 years. The 2011 uprisings marked a critical juncture for atrophying, status-quo statesociety relations: citizens questioned the nature of governance while governments grappled with reinvigorated demands of citizenship. These demands were not fully met, however, and peaceful transitions towards democracy did not ensue. Instead, many countries experienced significant conflict, including proxy-wars resulting from interests of regional powers and sectarian differences. As of 2019, Tunisia remained as the only country that is on a democratic but fragile path toward a democratic consolidation. In this context and over a 13 year period (2006-2019), the Arab Barometer can present an overarching picture of how political and interpersonal trust in the Middle East have changed in the years surrounding the 2011 Arab uprisings. With few exceptions, political and interpersonal trust in the Middle East has been decreasing, demonstrating the extent of anti-establishment feelings nurtured in societies. However, trust in legal systems has not decreased as much as trust in political institutions such as government and parliament. These findings suggest that despite widespread lack of confidence in governments and parliaments, ordinary citizens have not entirely given up on existing systems of governance. These patterns are clearly evident in Tunisia, the only country generally considered to have fully undertaken a democratic transition after the Arab uprisings. All measures of trust show a similar declining trend for political and interpersonal trust in Tunisia since 2011. As of 2018, only 20 percent of Tunisians trust the government, compared with 14 percent who trust parliament, and only 8 percent who have high levels of interpersonal trust. However, trust in the legal system (48 percent) is virtually unchanged between 2011 and 2018, suggesting that Tunisians might still be still committed to the system brought about by the Arab Spring.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Citizenship, Arab Spring, Proxy War, and Social Capital
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

25. Beyond the proxy powder keg: The specter of war between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

26. Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Life on the Margins

Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
The outbreak of civil war in Syria led to a mass exodus of refugees to neighboring countries and beyond. Many of these refugees fled to Jordan and Lebanon where they face a myriad of challenges, including of how to provide services for such a vast population increase. Overall, while Jordan has taken a number of steps to address some of the key challenges faced by refugees,1 Lebanon has taken fewer steps. Perhaps this is due to Lebanon’s unique history and fears that a large influx of refugees could change the country’s fragile sectarian balance and even lead to a renewed civil conflict.2 Against this background, the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer reveals that refugees in Jordan and Lebanon show different feelings about the degree to which they feel secure in their host country and how they the degree to which available services are meeting their needs. Overall, the findings reveal significant differences in the degree to which Syrian refugees feel safe and secure in the two countries. For example, while a majority of refugees in Jordan (59 percent) are not very worried or not worried at all about being harassed or threatened in street, only 25 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same. This result shows similarities with citizens of their host countries: while 58 percent of Jordanians are not very worried or not worried at all, only three-in-ten (29 percent) of Lebanese have such concerns. However, Lebanese tend to see Syrian refugees as a greater challenge to their country than Jordanians: 44 percent of Lebanese as opposed to 35 percent of Jordanian cite Syrian refugees as one of the two most important challenges that their countries face today. Perceptions of Syrian refugees toward the quality of public services also diverge to a great extent. Although the vast majority in Jordan are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system (86 percent) and the education system (81 percent), only 53 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same about the educational system, and just 28 percent in Lebanon are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system. Economic conditions are even more challenging for refugees in both countries. Most face with difficulties in meeting their household expenses. However, Syrian refugees in Jordan are more likely to show greater optimism toward economic conditions than those living in Lebanon. Notably, support for democracy remains strong among the refugee population in both countries, with 79 percent in Jordan and 85 percent in Lebanon agreeing or strongly agreeing democracy is better than other forms of government. At the same time, refugee communities in both countries define democracy based primarily on socioeconomic terms instead of political outcomes. Moreover, most believe that political reform should be instituted gradually instead of once (85 percent in Jordan and 80 percent in Lebanon).
Topic:
Civil War, Refugee Issues, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

27. Facilitating a Political Transition in Syria

Author:
Omar Sheira
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The Arab Spring shook the fragile foundation of Syria, effectively highlighting the pre-existing sentiments of conflict and separatism along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines. Refusing to respond to the calls of nationwide protests, President Bashar al-Assad responded with unrestricted force, effectively plunging the country into a fully-fledged civil war, very similar to what Hobbes described as the state of nature. Five years later, the war has all but damaged Syria's security, political, economic and social domains, causing more than $200 billion of losses (Abdul Razzaq, 2015) and spilling over to cost nearby countries an estimated $35 billion (World Bank, 2016). In terms of human suffering, it has claimed the lives of 250,000-470,000, injured over 1-2 million Syrians, and forcefully displaced 54% of the pre-war population, including 4.6 million people who fled the country and 6.6 million others who were internally displaced by violence (UNOCHA, 2016). The intensifying conflict, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has transformed Syria into an international stage for the proxy confrontation between local, regional and international powers, including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon, as each of them supports various Syrian players in the conflict. This has led to the inability of any party to achieve an absolute military victory and prolonged the conflict, risking the expansion of its military dimensions and political consequences.
Topic:
Syrian War, Crisis Management, Proxy War, and Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

28. External Actors in the Syrian Civil War. Clash of Interests and Strategies / Los actores externos en la guerra civil siria. Choque de intereses y estrategias

Author:
José Luis Calvo Albero
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The civil war in Syria has become a classic example of proxy war, in which different regional and global powers defend their interests through third parties. That explains its long duration and the high level of violence without reaching exhaustion. This article describes the motivations of the different external actors in the conflict and the strategic lines they follow to achieve their objectives.
Topic:
Syrian War, Proxy War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

29. When Proxies Fail, Force Must Prevail U.S.-Iran Relations

Author:
Jonathan Ruhe
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
For decades, the United States and Iran have pursued fundamentally incompatible strategic objectives. Yet despite having expansive goals and minimal mutual interests, each side has recognized that direct confrontation would jeopardize its ultimate goal. Thus competition between the two countries often has taken less decisive, but also less risky, forms of behavior, namely: diplomacy, sanctions, and the use of proxy forces. Given the stakes involved, however, relying entirely on such measures to convey the seriousness of one’s intentions is insufficient. Indeed, the United States has been most successful influencing Iranian policy when it has demonstrated its own willingness to use force or supported actors using military force directly against Iran – and conversely, least successful when it has failed to do so. ​ The two countries have long held mutually exclusive aims. The United States wants to remain predominant in the Middle East to ensure the free flow of natural resources and the security of its allies, even as it withdraws troops after more than a decade of war and faces an uncertain fiscal future. The Iranian regime pursues nuclear weapons capability to protect against its perceived danger from a U.S.-supported overthrow, provide an umbrella under which it can project unmatchable power against its neighbors, and validate its continuing right to rule, among other goals. Both objectives are highly ambitious and in direct conflict with each other. ​ Therefore the lethargy of peace suits both rivals well, as neither side feels it can afford an overt rupture. For the United States, direct conflict would critically endanger its efforts to maintain regional stability with a receding regional footprint. For Iran, it would seriously delay its approach to a nuclear weapons capability. There is little middle ground for diplomacy to secure, given the two countries’ ultimately irreconcilable goals.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America