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212. Preventive Military Action: The Worst Way to Deal With Iran's Nuclear Program
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- Although the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons is a major concern for Israel and the United States, leaving the "military option" on the table is counterproductive. Preventive military action by either country against Iran's nuclear facilities would only delay, rather than halt, Tehran's nuclear program, and it would cause Iran to retaliate against the United States as well as Israel. The aftermath of such an attack would be disastrous for the U.S. position in the region-particularly for relations with Israel and with Iraq-and its position in the wider world.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America
213. PolicyWatch #1350: Iran and the Road Ahead
- Author:
- Michael Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 03-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Recently, two important developments have broken months of gridlock on the Iranian nuclear issue: a third round of UN sanctions and a new warning by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Although both measures are positive, their ultimate impact will depend on how aggressively and effectively key governments implement them.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons and United Nations
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
214. PolicyWatch #1334: Iranian Threats and the UN Sanctions Debate
- Author:
- Patrick Clawson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- On January 26, Hussein Shariatmadari -- the publisher of Iran's most influential newspaper and a close confidant of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- stated that attacks on "Zionists, Americans, and European countries that support Israel," as well as on compliant regional rulers, were both morally permissible and easily carried out. Indeed, Iran's hardliners engage in not only heated rhetoric, but also heated action -- from funding terrorists to ignoring international nuclear mandates. Accordingly, while the UN Security Council attempts to set the agenda with a new round of sanctions, the hardliners may forgo passivity and go on the offensive.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons and United Nations
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
215. PolicyWatch #1330: Domestic Issues Trump Foreign Policy in Iran
- Author:
- Mehdi Khalaji
- Publication Date:
- 01-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- At each stop on his recent Middle East tour, President Bush centered his foreign policy agenda on the growing threat from Iran. But inside the Islamic Republic, domestic policies -- and not the international issues that Bush highlighted -- are at the center of political debate.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, and Middle East
216. PolicyWatch #1324: Raising the Costs for Tehran
- Author:
- Michael Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In the wake of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, questions are being raised as to whether sanctions and financial pressure remain a viable approach to changing Tehran's decisionmaking on its nuclear program. As evidence of this strategy's demise, critics point to the foundering attempts to negotiate a third round of UN sanctions against Iran -- sanctions that appeared imminent before the NIE's publication. While additional punitive measures by the UN are important and necessary, better enforcement of the various sanctions regimes already in place could have an equally significant impact.
- Topic:
- Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, and Middle East
217. Iran Says “No”—Now What?
- Author:
- George Perkovich
- Publication Date:
- 09-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Neither Iran nor the United States can achieve all it wants in the current nuclear standoff. Iran has demonstrated its unwillingness to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands to cease its enrichment activities or to negotiate seriously toward that end. The United States and other interlocutors should offer Iran a last chance to negotiate a suspension of its enrichment program until the IAEA can resolve outstanding issues in return for substantial incentives. If that package were rejected, the P-5 plus Germany should withdraw the incentives and commit to maintaining sanctions as long as Iran does not comply with IAEA demands. Simultaneously, the U.S. should take force “off the table” as long as Iran is not newly found to be seeking nuclear weapons or committing aggression.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, and Middle East
218. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation
- Author:
- David Albright and Andrea Scheel
- Publication Date:
- 11-2008
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Science and International Security
- Abstract:
- Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America
219. Iran's Nuclear Ambitions and Turkey
- Author:
- Hakki Uygur
- Publication Date:
- 02-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
- Abstract:
- The Iranian nuclear issue has serious implications for regional and international security and as such requires a comprehensive analysis of the Iranian domestic power structure, foreign policy decision making process and nuclear diplomacy. Iran has a complex internal decision making process and the management of nuclear issue makes the situation more complicated. This policy brief argues that the Iranian nuclear issue is as much a regional and international issue as it is part of the domestic power struggle in Iran. It also argues that Turkey should follow the nuclear issue closely and play a constructive role in opposing the proliferation of WMD including nuclear weapons in the Middle East while maintaining good relations with Iran.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Turkey, and Middle East
220. PolicyWatch #1432: Syria's Reactor: Can the IAEA Act Effectively?
- Author:
- David Schenker and Patrick Clawson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2008
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- High on the agenda of the November 27-28 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) will be the November 19 report from Director General Mohammed ElBaradei about Syria. How the IAEA responds to the Syrian challenge may determine whether future urgent proliferation concerns are taken to the IAEA and UN Security Council or resolved through military force, such as Israel's airstrike last year on Syria's Dayr al-Zor site.
- Topic:
- Security, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Syria