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171. CNS NPT Monitoring Report - Disarmament

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The Eighth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 28, 2010 with the adoption by consensus of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, which contain 64 action items across the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An additional set of recommendations contained in the final document pertains to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. While the adoption of the “action plan” was widely and deservedly regarded as a success, its long-term impact will depend on the implementation by the NPT member states.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Peace Studies, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Middle East

172. Turkey and the Iranian nuclear programme: Key to progress in regional disarmament?

Author:
Hanna Ojanen and Barbara Zanchetta
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The increasing tension around the Iranian nuclear programme and the uncompromising positions of the protagonists have made the goal of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East seem utopic. Yet, the current strategy of maintaining a low profile in the discussions on the zone, while keeping the focus exclusively on Iran, is not likely to lead to progress. Instead, combining the Iranian question with the zone and enlarging the content and scope of the negotiations even further by including Iran's neighbours could be a better strategy. Turkey could play a key role because of its unique relations with Iran, and because of its strong quest for a more prominent international position — if it can only strike the right balance between the role of lead actor and team player. Turkish-Iranian relations could notably inspire the consideration of accompanying pragmatic agreements on regional cooperation in other fields as a way forward for the upcoming Middle East disarmament negotiations in Finland.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Finland

173. The P5 +1, Iran and the Perils of Nuclear Brinkmanship

Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West have had their share of dashed expectations, but even by this peculiar standard, the recent diplomatic roller coaster stands out. Brimming with hope in Istanbul, negotiators crashed to earth in Baghdad, a few weeks later. That was not unexpected, given inflated hopes, mismatched expectations and – most hurtful – conviction on both sides that they had the upper hand. But if negotiations collapse now, it is hard to know what comes next. Washington and Brussels seem to count on sanctions taking their toll and forcing Iran to compromise. Tehran appears to bank on a re-elected President Obama displaying more flexibility and an economically incapacitated Europe balking at sanctions that could boomerang. Neither is likely; instead, with prospects for a deal fading, Israeli pressure for a military option may intensify. Rather than more brinkmanship, Iran and the P5+1 (UN Security Council permanent members and Germany) should agree on intensive, continuous, technicallevel negotiations to achieve a limited agreement on Iran's 20 per cent enrichment.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East

174. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and Iran's future ability to arm its missiles and aircraft with such weapons, pose s critical risk s that shape every aspect of US, Arab, Israeli and other military competition with Iran . In the near term, they could trigger a major confrontation or war in the Gulf. In the mid to long - term, they could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, coupled to the search for missile defenses and an accelerated arms race to improve conventional, asymmetric, and proxy forces as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

175. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The most threatening form of US and Iranian competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to “close the Gulf.” US and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear program have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European, and UN sanctions become steadily stronger.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Oil, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United Nations

176. Iranian nuclear weapons: a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Author:
Mariano Aguirre
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The debate about the Iranian nuclear programme has heated up over recent months, with the danger that the situation could get out of control and violence may erupt. Currently, the main threatis an escalation of violence between Iran and the U.S. Strategically, an attack will further decrease U.S. legitimacy in a region already in turmoil and will isolate Israel even further. The consequencesof these processes are both serious and unpredictable.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

177. Can Iran be Contained? Thoughts on the Possibility of Extended Deterrence in the Middle East

Author:
Carlo Masala
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
“Extended deterrence,” or “active deterrence,” as it is sometimes called, threatens a nuclearstrategic response in case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of one’s allies. This paper aims to explore the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East in light of an Iranian nuclear military capability. Two preliminary remarks are necessary in order to frame the line of reasoning on the issue. First, discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of extended deterrence in the Middle East does not intend to insinuate that diplomatic efforts to stop the Iranian regime from constructing a nuclear device have failed or that a nuclear Iran is already a given. Exploring the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East is, rather, an attempt to be intellectually honest and anticipate that all the efforts underway for almost a decade will fail because the Iranian regime is determined to produce nuclear warheads or reach the breakout point, in which it will become a “virtual nuclear power.” Either trajectory will have a decisive impact on the nuclear realm, but even more so, on the political balance of power in the region; each has the potential to reshuffle relations not only between Iran and Israel but also between Iran and the Arab states in the Middle East. If either development is perceived as detrimental to the already fragile security situation in the Middle East, academics and practitioners must start thinking about a “Plan B”. The second preliminary remark that must precede any analysis of extended deterrence and its applicability to the Middle East concerns the nature of the subject to be explored. Although for about six decades there has been a profusion of literature on the mechanisms of deterrence and extended deterrence (in conjunction with the same number of critical studies on why deterrence and extended deterrence might not work),1 we still don’t know much about these two concepts. This paradox can be explained by the simple fact that so far we have not experienced the failure of a deterrence relationship, i.e., resulting in a nuclear war between two powers. Proponents and opponents of deterrence believe – in the theological sense of the word – that deterrence either works or doesn’t, respectively, but neither camp knows for certain. The consequences of this highly unsatisfying state of the art is that neither the “more may be better” nor the “dead end of deterrence”2 approach provides any form of guidance for policymakers. If academics want to speak truth to power they need to be aware of, first, the limitations of their theories, and second, that the real world can’t be grasped with parsimonious concepts.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

178. Diplomatic Engagement: The Path to Avoiding War and Resolving the Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Seel
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
U.S.-Iranian relations are bad and getting worse. The New Year has opened with rising tensions between the United States and Iran and an increased prospect of war—either intentional or accidental. The Nov. 2011 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency details why the international community remains deeply concerned about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. While sanctions and other measures have slowed down Iran’s movement toward acquiring a nuclear weapons option, Tehran continues to improve its nuclear capabilities and has so far refused to implement the confidence-building steps necessary to ensure it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The latest round of U.S. unilateral sanctions has been met with Iranian threats of closing the Straits of Hormuz through which 35% of the world’s seaborne oil passes. Iran reinforced those threats with ten days of military exercises in nearby waters that included launches of anti-ship missiles. These and other developments highlight how relatively minor incidents could quickly escalate into a major military conflict. At the same time, Iran proposed on December 31 a new round of talks with the P5+1 group of nations, suggesting that that diplomatic options to resolve the nuclear concerns about its nuclear activities have not been exhausted. In the following Iran Nuclear Brief, ACA Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann argues that in order to avoid unintentional conflict with Iran, there is an urgent need to establish better lines of bilateral communication at all levels—between military forces in the region, between diplomats, and between senior officials. Thielmann also explains why pragmatic diplomatic engagement is essential to a successful strategy to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

179. Charting a Diplomatic Path On the Iran Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Peter Grail
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Even as tensions over Iran’s nuclear program rise, the principal parties engaged in the issue say that they seek a peaceful resolution through diplomacy. Earlier this month, Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili reportedly sent a letter to European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton—who represents the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—in response to the six-country offer for the renewal of serious talks on Iran’s nuclear program. With the P5+1 insisting that a diplomatic path to resolve the issue remains open and Tehran’s professed interest in dialogue, the question arises: what steps could the two sides take to resolve the impasse? In her letter to Jalili last October calling for renewed negotiations, Ashton said the process would need to begin with confidence-building measures to facilitate longer-term engagement. Given the current trust deficit and the inability of the fractured Iranian political leadership to agree on whether and how to engage on the nuclear issue, an approach that builds upon short-term arrangements makes sense. But it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement might be. In this respect, Ashton said in her letter that the goal of the six countries is “a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” reaffirming the group’s commitment to proposals it put forward 2006 and 2008. This brief provides an overview of these proposals and related confidence-building steps and discusses how they address the critical issue of Iran’s enrichment program.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Dialogue, and P5+1
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

180. The Breakout Option: Raising the Bar for the Supreme Leader

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The U.S. intelligence community still assesses that Tehran has not yet actually decided to build a nuclear weapon. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would be the one to give that order and the one who would control the weapons. It is therefore worth pondering what steps could discourage him from proceeding down the nuclear weapons path. If Khamenei's foremost goals are the survival of the Islamic Republic with himself as supreme leader, developing nuclear capabilities may be seen an asset, even with the damaging sanctions that result. By positioning himself as a defiant defender of Iranian nuclear progress against foreign bullying, he can reinforce the domestic legitimacy of the clerical regime. If he came to believe that Iran could forestall continuing economic punishment and eventual military attack only by abject capitulation, he might decide that breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to build a bomb would be the preferred path for restoring Iran's international position and securing the Islamic revolution. The challenge for the United States is to devise policies that would make it as difficult as possible for Khamenei to retain domestic support and international sympathy if he were to go for a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East