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1. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:
Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

2. Trump’s JCPOA withdrawal two years on: Maximum pressure, minimum outcomes

Author:
David Mortlock
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Two years ago, US President Donald J. Trump walked into the White House Diplomatic Reception Room and announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Iran and has adopted a policy of “maximum pressure” to compel Iran to change its behavior and to deny the Iranian regime the resources to engage in its destabilizing activities. However, he also promised he was ready, willing, and able to make a new and lasting deal with Iran. In “Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Two Years On – Maximum Pressure, Minimum Outcomes” author David Mortlock, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, evaluates the policy outcomes of President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. The author walks readers through the timeline of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the subsequent implementation of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, and the policy outcomes relative to stated objectives. In sum, Mortlock concludes that although the maximum pressure campaign has been effective in inflicting economic harm on Iran, it has had minimum effect in other areas. Therefore, Mortlock believes the Trump administration should seize the opportunity to pivot from maximum pressure to an approach focused more on policy outcomes.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Donald Trump, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. What Happens to Israel If the US and Iran Go to War?

Author:
Louis René Beres
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
On core matters of peace and security, two closely interrelated questions must be asked: 1. What precisely does Donald Trump have in mind regarding any potential armed conflict with Iran? 2. What might such a possibility portend for Israel, a US ally? Answers to these questions must extend beyond narrowly partisan simplifications. They should be nuanced and subtly overlapping. At a minimum, once a shooting war were underway, the Israeli armed forces (IDF) could become involved, possibly to a substantial degree. In a worst case scenario, clashes would involve unconventional weapons and directly affect Israel’s civilian population. The worst of the worst could involve nuclear ordnance.
Topic:
Security, War, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Israel

4. Improving the Role of Intelligence in Counterproliferation Policymaking: Report of the "Speaking Truth to Nonproliferation Project," 2018

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This report is the culmination of a two-year project sponsored by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which engaged more than 50 senior, retired and serving policymakers, intelligence officers, and top academic national security analysts. Its findings are based on hours of group discussions and private conversations that helped develop new primary histories of eight nuclear proliferation cases: India, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Libya, and an Argentine and a separate South African nuclear rocket case. Each history was prepared by an academic historian and was based on open sources. Former officials who had direct roles in these cases then critiqued these accounts. Additional private interviews were conducted with participants to fill in historical gaps. The purpose of the case studies was to identify when and how intelligence shaped or prompted nonproliferation policy actions and, if it did not, why. This set of historical conclusions prompted a more general discussion of how policy and intelligence officials might improve their collaboration to prevent and curb further nuclear proliferation and how academics might contribute by enhancing their treatment of such issues. The project addressed three broad, related questions: How can the role of intelligencein the making of nonproliferation policy be improved? How can the nonproliferation agenda get the priority it deserves? How can the nonproliferation community be sustained and strengthened?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, History, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, India, Israel, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Libya, South Africa, Argentina, South America, and North Africa

5. The politics of hope: a nation’s patience tested

Author:
Ali Tehrani and Azadeh Pourzand
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Winter 2019 marked the 40th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The anniversary celebrations occurred in the midst of a difficult era of socio-economic turmoil, the return ofَ U.S. sanctions, and deepening political infighting in the Islamic Republic. Tensions between the government and the people are especially high. The tectonic plates of social change have been shifting below the surface in Iran over the past two decades, with major discontent erupting in the past year. While the country’s political facade appears largely unchanged, tensions and fragmentations among the ruling elite have deepened. Economic conditions are fast deteriorating for the average citizen, while political repression remains a harsh reality. Iran’s citizens, who have clung to hope and the possibility for change through decades of domestic repression and isolation from the global economy, struggle to remain hopeful. Collective fatigue stemming from years of isolation from the global economy, as well as domestic economic hardship, compounds the disappointment Iranians feel from unfulfilled political promises. The Iranian government has repeatedly failed to carry out promised reforms; in recent years alone, President Hassan Rouhani has proven unable to carry out his promises to “open up Iran politically, ease rigid social restrictions and address human rights abuses.” As this situation continues, Iran risks despair and chaos.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Social Movement, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Reform, Economy, and Memory
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Preventing an Israeli-Iran War

Author:
Alon Ben-Meir
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The EU is in a unique position to prevent the outbreak of a war between Israel and Iran that could engulf the Middle East in a war that no one can win.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

7. The Rising Crisis between the United States and Iran

Author:
Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
After a year in which Iran opted for "strategic patience," in the hope that European nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less dangerous option for them. The latest developments embody the potential for escalation and miscalculation that is liable to affect Israel's security, and therefore the security cabinet should convene to craft an appropriate policy for the near, medium, and long terms.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Oil, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America

8. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?

Author:
Basel Ammane
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

9. Russia and China in the Middle East: Playing their best cards

Author:
Marco Siddi and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia and China share a number of interests in the Middle East: limiting US power and maintaining good relations with all players in the region while remaining aloof from the key conflicts, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and Israel. Russia’s position has been based on political support for particular states, arms sales and the provision of civilian nuclear energy technology. Moscow has boosted its role by intervening militarily in the Syrian civil war. China has been strengthening its political position in the region for the last decade and its presence is more substantial from a financial-economic perspective. The current Chinese and Russian regional posture further marginalises the influence of the EU in MENA. In the Middle East, the EU is already a weaker economic actor than China and a weaker military player than Russia. However, the EU can cooperate with Russia and China on upholding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

10. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) on Restricting Iran’s Nuclear Program and Russia-Iran Relations Century | İran’ın Nükleer Enerji Programı’nın Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı (2015) ve İran-Rusya İlişkileri

Author:
Nurhan Hacıoğlu
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
After 11 September, Iran's nuclear energy program turned into an international crisis. However, Iran did not give up its nuclear energy program despite the pressure on it in the world public opinion. This crisis, which occurred in the early 2000s, did not cause a negative impact on relations between Iran and Russia. Russia continued to help Iran to develop its nuclear program. One of the main points of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between P5+ 1 countries and Iran in 2015 is that Iran limited its nuclear energy development for ten years. However, Iran could be a regional rival for Russia, especially in terms of energy and gas exports, after a decade. In this context, the focus of the study is to analyse whether there was any change in the good relations between the two countries after JCPOA. The study seeks answers to specific questions: How does Russia look at JCPOA? Why does Russia stand for a rival Iran? Are there any changes in the relations between Russia and Iran in the post-2015 period? According to the results, JCPOA did not have any negative effect on Russia-Iran relations. | 11 Eylül sonrası İran’ın nükleer enerji programı uluslararası bir krize dönüşmüştür. Ancak İran, uluslararası kamuoyunda kendisine yönelik baskılara rağmen nükleer enerji programından vazgeçmemiştir. 2000’li yılların başlarından itibaren ortaya çıkan bu kriz Rusya İran ilişkilerinde olumsuz bir etkiye neden olmamıştır. Rusya İran’a nükleer programını geliştirmesi için yaptığı yardımlara devam etmiştir. 2015 yılında P5+1 ülkeleri ve İran arasında imzalanan Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı’nın (KOEP) temel noktalarından biri İran’ın nükleer enerji gelişimini on yıllık bir süre için sınırlandırmış olmasıdır. Ancak İran on yılın sonunda kendisine yönelik yaptırım ve ambargolardan kurtulmuş bir ülke olarak Rusya’ya özellikle enerji ve gaz ihracı noktasında bölgesel bir rakip olabilecektir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın odak noktası, bütün bunlar göz önünde bulundurularak iki ülkenin KOEP sonrası iyi ilişkilerinde değişme olup olmayacağını analiz etmektir. Çalışma belli sorulara cevap aramaktadır: Rusya KOEP’e nasıl bakmaktadır? Rusya neden kendisine rakip olabilecek bir İran’ı göze almaktadır? 2015 sonrası dönemde Rusya-İran ilişkilerinde değişiklik olmuş mudur? Ortaya çıkan sonuçlara göre KOEP'in Rusya-İran ilişkilerine herhangi bir olumsuz etkisi olmamıştır.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East