Search

Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Political Geography Middle East

491. A Path Forward with Iran: Pressure through Engagement

Author:
Andy Johnson and Kyle Spector
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
If the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is the most dangerous place in the world at the moment, Afghanistan's neighbor to the West, Iran, is making a strong play for number two. It is alarming the world community, rattling its saber loudly at Israel and the West, and brutally suppressing internal dissent. Iran's regime, yet again, is showing why it remains a major threat to America n national security interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, America, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

492. Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives

Author:
Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex
Abstract:
Great powers use strategic narratives to establish and maintain influence in the international system and to shape the system itself. This is particularly the case in periods of transition in the international system when challengers to hegemonic powers emerge. Strategic narratives are an important tool which must be considered alongside material resources as a determinant of whether emerging great powers are able to shape a new systemic alignment. Strategic narratives are a tool through which great powers can articulate their interests, values and aspirations for the international system in ways that offer the opportunity for power transitions that avoid violent struggle between status quo and challenger states. Complicating this picture, however, is a complex media ecology which makes the process of projecting strategic narratives an increasingly difficult one. Analysis of international political communication within this media ecology is central to evaluating how strategic narratives are projected and the interactions that follow. We argue that empirical analysis of the formation, projection and reception of strategic narratives in that media ecology offers a framework through which to generate important findings concerning power transition, domestic and international legitimacy, and recognition and identity - important because many international relations scholars thus far failed to take into account the difference such narratives make, and can make.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and State Actors
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

493. The Fight for Diwaniyah: The Sadrist Trend and ISCI Struggle for Supremacy

Author:
Patrick Gaughen
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Even as U.S. operations to co-opt large elements of the Sunni insurgency and target irreconciliable al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters resulted in lower levels of violence during the summer, U.S. forces have simultaneously pursued rogue elements of Muqtada as-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). These operations, often in collaboration with Iraqi Security Forces friendly to Sadr's main Shi'a rival, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), took place within the broader context of a violent struggle between ISCI and the Sadrist Trend for supremacy within the Shi'a community, the lucrative income from control of the Shi'a shrines, and control of southern oil fields. This struggle has increasingly centered on the city of Diwaniyah, located in southern Iraq, approximately halfway between the capital of Baghdad and the southern port city of Basrah.
Topic:
Religion, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

494. The Growing Threat of Special Groups in Baghdad

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
While al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat in northern Iraq, violence by Special Groups—Shi'a extremist elements funded, trained, and armed by Iran—remains a key challenge to stability and security in central and southern Iraq. Despite reports in late 2007 that Iranian sponsorship of Special Groups had declined, the trend in Special Groups activity in January and February 2008 suggests otherwise. In a recent briefing, Admiral Gregory Smith, the Deputy Spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, explicitly stated, “The Special Groups' activity has not decreased in recent months. They continue to be probably the most violent of the extremist groups that we're seeing from Shi'a sects. [The] intent of Iran in supporting the training and financing we believe continues.” Other officials from both the Departments of State and Defense have also cited an increase in Special Groups activity since the beginning of 2008.The use of highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a hallmark of Iranian-backed groups, has risen since the start of 2008.Indeed, the month of January saw twelve EFP attacks, which was the highest monthly total of such attacks in over a year. This meant that, on average, from early January to early February, there was an EFP attack every three days.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

495. Iraq's Three Civil Wars

Author:
Juan Cole
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
All war situations are a little bit opaque, but from reading the Iraqi press in Arabic, I conclude that there are three major struggles for power of a political and violent sort. What’s striking is how little relevant the United States is. It is a superpower, and it is militarily occupying the country, but it appears most frequently to be in the position of going to the parties and saying, “Hey, guys, cut it out. Make nice. Please.” It’s odd that it should be so powerless in some ways, but let me explain. Then, there’s a war for Baghdad. This is the one that Americans tend to know about because the U.S. troops are in Baghdad, and so it’s being fought all around our guys, and we are drawn into it from time to time. The American public, when it thinks about this war, mainly thinks about attacks on U.S. troops, which are part of that war because the U.S. troops were seen by the Sunni Arabs as adjuncts to the Shiite paramilitaries, and they have really functioned that way. Most American observers of Iraq wouldn’t say that the U.S. is an enabler of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps paramilitaries of these Shiite fundamentalist parties, but you could make the case that, functionally speaking, that’s how it’s worked out. The U.S. has mainly taken on the remnants of the Ba’ath party, the Salafi jihadis, and other Sunni groups, and has tried to disarm them, tried to kill them, and has opened a space for the Shiite paramilitaries to claim territory and engage in ethnic cleansing and gain territory and power. So that battle between the Sunni Arabs and the Shiite Arabs is going on in Baghdad, is going on in the hinterlands of Baghdad, up to the northeast to Diyala Province, and then south to Babil and so forth. And finally, as if all that weren’t enough, there is a war in the north for control of Kirkuk, which used to be called by Saddam “Ta’mim Province”. Kirkuk Province has the city of Kirkuk in it and very productive oil fields, in the old days at least. Kirkuk is not part of the Kurdistan Regional Authority, which was created by melding three northern provinces together into a super province; however, the Kurdistan Regional Authority wishes to annex Kirkuk to the authority. Regional governments are super-provinces or provincial confederations. Try to imagine what happened—Iraq had 18 provinces in the old days, but it now has 15 provinces and one regional authority. It would be as though Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana got together, erased their state borders, elected a joint parliament and a prime minister, and then told the Federal leaders in Washington that if they would like to communicate with any of those states, they need to go through the regional prime minister, and by the way, we’re not sending any more money to Washington. And don’t even think about keeping federal troops on our soil. So, this is what the Kurds have done. They’ve erased the provincial boundaries that created one Kurdistan government that had -- it has its own military. They’re giving out visas independent of Baghdad. They’re inviting companies in to explore for oil independent of Baghdad. They’re the Taiwan of the Middle East. They’re an independent country. They just don’t say that they are because it would cause a war.
Topic:
Civil War, Religion, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

496. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff

Author:
William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

497. Much ado about nothing: the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Author:
Anat Biletzki
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
One could say that we have been in the midst of some sort of peace process since the 1991 Madrid conference. Erstwhile movers and shakers can, in fact, point to earlier attempts at peace-making—clandestine efforts at give-and-take, less or more secret track-2 initiatives, various collaborations (between teachers, students, doctors, lawyers, et al, from “both sides”)—that have had sporadic success and perhaps even some achievements. But the starting point of a grand-scale peace process, one with official authorities of Israel and Palestine, can be pinpointed in Madrid. Then fol- lowed the Oslo 1 and 2 accords, the Wye River Memorandum, the Taba Summit, the Road Map to Peace, and finally the Annapolis Conference. Each of these housed almost an identical set of ceremonies, rituals, icons, and discourse (and several identical players as well). Almost all had the expected preliminary (honest?) deliberations, the requisite early (prefabricated?) suspense, the accompaniment of (objective?) third-party American pressure, the moments of (manufactured?) crisis, and the final fanfare regarding an (historic?) announcement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Territory
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

498. Does the “Surge” Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?

Author:
Jon R. Lindsay
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Sen. John McCain has long advocated “sustained and substantial” troop increases,1 attacking Sen. Barack Obama’s position on drawing down forces. Obama for his part recently stated that the surge has “succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated” and “beyond our wildest dreams.”2 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi- National Corps Iraq during the surge, told a Heritage Foundation audience in March 2008, “I think it’s safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces—and how we employed those forces—have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.”3 While the surge was quite controversial in its inception,4 it now seems that “success has a thou- sand fathers.” Indeed, since the deployment starting in January 2007 of an additional 30,000 troops (five addi- tional Army brigades primarily in and around Baghdad and 4,000 Marines in Anbar Province, rising to a high-water mark of 171,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by October 2007), the drop in vio- lence has been remarkable. From December 2006 to August 2008, monthly insurgent-initiated attacks have dropped from over 5,600 to 800, U.S. troop fatalities from 112 to 23, and Iraqi civilian fatalities from 3,500 to 500. Even though we’re hardly out of the woods, the troop surge is clearly correlated with a major decrease in violence.5 Correlation, of course, is not causation. Lt. Gen. Odierno is right to highlight the employment of surge forces in addition to the increase in their numbers. The renewed focus on providing security to the Iraqi population—by pushing troops out of sprawling Forward Operating Bases and proactively controlling movement within major cities—has truly been a change for the bet- ter. Nevertheless, there are factors above and beyond additional troops and better counter-insur- gency tactics that may account for the drop in violence. These include the Sunni Awakening movements that emerged in Anbar province prior to the surge, the tragic efficacy of sectarian killing in 2006, the Shia Mahdi Army cease-fire announced and renewed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and operations by other U.S. organizations not associated with the surge.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

499. The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry

Author:
Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

500. Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know

Author:
Peter Krause
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Troop levels in Iraq have been one of the most hotly contested issues om American foreign policy over the past three years, from debates over the initial deployment in 2003 to those surrounding the troop surge in 2007. The Bush administration has faced significant criticism for ignoring the conventional wisdom regarding the number of soldiers required to secure Iraq, and recent attempts to change course in this area are seen by some as too little, too late. Specifically, the Pentagon’s deployment of only 120,000 American troops for the invasion and the decision by Paul Bremer, U.S. Administrator in Iraq, to disband the Iraqi army and police has kept the ratio of security forces to Iraqi civilians well below the 20 per 1,000 seen as the basic ante required to play the high stakes stabilization game. Many supporters of higher troop levels blame these missteps for the emergence of the robust insurgency and the coalition’s failure to defeat it. But where exactly does the 20 per 1,000 figure come from, how strong is the evidence sup- porting it, and what steps are being taken to assess and improve the conventional wisdom in this area? While the answer to the first part of the question is relatively accessible, the latter are more difficult. They address a daunting problem, but unveil a disconnect between the objectives and methods of policy and social science.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Iraq War, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North America