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161. Syria in the US and Israeli debate on Iran

Author:
Shira Efron
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With presidential elections in the United States underway in November 2020[1], the only possible scenarios for Washington in the Middle East are either continuation and solidification, or a change in its Iran policy, each with different potential impacts on the geopolitical conflict between the United States, Israel, and allied Arab countries on one side and Iran and its regional Axis-of-Resistance on the other. Analysing current convergences and divergences between the United States and Israel on Syria and Iran is important to anticipate potential changes in both countries’ positions following the US election, as such changes may impact the effectiveness and even the prospect of the continuation of the United States’ so-called ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. The policies of the two countries on Syria and Iran became varyingly intertwined as Iran entrenched itself deeply in Syria. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Israel and the United States differ in their approaches to tackling Syria. This contribution attempts to assess the US campaign against Iran, the cost it is likely to have inflicted upon it in Syria, and the outlook of an agreement with Iran. Although we are considering US policy on Iran, the analysis here also includes the Israeli perspective. Private conversations with Israeli current and former officials have provided important insights into how Israeli officials see US policy in Syria and vis-à-vis Iran, and can add a unique contribution to the dialogue. In this analysis, we sought to address several issues. First, whether there are any incentives for Iran to concede to US demands or reach a meaningful bargain, and whether under a Biden or Trump administration a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could be renegotiated to include Iranian expansion in the region. We also examined the form and incentives structure that could entice Iran to offer a constructive contribution to the stability of Syria and the region. In addition, we assessed to what extent the Maximum Pressure campaign affects Iran, and whether targeting Syria with sanctions would incentivise both the Syrian government and the Syrian locals (who are working with Iran as fighters) to break with Iran. Finally, assuming that Iran is in Syria to protect its own interests, we question whether more threats to Tehran would lead to reduced presence in Syria.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Governance, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

162. The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus

Author:
Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Syrian National Army (SNA) is officially part of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and responds to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Abdurrahman Mustafa, the President of the SIG, and Selim Idris, the Minister of Defense, oversee the SNA. Idris is also the Chief of Staff of the SNA. The SNA is then further divided into legions and factions. The commanders of the three key legions of the SNA, namely Muataz Raslan, Mahmud el-Baz, and Abu Ahmad Nour, are responsible for all of the factions of their legion. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh legions are organised under the National Liberation Front (NLF). Each faction commander is officially under the legion’s command, though each legion’s number of factions vary, and each legion commander makes decisions as a representative of their legion in coordination with Selim Idris, the commanders of the other legions, and the council. The council is made up of SNA faction leaders who each maintain their own autonomous area and thus can exercise significant power. Therefore, most decisions need explicit or at least tacit approval from them. The SNA’s Chief of Staff and the MoD have different offices operating autonomously from the factions of the SNA and only respond to Selim Idris. The SNA is additionally composed of eight offices (figure 1): The media office, the military court office, the military police, the guidance counselors’ office, the finance office, the administration and organisation office, the operational office, and the training office.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

163. Security, Stability, and Counter-Terrorism in Idlib: A Turkish Perspective

Author:
Serhat Erkmen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In Idlib, armed groups can be categorized under three conglomerates: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and radicals led by Hurras al-Deen (HaD). Among these three anti-government groups, HTS is the strongest one. Though the SNA’s Idlib branch has more manpower than other groups, HTS has superiority in terms of discipline, organisation and weaponry.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

164. Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria

Author:
Alexey L. Khlebnikov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region. The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

165. The Syrian National Army: Formation, Challenges, and Outlook

Author:
Nawar Shaban
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On 30 December 2017, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) announced the establishment of the Syrian National Army (SNA). The main goal was to unite all military factions that fought as part of the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch military operations against the Islamic State (IS) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD). In October 2019, and prior to the launch of Operation Peace Spring in the east of the Euphrates, the merger of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the SNA was announced, through an official ceremony in the presence of the SIG officials in Şanlıurfa, Turkey. This discussion paper aims to clarify the key difficulties that have faced the SNA since its foundation until now. The paper will also outline potential scenarios for the SNA in future military and political realities. Figure 1 and Table 1 give an idea on the SNA’s areas of control and that of rivalling local and international actors in Aleppo, Idlib, and al-Raqqa.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

166. The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria

Author:
Abdullah Al-Jabassini
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In June 2018, the Syrian regime forces backed by Russia launched a military offensive that aimed at terminating rebel rule and restoring control over southern Syria. By August 2018, Daraa’s rebel organisations were pushed to surrender under a “patchwork” strategy, including Russian-led negotiations between regime and opposition figures, and the Syrian regime’s use of armed force. The two fundamentally divergent approaches have demarcated three main zones in which the regime’s authority and thus the roles former rebels come to play in the post-rebellion period vary significantly. In eastern Daraa, Russia established the Eighth Brigade, a sub-division of the Fifth Corps, and entrusted Ahmad al-Oda, a former rebel leader, with its command. By incorporating former rebels in the Eighth Brigade’s ranks, Russia, in fact, intended to establish a local armed actor characterised by a wide margin of manoeuvre to handle local security affairs and inflict acceptable and monitored small-scale violence to limit the regime’s authority and to keep Iranian influence at bay, thereby limiting status quo violations. For more than two years, the Eighth Brigade has limited the regime’s authority, served as a bulwark against Iranian expansion, intervened to defuse tensions, and mediated to prevent wide-scale regime-led military offensives against several localities, all of which are Russia’s top priorities to maintain the status quo in the south. Nevertheless, the Eighth Brigade has been mired in struggles to overcome and mitigate top four interrelated challenges. First, the absence of official recognition by the Syrian Ministry of Defence. Second, the ambitions of Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. Third, the intermittent cyclical patterns of retaliations with local armed groups in neighbouring province of Sweida. Fourth, the ongoing rivalries among former rebel leaders.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Local, Peace, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

167. Turkish Strategic Alternatives for the North East of Syria

Author:
Murat Yeşiltaş
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Turkey’s Syrian policy has been under significant transformation since the Syrian uprising erupted in the Spring of 2011. In the early stage of the crisis, Turkey’s main objective was to peacefully support the democratic transition in Syria. However, with heightened competition between regional and international actors over the Syrian crisis and intensifying militarisation of the uprising, Turkey had to adopt a security-oriented strategy to prevent potential spill-over effects of the civil war into its borders. In the post-2016 security and strategic landscape, Turkey has been following a two-dimensional military strategy. On the one hand, while Turkey has been trying to minimize the terrorist threat in northeast Syria (NES), on the other hand it has been calibrating its military strategy in NES by supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Interim Government to establish a sustainable local order. This paper aims to make sense of Turkey’s strategic alternatives in northeast Syria by presenting four different scenarios.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

168. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

169. It is Time to Establish a Middle East Regional Security System

Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Unlike every other region of the world, the Middle East does not have an inclusive regional security system. This article explores why that is, asks whether now is the time to begin, and suggests how such a process could be started
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Middle East

170. The Disrupting Stabilizer

Author:
Samuel Ramani
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
How Russia’s military, diplomatic, and economic roles in the Mediterranean have developed in recent years
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean