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131. US-Iran Relations After Trump: The Path to Peace is Open

Author:
Assal Rad
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The attacks on 11 September 2001 not only shaped the focus of US foreign policy over the last two decades, but also de!ned how a generation of Americans understood the gravity of these policies by bringing the cost and tragedy of con"ict home. For many young Americans, it was the !rst time they became aware of the extent of US interventionism and how it impacts the way other nations and peoples view the United States. But events over the last year in the United States have brought the attitude of US foreign policy—which has long been driven by the idea that problems can be solved exclusively through militarism and force—much closer to home. Images of police violently confronting Black Lives Matter protestors and an insurrection at the Capitol were often likened to images of war zones abroad, the very wars started by the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

132. American Invasion And Withdrawals Post 9/11

Author:
Ibrahim Karatas
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
When the United States was hit by al-Qaida's terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11 attacks), not only Americans but the whole world was shocked: The world’s only superpower was attacked at home and had lost more than three thousand people. To take revenge for the attack as well as to prevent new ones, the Bush administration decided to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, which they claimed were sheltering and supporting al-Qaida. Afghanistan was invaded on 7 October 2001 because the US wanted (1) to eliminate Osama bin Laden (the mastermind of 9/11) and al-Qaida; (2) to remove the Taliban group from power and bring stability to Afghanistan by creating a democratic and peaceful state.[1] The US Army subsequently invaded Iraq in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussain was supporting terrorism and producing chemical weapons. There were also allegations that the Hussain regime was behind the 9/11 attacks, but it was never proven. The US eventually removed both Taliban and Saddam Hussain from power and captured Hussain, who was later judged and executed by the new Iraqi government on 30 December 2006. US special forces killed Laden on 2 May 2011. As of today, the US has killed its two archenemies and changed regimes allegedly supporting terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq, yet could not bring stability. What is more, the remaining US troops are preparing to leave the two countries. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq is in better condition than the pre-invasion era as both states have failed, lack a strong authority, and cannot !ght terrorism. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was the enemy to be removed, however the US’s recent agreement with the organization has paved the way for re-control of the country by the group. On the other hand, Iraq has become a land of widespread terrorism, and the country is more divided than before, not mentioning Iranian in"uence on Baghdad. Based on the current situation, my arguments are that (1) the US is about to make the same mistake it did in Vietnam, and (2) Afghanistan and Iraq might again become the hub of terrorist organizations as well as regional rivalries. Although I do not approve of the US invasions, as Afghanistan and Iraq saw the worse with its invasion, these countries will face the worst with the US’s withdrawal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, War on Terror, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

133. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:
Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

134. The Forecast of the Number of Soldiers in the Saudi Arabian Army in Terms of Military Security

Author:
Bartosz Kozicki, Jaroslaw Zelkowski, Szymon Mitkow, and Mariusz Gointarczyk
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The study concerns forecasting the number of soldiers in the Saudi Arabian army based on information obtained from the website: https://data.worldbank.org (The World Bank, 9.03.2020). The research began with a comparative analysis of the number of soldiers in the armies of Saudi Arabia and Russia. The idea for a comparative analysis of the number of armies of Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation arises from Russian policy in the region of the Middle East countries, including the impact on world oil prices. The comparative analysis showed the similarities and differences in the dynamics of changes in the number of both armies dynamically. Subsequently, the primary time series data analysis on the number of Saudi Arabian troops was performed. The study selected methods for predicting raw data: Holt’s exponential smoothing and Klein’s model for the future. The next stage of the research was forecasting and the analysis and evaluation of the obtained forecasts. Klein’s model was the best forecasting model. The forecast of the number of soldiers in the Saudi Arabian army for 2020 is 251454, and for 2021, it has increased to 251006. The study ends with a summary and conclusions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

135. Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East

Author:
Brian Katulis and Peter Juul
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Biden administration can rebalance America’s policy in the Middle East through diplomacy, economic statecraft, and security cooperation—all while shifting away from direct military action.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

136. Seeking a New Balance for U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Author:
Brian Katulis and Peter Juul
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Biden administration signaled an effort to shift overall U.S. policy by prioritizing diplomacy and making some modest shifts on the military front, but key human security challenges loom on the horizon.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

137. U.S. Foreign Policy in Syria: Why Action is Needed Now to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Children Exploited by the Islamic State

Author:
Cecilia Polizzi
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
For the past nine years, two U.S. administration have sought to end the catastrophic war in Syria, reach a negotiated political settlement to the conflict and ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State (IS). Yet, the Syrian crisis has not been meaningfully contained and IS continues to threaten regional and global security. While U.S. counterterrorism strategy remains stagnant, heavily reliant on technological superiority and prioritizing aggressive intervention, IS has continuously found opportunities to evolve. The IS has systematically recruited and indoctrinated children across Syria and Iraq and demonstrated unprecedented capacity to influence children and youth around the world to conduct spontaneous acts of violence. Precious few new options have been put forth to defeat IS militarily. Any new strategy that fails to address the victimization and exploitation of children by IS, and does not embrace a long-term sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration strategy, will lead to instability continuing apace and regional allies finding themselves unable to contain a resurgent IS.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Syria, and North America

138. A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan: Pipedream or Path to Stability?

Author:
Ryan Van Wie
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
This article analyzes how an international peacekeeping operation (PKO) can support an intra-Afghan peace settlement by mitigating information and commitment problems and fostering compliance during the settlement’s implementation phase. To frame the information and commitment problems currently hindering an intra-Afghan settlement, I briefly review noncooperative bargaining theory, its application to civil conflicts, and how PKOs can lessen mutual uncertainty and foster stability. Anchoring this research on Afghanistan, I analyze the first peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, the 1988–1990 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). UNGOMAP’s eventual failure to foster peace highlights Afghanistan’s complexities and the dangers of an insufficiently resourced PKO operating in a state without a viable, incentive-compatible settlement. I apply these lessons to policy analysis, where I explore possible PKO options and their potential for incentivizing compliance with a future intra-Afghan deal. Though a viable PKO currently seems improbable given Afghanistan’s ongoing violence and the Taliban’s insistence on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, future conditions may change, and I highlight necessary prerequisites where a PKO may become possible. If designed properly, an Afghanistan PKO can fill a critical monitoring and verification capacity and bolster Afghanistan’s prospects for long-term stability.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

139. Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment

Author:
Teresa Val
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment is intended to serve as an analytical tool for policymakers and an impetus for joint U.S.-Russia action. The report provides an overview of the security situation and peace process in Afghanistan, taking into account U.S. and Russian policies, priorities and interests; surveys the militant terrorist groups in and connected to Afghanistan and explores the security interests of various regional stakeholders vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Challenges relating to border management, arms trafficking and terrorist financing in Afghanistan are also briefly addressed.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

140. U.S. Troops Injured in Altercation with Russian Forces: What It Means for the War in Syria

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
On August 26, Politico reported that U.S. service members were injured after an altercation with Russian forces in northeast Syria. This pattern of Russian challenges to U.S. forces was enabled by the Trump administration’s decision to retreat from parts of northern Syria in 2019, allowing Russia to fill the void. Until this decision was made, the two countries had agreed to make the Euphrates River the deconfliction line to keep U.S. and Russian forces separated. Russia stayed on the west side of the river, and the United on the east side, where this incident took place. Robert Hamilton, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, commented on the story and warned that it will not be a one-off incident: “We need to respond to this immediately and forcefully. Russian forces deliberately escalated against U.S. partners when I was running the ground deconfliction cell for Syria in 2017, but tended to be careful when U.S. forces were present. Unless we make it clear that we’ll defend ourselves, these escalations will continue with dangerous and unpredictable results.” Below, we offer readers an excerpt from a chapter written by Robert Hamilton from a forthcoming edited volume on Russia’s Way of War in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and North America