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1. A Strategy for Countering the Houthi Threat at Sea

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab, Nancy Youssef, and Kevin Donegan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
For the first time in four decades, a core US interest — freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce — is increasingly at risk in the Middle East region. By enabling the Yemeni Houthis to attack international vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with armed drones and sophisticated anti-ship missiles, Iran, as it did in the Gulf in the late 1980s, is causing tremendous harm to commercial activity in one of the world’s most crucial waterways. In a memorandum entitled “A Strategy for Countering the Houthi Threat at Sea” and addressed to US President Joe Biden, the Middle East Institute’s Defense and Security Program members Bilal Y. Saab, Kevin Donegan, Mick Mulroy, Sam Mundy, and Joseph L. Votel offer recommendations for the United States on how to effectively degrade the capabilities of the Houthis and protect international shipping in regional waters. To discuss in greater detail the Defense and Security Program’s proposed strategy and the likely future trajectory and implications of the US campaign against the Houthis, MEI is pleased to host Bilal Y. Saab and Kevin Donegan.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Houthis, Shipping, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Red Sea

2. US Military Action in the Middle East

Author:
Joseph Votel and Gerald Feierstein
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss US military action against the Houthis and other militant groups throughout the region.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Houthis, Shipping, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. Ties Between Hostile Actors in the Red Sea

Author:
Mirette F. Mabrouk, Guled Ahmed, and Thomas Halvorsen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the ways in which the Houthis, Al Shebab, Somali pirates, and others are collaborating to undermine maritime security and limit the free flow of commerce in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Maritime, Al Shabaab, Houthis, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Red Sea

4. Houthi Shipping Attacks in the Red Sea

Author:
Kevin Donegan and Sam Mundy
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the Houthis’ escalatory military activity in the Red Sea and what it means for the future security of merchant vessels in this key waterway.
Topic:
Security, Violence, Houthis, and Shipping
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Red Sea

5. Update: US and UK Strikes on Yemen Escalate Tensions

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 12 January, United States and United Kingdom air forces claimed to have carried out strikes on over 60 Houthi targets at 16 locations in Yemen. The operation was supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, members of the naval task force Operation Prosperity Guardian. The spokesperson of the Houthi military forces acknowledged the attack, mentioning that 73 raids targeted the capital Sanaa and the governorates of al-Hudayda, Taizz, Hajja, and Saada, resulting in five fighters dead and six injured. The multi-national operation sought to eliminate Houthi strategic infrastructure, thereby diminishing the Houthis’ offensive capabilities, and to retaliate following the group’s 9 January direct attack on US warships. However, it is unlikely that the strikes completely eradicated Houthi military capacity to target objectives in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

6. The battle over shipping lanes tips toward the Houthis

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Houthis have succeeded throughout the period following the initiation of their military support for Gaza in disrupting commercial shipping passing through the Red Sea to countries they consider hostile; and the military operations of the US alliance inadvertently aided them in achieving their objective.
Topic:
Maritime Commerce, Houthis, Shipping, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, United States of America, and Red Sea

7. Israel and the Palestinian support fronts: Setting a new balance of deterrence

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Netanyahu insists on violating the rules of engagement established since 7 October 2023, relying on military solutions to achieve his political goals and Israel's strategic objectives. However, this can only be realised if the link between Palestinian resistance in Gaza and its external support fronts is severed.
Topic:
Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Rules of Engagement
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon

8. The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science

Author:
Marc Lynch, Ibrahim S. I. Rabaia, Fiona B. Adamson, and Alexei Abrams
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
This special issue of POMEPS Studies offers a platform for scholars to think through what feels like a moment of rupture for the Middle East, for Middle East Studies, and for long-standing assumptions about the region’s politics. This POMEPS collection originated as an open call for papers for scholars affected by or invested in these urgent issues, in an initial effort to give a platform and a voice to those in our network who have grappled with these trends. We kept the call intentionally broad, asking potential authors to reflect on the effects of October 7 and the Gaza War on politics or scholarship. As it turned out, most of the contributors wanted to talk about academic freedoms and the conditions of public discourse in their countries – perhaps because of how profoundly they felt this crisis, perhaps because of the availability of other platforms to discuss the war itself. The issues confronting our field have never been more urgent and the need for academic networks and institutions to rise up to defend it has never been greater.
Topic:
Civil Society, Diplomacy, Education, Genocide, Political Science, Institutions, Academia, Houthis, Forced Migration, Activism, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Frantz Fanon
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, Germany, Jordan, Czech Republic, and Gulf Nations

9. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

10. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Yemen’s political and economic situation worsened in the first months of the year as the impacts of the Red Sea crisis, which began in November, began to manifest themselves. Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) were effectively placed on hold, and the United States broadened its response to the Houthi attacks, launching strikes alongside the UK against Houthi targets inside Yemen and designating the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT), which came into effect on February 16. The designation could impact not only Houthi military and economic activities but also risks a further stranglehold on international humanitarian work in Houthi-run territories, as banks and exchange firms stop dealing with Sana’a-based entities. In late March, Houthi authorities issued a 100-rial coin to replace dilapidated notes, escalating the economic warfare between the two rival central banks. Denouncing the move as illegal, the Aden central bank branch prohibited the coins’ circulation, but the real fear is that this is a trial balloon for a series of currency roll-outs that will end with Sana’a printing its own banknotes, possibly with foreign help, as rebel authorities did in Libya in 2019. Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed finally stepped down, succeeded by Foreign Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak on February 5. Yemen’s ambassador in Riyadh, Shaya al-Zindani, was belatedly appointed to the vacant foreign minister post on March 26. Neither man is popular with the PLC. Combined with the government’s strained finances, this could hamper their effectiveness. Houthi attacks on foreign shipping and US-UK attacks continued more or less unabated, causing in one case the sinking of a ship carrying fertilizer and diesel fuel. US-UK airstrikes have killed at least 37 on the Houthi side, and reportedly some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. After talks with Omani officials in Muscat in early April, the US Yemen envoy appeared to hold out hope of a resolution, suggesting the sanctions would be lifted if the attacks stopped – as tensions rose again between Iran and Israel, with possible implications for Yemen. Tensions also rose on frontlines inside Yemen as Houthi and government-aligned forces reinforced their military presence in several areas, including Hudaydah and Marib. The US-UK strikes also heightened the repressive atmosphere in Sana’a and elsewhere, as Houthi authorities cracked down in areas near mobile launch sites and introduced a new law against support for Israel that is already being used as another cudgel to crush dissent. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch announced the loss of its leader Khaled Batarfi in March, who died after several months of illness. He was replaced by Saad al-Awlaqi, a senior Yemeni figure with strong tribal ties in Shabwa who is popular among younger members of the group but whose ties with Iran-based Saif al-Adel, the de facto leader of the global organization, appear to be tense. Al-Qaeda also lost Saif al-Adel’s son, known as Ibn al-Madani, reportedly as a result of a fire in the place where he was staying in Marib, and the group’s lead drone expert Khaled al-Sana’ani also died in an apparent traffic incident – incidents that have raised speculation of possible internal skulduggery as Al-Awlaqi settles into his new role.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia