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51. Starr Forum: The Israel-Hamas conflict: Expert perspectives on the ongoing crisis

Author:
Marsin Alshamary, David Kirkpatrick, Peter Krause, Steven Simon, and Evan Lieberman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speakers: Marsin Alshamary on the regional impact. Alshamary, MIT PhD '20, is an assistant professor at Boston College, and an expert on religion, civil society and social movements in the Shi’a Middle East. David Kirkpatrick on Hamas’s strategy. Kirkpatrick is a staff writer for The New Yorker and has worked for more than two decades as a reporter for the New York Times. Peter Krause on the historical context and Israeli strategy. Krause, MIT PhD '11, is an associate professor of political science at Boston College, and an expert on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. Steven Simon on US policy. Simon, a former Robert E Wilhelm Fellow at CIS, served as the National Security Council (NSC) senior director for the Middle East and North Africa during the Obama Administration and as the NSC senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House. Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa at MIT and the director of the Center for International Studies (CIS).
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Hamas, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

52. A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework

Author:
Yitzhak Gal
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
As with many major crises, the catastrophic Oct. 7 Hamas onslaught on Israel and ensuing war in Gaza offer an opportunity for change. This policy paper proposes guidelines for a post-war roadmap to long-term economic, security, and political stability in Gaza. The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system. Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy. An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Political stability, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

53. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack

Author:
Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar

54. In the Israel-Hamas war, Russia takes the ridge road

Author:
Laetitia Spetschinsky
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The article explores Russia’s response to the Israel-Hamas conflict, revealing a distinct stance from the US, Europe and many other partners. Moscow refuses to condemn Hamas, advocating instead a path to peace that downplays the US and raises the emerging powers’ profile – especially Russia’s. Examining historical ties, economic connections, and internal dynamics, the article analyses Russia’s role as a mediator. It highlights significant elements in the complex relationships between Russia and strategic regional players such as Iran, China, India, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Moscow’s ambitions in the UN. The conclusion discusses potential implications for Europe, emphasizing the EU’s vulnerabilities and the role of key member states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, European Union, Geopolitics, UN Security Council, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

55. Al-Aqsa Flood: The Collapse of Israeli Deterrence and Attempts to Restore It

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Palestinian resistance dealt a significant blow to the Israeli occupation, leading Israel to retaliate by launching an aggressive campaign on Gaza with full Western support. The objective was to eradicate Hamas and establish a pro-Israel authority in Gaza. However, several factors may impede this outcome, as seen in comparable conflicts.
Topic:
Occupation, Deterrence, Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and Al-Aqsa Flood
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

56. Turkey’s regional policy in the shadow of the Gaza War

Author:
Michael Sarlis
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our November-December issue of Turkeyscope, Michalis Saris discusses Turkey's reaction to the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza War. He notes that Turkey foreign policy has undergone a rapid shift and its relationship with Iran has improved as a result.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

57. Israel Is Doing Exactly What Hamas Wants It to Do

Author:
Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The conflict between Hamas and Israel is a tragedy in a world already rife with too many crises. Hamas’s massive attack on Israel, predominantly targeting families and children, cannot be justified by the prolonged history of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, no matter how brutal and indifferent the approach to the fate of Palestinians may have been. Just yesterday, a hospital in the north of the Gaza Strip was bombed, causing the loss of hundreds of lives. The ongoing blame game between the two parties further illustrates the deepening hostilities, no matter who is ultimately found to be responsible. In carrying out this attack, Hamas never believed it would overthrow the Israeli state by military force. Rather, it has followed a well-worn playbook of terrorist organizations that aim to provoke excessive retaliation by military and state forces, fostering further grievances and creating a broader base of civil resistance and strife. This basic strategy has been followed by terrorist groups as diverse as the Red Army Faction, Irgun and the Stern Group, and Al-Qaeda. The State of Israel is now, unfortunately, following this playbook, responding with lethal actions in the Gaza Strip. The degree of shock and outrage in Israeli society cannot be overestimated—the more than 1,400 dead are, in proportion to Israel’s size, the equivalent of more than 45,000 dead in the United States. Yet, its response is disproportionate and knowingly breaches international humanitarian law. Israel has demanded that one million Palestinians evacuate their homes and has cut off energy, food supplies, medical supplies, and water to the Gaza Strip. In this piece, Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally discuss what should the international community do to prevent an irreversible downward spiral in both societies, in the conflict between them, and in the spillover to the rest of the world?
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

58. Messy Diplomacy: Western Balkan Countries Facing the Gaza Conflict

Author:
Srđan Cvijić and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
The ongoing war that Israel is waging in Gaza against Hamas is one of the most consequential conflicts with serious political implications worldwide. The Gaza conflict has already diverted the world’s attention from what has been the most dominant international conflict in the past year and a half: the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Many countries in the Western Balkans are conflicted about what diplomatic stance to take on the Gaza war, primarily whether they should support Israel or Palestine or remain neutral since their decision-making will have to balance their domestic public, as well as their ties with Israel, Muslim countries and, most importantly, the US and the EU. The vote taken on October 26 in the UN General Assembly (hereinafter: UNGA) on the resolution that called for a truce between Israel and Hamas with a strong emphasis on humanitarian factors demonstrated how conflicted the Western Balkan countries were on the current conflict in Gaza. The pattern of division among the Western Balkan countries on this occasion somewhat diverges from the votes cast in different UN fora in the past decade. Whereas Albania and North Macedonia have continued with their previous positions when it comes to their foreign policy toward the conflict in the Middle East, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have displayed an interesting change.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Western Balkans

59. Understanding Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s Uses of Information Technology

Author:
Daniel Byman and Emma McCaleb
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s information technology (IT) strategies heavily reflect their roles in governance. Terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and the Islamic State eschew nationalism in favor of a broad pan-Islamist vision and focus media operations primarily on recruitment and at times operations. In contrast, Hamas and Hezbollah are nationalist as well as Islamist in orientation and favor traditional forms of communication over social media in order to legitimize their political power—a preference reinforced by the policies of technology companies and, in general, the limited capacity of these terrorist groups to use social media without considerable risk. Because Hamas and Hezbollah govern and provide goods, services, and information to their constituents, it is harder to target their IT infrastructure without risking humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Hezbollah, Hamas, Information Technology, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Lebanon

60. CTC Sentinel: December 2023 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, Crispin Smith, Phillip Smyth, Austin C. Doctor, and Sam Hunter
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the December feature article, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Crispin Smith outline how over the past two years Tehran-backed terrorist organizations and militias captured the Iraqi state, a development that could have dramatic implications for the regional terrorist threat, regional stability, U.S. interests, and great power competition in the wake of Iran enabling the second deadliest terrorist attack in history on October 7. They write that “Iran-backed terrorists and militias lost the 2021 elections in Iraq yet ended up picking the prime minister anyway and taking charge of the world’s fifth-largest oil producer. This remarkable reversal of fortunes in 2022 was not delivered via the barrel of a gun but rather a series of cool-headed and coordinated moves by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, by Iranian-groomed and militia-controlled judges, and by militia politicians. The country’s oil economy, its freedoms, and its intelligence services are being gutted by militias to ensure their rule is permanent. Yet unprecedented control has not moderated these militias: The Gaza war has shown that these armed factions are also still addicted to militant ‘resistance’ to the United States. The result is the emergence of a terrorist-run state with greater resources than any of Iran’s other proxy networks, hiding behind the façade of a sovereign country.” The attack on Israel on October 7 and its aftermath have underlined the regional threat posed by the broader Iran threat network. Besides Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a multitude of other Tehran-backed Palestinian armed groups participated in the attack, including Fatah splinters and leftist groups. Phillip Smyth examines how Iran built up and managed a constellation of Palestinian ‘Axis of Resistance’ groups from across the ideological spectrum and empowered them to launch an attack that killed 1,200 Israelis. He writes: “Iranian assistance allowed its Palestinian proxies to amass the firepower, messaging know-how, and much of the hi-tech equipment necessary to carry out and propagandize the attack.” Austin Doctor and Sam Hunter examine the evolving threat of improvised explosives devices in the United States. They write: “Violent extremists continue to innovate, drawing on emerging technologies and creative problem solving. The onus of initiative requires that the counterterrorism mission community looks over the horizon to identify emerging threats.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Hamas, IED, October 7, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Palestine