Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Ankara is allowing Hamas to continue operating from Turkish territory against Israel. Israel can and should thwart such Turkish violations of the reconciliation agreement between the two countries.
Topic:
International Relations, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hamas
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Although Hamas’ cyber capabilities do not now constitute a serious threat to Israel, this reality can quickly change in view of the rapid pace of technological progress.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Hamas
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Conflict, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Egypt
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Reducing enemy capabilities and ambitions in Gaza requires Israeli military readiness and government willingness to use force intermittently, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hamas
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel’s security requirements on other fronts, require containment of the conflict on the southern front, while continuing to build the western Negev notwithstanding Hamas’ arson attempts.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Territorial Disputes, Deterrence, and Hamas
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Hamas
Following the "March of Return" events led by Hamas on two turbulent Fridays at the border fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip, both sides declared victory. And in the case of such a blatantly asymmetric conflict between parties with opposing aims, both sides can indeed claim victory, precisely because they are conducting parallel maneuvers. Israel operates largely on a physical dimension (protecting its sovereign territory), while Hamas works mainly on the cognitive-political level. In a world of images, intensive information campaigns, and mass media (including fake news), a sense of victory on both sides could intensify the hostilities on the Gaza border and perhaps even beyond in the coming weeks. Israel must stress that it is defending a recognized international border; clarify the legality and proportionality of its use of live fire; expand its visual documentation of the events; update Arab countries about the facts and balance the pro-Hamas messages delivered in the Arab media; and prepare for an escalation of the conflict. Finally, while focused on the immediate challenge of mass demonstrations on the Gaza border, Israel must continue to address the underlying issue: the growing distress in Gaza and the collapse of its infrastructures will make it hard for Israel to continue managing the situation with relatively low political, military, and financial costs. Mid-May will be followed by the month of Ramadan and another scorching summer. Temporary success in containing the new challenge posed by Hamas will not defuse the social-economic-military time bomb ticking in the Strip.