Search

Begin New Search Topic Government Political Geography Middle East

251. Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World

Author:
Marina S. Ottaway
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
THE CENTRAL DILEMMA OF DEMOCRATIC reform in Arab countries can be summed up fairly simply. Presidents and kings remain too powerful, untrammeled by the limits imposed by effective parliaments and independent judiciaries. Countervailing institutions remain weak, if they exist at all, not only because constitutions and laws deliberately keep them that way, but also because they are not backed by organized citizens demanding political rights, participation, and government accountability. This does not mean that there is no desire for democracy on the part of Arab publics. Recent opinion surveys suggest that in the abstract there is strong support for more open political systems, increased protection of human rights, and broader personal liberties. However, the existence of a general, diffuse sense that democracy is a good thing is quite different from the existence of organized constituencies that provide a counterweight to the authoritarianism of incumbent governments. The demand, or better the desire, for democracy is present in the Arab world today; what is lacking is a supply of broad-based political organizations pushing for democracy—political parties, social movements, labor unions, large civic organizations. Unless such constituencies develop, the future of democracy remains extremely uncertain. In many countries, governments anxious to burnish their modern image will continue to introduce modest reforms. Until the governments face stronger pressure from organized citizens, however, they will not take steps to truly curb the power of the executive by strengthening checks and balances and allowing unfettered political participation.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

252. The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq

Author:
Kirsti Samuels and Sebastian von Einsiedel
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Whether by accident or design, the United Nations increasingly finds itself in operations that seek to build or re-build the institutions of a state. This report discusses the challenges facing the UN in such state-building activities in the post-Iraq environment. Three sorts of challenges are reviewed: those arising from a lack of conceptual clarity on the aim of state-building, those resulting from the transformed strategic environment, and those operational and strategic challenges inherent to the complex task of state-building.
Topic:
Development, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

253. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

254. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

255. Force Size and Strategy

Author:
Thomas Donnelly
Publication Date:
09-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
One of the emerging ironies of the presidential campaign is that both parties seem to want to regard the events of the past three years—the post-September 11 era—as an anomaly. The Democratic convention was an exercise in nostalgia for the good old days of the 1990s. Even the Bush campaign has lately succumbed to a kind of Iraq fatigue, seeking in particular to divert attention from the president's rhetoric of a year ago calling for the democratization and liberalization of the Middle East. Alas, the United States cannot simply resign as the “sole superpower” and guarantor of the current global order. No matter the outcome of the election, the United States still will face two inescapable strategic tasks: changing the Middle East and containing the rise of China. At the same time, the new president must rebuild and restructure the U.S. armed forces to respond to the needs of these very different theaters.
Topic:
International Relations and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

256. Muqtada al-Sadr's Continuing Challenge to the Coalition (Part I): The U.S. Military Response

Author:
Jeffrey White and Ryan Phillips
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Muqtada al-Sadr represents a serious long-term political and military challenge to the coalition and the new Iraqi government. Open warfare between Sadr and the coalition first emerged on April 4, 2004, with "uprisings" by his militia, the so-called Mahdi Army, in Baghdad and across southern Iraq. Although Sadr has not achieved his objective of a broad-based Shi'i rebellion, coalition forces have not been able to bring him to justice or dissolve his militia. Both sides are now playing a high-stakes game. The coalition is betting that it can eliminate or reduce Sadr as a political force without causing a serious breach with the larger Shi'i community. Sadr is gambling that he can persist, even prosper, in the face of the coalition. Indeed, he has long-term political goals and is positioning himself for the upcoming elections. The prospects that the coalition can bring him under control at acceptable cost and risk remain uncertain.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Religion
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

257. Is Gradualism Possible? Choosing a Strategy for Promoting Democracy in the Middle East

Author:
Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As part of the changed U.S. geostrategic outlook arising from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, the Bush administration is giving greatly heightened attention to the issue of promoting democracy in the Middle East. Although a policy of coercive regime change has been applied in Iraq, in most of the region the administration is pursuing a more gradualist model of political change that emphasizes diplomatic pressure and democracy-related aid.
Topic:
Democratization and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

258. Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform

Author:
Daniel Brumberg
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
No American administration has talked more about democracy in the Middle East than the Bush administration. The president and his advisors have spoken optimistically about a post-Saddam democracy in Iraq, one that might eventually become a veritable light to other Arab nations. This grand vision assumes that sooner or later, advocates of democracy throughout the Middle East will demand the same freedoms and rights that Iraqis are now claiming. Yet, however inspiring this vision appears, the actual reform plan that the administration has thus far set out is unlikely to produce radical changes in the Arab world. Regardless of how dramatic the change in Baghdad is, when it comes to our friends in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen, the administration's reform plan points to evolution rather than revolution.
Topic:
Democratization and Government
Political Geography:
Iraq, America, Middle East, Arabia, Arab Countries, and Egypt

259. Building an Iraqi Defense Force

Author:
Joseph McMillan
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The reconstruction and reform of the Iraqi armed forces will inevitably take place in the context of both Iraq's present and past. Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, going back to the creation of the state, have left Iraq a legacy of endemic domestic political violence, dysfunctional civil-military relations, and, in recent decades, an ideology of unremitting hostility to virtually every one of Iraq's neighbors.
Topic:
Security and Government
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

260. Hidden Costs of War

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
The Bush administration's war on terrorism and its proposed military intervention in Iraq have sparked the steepest increases in military and security spending in two decades. Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has approved over $110 billion in increased military spending and military aid. Spending on national defense is slated to reach $399 billion in the Fiscal Year 2004 budget, and to rise to over $500 billion annually by the end of this decade. These vast sums do not include the costs of the ongoing war in Afghanistan or a war with Iraq. Steven Kosiak of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that only 5 to 10 percent of the Fiscal Year 2003 Pentagon budget is being set aside for anti-terror activities and homeland security.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Government, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Middle East