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341. Revisiting and going beyond the EU-Turkey migration agreement of 2016: an opportunity for Greece to overcome being just “Europe’s aspis”

Author:
Kemal Kirisçi
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
In contrast to early last year, marked by a “border crisis” that erupted after the Turkish President finally put into action his long-standing threat to “open the border” for Syrian refugees, the year 2021 had a more promising start. The intense tensions in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean that followed the “border crisis” appear to be subsiding. The European Council statement of March 25 offers a possible framework for dialogue and diplomacy to take over from what was an annus horribilis in Greek-Turkish and EU-Turkish relations. Within this framework, room is also made for revisiting the EU-Turkey statement adopted in March 2016 to manage the aftermath of the European migration crisis that had seen a mass displacement of refugees and migrants primarily from Turkey to Greece and on to Europe. The statement has had many opponents and its implementation has faced multiple grievances and recriminations from both sides. Addressing and overcoming these challenges will call for extensive diplomatic effort, good will and take considerable time. In the interim, however, the emerging positive climate offers the possibility to explore expanding cooperation in a relatively successful but inadequately appreciated part of the EU-Turkey statement known as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT). FRIT has been instrumental in supporting Syrian and other refugees in Turkey. It has been an important manifestation of burden-sharing with Turkey and has benefitted refugees in concrete terms. Advancing cooperation in this area would also help contribute to mutual confidence building and have a positive spill over into other more complicated issue areas in the migration domain and broader bilateral relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Treaties and Agreements, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Greece, and Mediterranean

342. Turkey: A Problem Partner?

Author:
ELIAMEP
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
It was around the mid-2000s when Turkey—if only for a short period of time—promulgated the idea of “zero problems with neighbours”. At the time, Turkey was seeking positive reforms in all aspects of public life and a cooperative future with neighbouring countries based on mutual understanding and converging interests. Furthermore, Turkey imagined itself as a bridge between, not as a wall separating and isolating, different regions. Unfortunately, those days are long gone. For almost a decade now, Turkey has been reactionary in its treatment of its own citizens and solipsistic with regard to its neighbours. Democratic backsliding and human rights abuses inside Turkey have become the norm, while militarisation and unilateralism increasingly characterise its foreign policy choices. Its government actions have begun to resemble those of a rogue state. This report seeks neither to explain the intricacies of Erdoğan’s problematic behaviour towards its own people and the rest of the world, nor to denigrate Turkey’s standing. Rather, it aims to raise the alarm about the slippery slope Turkey finds itself on, hopefully well before his governance causes irreparable damage to the region. The report starts by presenting general aspects of Turkey’s relationship with international stakeholders, such as the EU and the US. It proceeds by mapping out internal developments that exemplify strong tendencies of democratic backsliding and human rights abuses. The third part focuses on regional aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour, starting with the most severe cases that epitomize the militarisation of its foreign policy and violations of international law. It concludes with various cases of political differences between Turkey and states on its periphery, which, combined with the other more severe cases described, demonstrate how Turkey’s foreign policy expectations of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ have turned into a ‘zero neighbours’ reality.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

343. The Netanyahu Doctrine: A paradigm shift in the State of Israel's foreign policy/La Doctrina Netanyahu: Un Cambio de Paradigma en la Política Exterior del Estado de Israel

Author:
Alberto Priego
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After almost 75 years of existence of the State of Israel, its foreign policy has maintained a certain continuity. Some prime ministers such as David Ben Gurion, Menahem Begin, Isaac Rabin have taken some turns in foreign policy that in the long term will condition Israel's future. Last summer Benjamin Netanyahu left the government after more than twelve years in office, becoming the longest-serving Israeli leader. Throughout these years, Benjamin Netanyahu has introduced important structural reforms in the country. One of these fields has been foreign policy, where he has implemented his own doctrine, the Netanyahu Doctrine. This article will try to present the fundamental points that make up this foreign policy doctrine. An interpretative approach will be adopted using the most important speeches of Benjamin Netanyahu. / En los casi 75 años de existencia del Estado de Israel, su política exterior ha mantenido una cierta continuidad. Algunos primeros ministros como David Ben-Gurión, Menahem Begin, Issac Rabín han dado giros a la política exterior que, a largo plazo, han condicionado el futuro de Israel. El pasado verano Benjamín Netanyahu salió del gobierno después de más de doce años en el cargo convirtiéndose en el mandatario israelí que más tiempo ha permanecido en el cargo. A lo largo de estos años, Benjamín Netanyahu ha introducido importantes reformas estructurales en país. Uno de estos campos ha sido la política exterior donde se puede considerar que se ha instalado una doctrina propia, la Doctrina Netanyahu. Este artículo tratará de construir los puntos fundamentales que componen esta doctrina de política exterior. Se adoptará una aproximación interpretativa usando los discursos más importantes de Benjamín Netanyahu.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Negotiation, Peace, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

344. When Less Is More: Rethinking U.S. Military Strategy and Posture in the Middle East

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Becca Wasser, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Lilly Blumenthal
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the past 20 years, the U.S. military has invested heavily in the Middle East. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump both attempted to shift assets out of the region and put a greater focus on the Indo-Pacific, but both were drawn back into the Middle East. Now, President Joe Biden again has put an emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has emphasized the importance of China as the Department of Defense’s “pacing challenge.” Effectively realizing the new administration’s shift in priority—and avoiding the cycle of drawing forces out of the Middle East only to have new crises pull them back in—requires an assessment of how the United States can continue to protect its core interests in the Middle East with a smaller and smarter footprint. This paper is the beginning of an effort to answer this question. It methodically outlines what key U.S. interests and objectives should be in the Middle East to develop the appropriate U.S. force posture to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. It then describes the key military activities necessary to protect those interests and achieve those objectives, in some cases breaking old assumptions and identifying areas where the United States can afford to accept more risk. Finally, it begins to outline the associated military assets necessary to pursue those activities and ends by identifying areas where the United States can look to alter its presence and activities in the region. The conclusion of this analysis is that the United States still has vital interests in the Middle East that require a level of military investment in the region. However, those interests are more limited, and the United States must be willing to accept more risk in the Middle East while also prioritizing non-military tools. Given challenges and strategic interests elsewhere in the world and at home, it is time to consider how the United States might approach force posture in the region differently than in the past.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

345. “Maximum Pressure” Harms Diplomacy and Increases Risks of War with Iran

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
With an economy less than a third the size of the U.S. defense budget and a military ill-suited for offensive operations, Iran is at best a minor threat to the U.S., and one in a region of limited strategic importance. The U.S. need not obsess over Iran policy. While Iran does not threaten vital U.S. interests, U.S. policy does seek to moderate Iran’s behavior and restrict its nuclear weapons development. That is why the U.S. negotiated the JCPOA, an agreement with Iran, Europe’s major powers, Russia, and China to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration abrogated the JCPOA and imposed a policy of “maximum pressure” designed to compel Iran to renegotiate on nuclear issues and moderate its foreign policy. Rather than capitulate to U.S. demands, Iran expanded its nuclear program and increased its aggression in the Middle East. U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and imposition of a maximum pressure strategy harmed diplomatic efforts with Iran and increased the prospects of direct conflict. The Biden administration has so far continued the policy it inherited from the Trump administration. With nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran predictably stalled, U.S. officials should abandon maximum pressure. Ongoing diplomacy is the best path to revive the JCPOA, and more importantly, lower the risks of war. Even if the JCPOA dissolves completely, U.S.-Iran diplomacy, including on nuclear issues, should continue. War with Iran is not worth the costs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

346. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

347. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

348. From Economic to Geopolitical Policy: The Middle East on the Silk Road

Author:
Yousif Khalaf
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article aims to present and evaluate the activities and politics of the People’s Republic of China in the Middle East, and to define its objectives through the Silk Project. It will provide an overview of the most important changes in the Chinese foreign and political policy, and the importance of the Middle East, particularly the Silk Road to China, and it will try to answer the following questions: How important is the Middle East for the Silk Road? Will the Chinese project bring stability to the region in light of the fierce competition between the great powers? The article adopted the hypothesis that China’s involvement in the Middle East will deepen the conflict between the countries of the region among themselves, and thus become a fertile ground for international conflicts to the international conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
China and Middle East

349. Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics

Author:
Mark Lamont Hill and Mitchell Plitnick
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
A book talk on Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, and Progressivism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and United States of America

350. The Importance of Middle East in Russian Foreign Policy

Author:
Sansz Rostamjabri, Seyed Javad EmamJomehzadeh, and Mahnaz Goodarzi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower in the Cold War, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new Russia was formed. To achieve the hegemony of power, Russia's security document was given priority. In the first term, Vladimir Putin focused on pragmatism and emphasized the power of domestic politics and the revival of the Russian economy. In his second term, Putin focused on the politics of realism to gain power on the international stage and return to what Moscow is interested in. In his second term, Putin pursued a political (power expansion), security (avoiding differences), and economic (strengthening Russia) view Middle East. Therefore, in this study, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and its importance The question for this study is: what factors in Russian foreign policy made the Middle East region important for Russia? And the hypothesis for this question: Russia's concern about Islamic fundamentalism (security), economic and political reasons are among the most important factors in directing its foreign policy to the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Middle East