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111. Joe Biden’s US Election Victory in the Eyes of Egyptians

Author:
Michael Barak
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Beehive, Michael Barak analyzes the reactions in the social media to the election of Joe Biden to the US Presidency among supporters and opponents of the Egyptian regime, including exiled dissidents. The growing probability of Joe Biden victory during the election week gained widespread attention on social media among Egyptian citizens and exiled dissidents. While al-Sisi’s supporters responded coldly, expressing concern about the tightening of the new administration’s policy towards the Egyptian regime, Egyptian exiled dissidents showed mixed feelings. On the one hand, there are those who express optimism, joy, and anticipation for a change of the American policy that they criticize for being sympathetic to the Egyptian regime. On the other hand, there are those who seek to cool the sense of euphoria, arguing that the American presidency does not intend to change its sympathetic attitude towards its traditional allies. Yet, some of the Egyptian exiled dissidents believe that this is the right time to erode the power of the Egyptian regime.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Social Media
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, Egypt, and United States of America

112. Why Israelis Like Trump

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
From his rejection of Obama-era political correctness to his family make-up, Trump has charmed Israelis.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

113. Syrian People’s Council Elections 2020: The Regime’s Social Base Contracts

Author:
Ziad Awad and Agnes Favier
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an unprecedented economic crisis, the Syrian People’s Council elections were held in July 2020, following two postponements due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the electoral campaign slogans launched by the candidates – especially the independents – focused on economic concerns, and made reference to charitable contributions and propaganda from the candidates, the elections failed to capture the interest of the majority of constituencies in the territories controlled by the Bashar al-Assad regime. As usual, the ruling Baath Party controls the majority of seats in the new Council. Certain marginal parties allied with the Baath are also represented within the so-called National Progressive Front (NPF), which is led by the Baath itself. Independents rank second in terms of seat numbers after the Baathists. However, partisan affiliations are of no significance in terms of stances vis-à-vis the regime, since loyalty is a non-negotiable prerequisite for all 250 MPs, and indeed all candidates. Though the Baath Party retains an absolute majority of seats in parliament (66.8%), the elections demonstrated the inability of its leadership to revive the Party as an effective political tool capable of exercising influence by itself. First, the primaries for selecting Party candidates were marked by limited participation, accusations of corruption and widespread objections within the Party. Second, the parliamentary elections saw a historically low turnout (33%), illustrating the Party's inability to mobilise the electorate. Finally, attempts to renew the Baathist bloc in the People's Council resulted in the rise of military and paramilitary figures (with the entry into parliament of retired army and police officers); a growing influence of capital (with higher numbers of businessmen MPs); and the emergence of centres of power outside the traditional Party structure (with the entry of charity and development activists, backed by First Lady Asma al-Assad). This heterogeneity within the Baath’s parliamentary bloc illustrates the reality of the Party today, which appears weaker than it was before the outbreak of the revolution.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

114. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus

115. Israel’s Election Result Shows Broad Consensus on Diplomatic and Defense Issues

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As ugly as the 2019 campaign may have been, it is simply wrong to portray Israel as a deeply divided nation on these matters.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Nationalism, Elections, Leadership, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

116. The Political Situation in Iraq in Light of Mass Protests

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In October, mass protests over poor living conditions and Iran’s influence on the country’s internal policy erupted in Iraq. Brutal attempts to quell the demonstrations led to the escalation of violence. On 30 November, Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi resigned, which was one of the demands of the demonstrators supported by the prominent Shiite spiritual leader in Iraq Ali al-Sistani. The PM’s resignation, the proposal of reforms put forward by the president of Iraq, and the UN plan to stabilise the country backed by Sistani indicate the possibility of abolishing the model of consensual democracy prevailing in Iraq.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Elections, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

117. Mapping Digital Disinformation around Elections: A Case Study of Pakistan’s 2018 General Elections

Author:
Talal Raza
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The 2018 general election represented one of the first times digital disinformation occurred on a massive scale in Pakistan. This report examines different forms of disinformation that circulated online in the lead up to the 2018 elections and its impact on the country’s political discourse, and considers methods to counter disinformation in Pakistan and elsewhere. Ultimately, combating this growing problem will require a variety of stakeholders to work toward a multi-pronged, collaborative response.
Topic:
Mass Media, Elections, Digitization, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

118. Examining Newly-Formed Mixed Arab-Jewish Municipal Coalitions

Author:
Alexander Jacob Shapiro
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Alexander Jacob Shapiro analyzes the circumstances surrounding the establishment of a joint Arab-Jewish municipal coalition in Lod following the recent municipal elections.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

119. Arab Voting in the 21st Knesset Elections

Author:
Arik Rudnitzky
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Arik Rudnitzky summarizes the results of the 2019 Knesset elections and the voting patterns of the Arab public. This article reviews the results of the elections for the 21st Knesset in Arab and Druze communities. It also examines voting patterns in these localities by demographic characteristics (by ethnic group and geographical area) and voting patterns of Arab residents in mixed cities. The discussion then deals with two issues: (a) the question of the renewed connection between the Arab voter and Jewish parties; (b) the voting patterns of Christian voters. All data presented here were taken from the conclusions of Central Elections Committee.
Topic:
Minorities, Elections, and Voting
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

120. To Close the Rifts, Leadership is Needed

Author:
Mohammad Darawshe
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Mohammad Darawshe's article analyzes the factors behind the historic low in the participation rate of Arab citizens, who stood at only 49.2% in the last elections. For the Arab voter, there weren’t compelling reasons to vote in the 2019 Knesset elections. In fact, a number of reasons motivated them not to. Quarrels around the issue of seat rotation plagued the Joint List and clarified for the Arab voter that the hope for unity had been lost. The Arab public therefore decided to punish the parties, taking from them the privilege it had given, returning them to their natural size in order to school them in the laws of modesty. Arab voters perceived the Nation-State Law as the antithesis of the integration to which they aspire. The law conveyed a clear message to Arab citizens that a border had been placed before them, and that they should not cultivate aspirations for class equality. Arab leaders must open the ranks of leadership and accept into it pragmatic social and economic figures. The mechanism of political parties are outdated and no longer reflect the new moods of the Arab public. There is no doubt that it is time to open a new chapter in Center-Left relations with Arab society. Without Arab cooperation, the Center-Left bloc will never come to power. Conversely, without the partnership of the Center-Left, the Arab public will not be able to influence decision-making in the state of Israel.
Topic:
Minorities, Elections, and Voting
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine