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1. Dealing Preventively with NPT Withdrawal

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since it came into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has worked remarkably well to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The one major exception is North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003. Despite this track record of success, the stability of the current non-proliferation regime could be significantly undermined by further withdrawals by countries such as Iran. The right of states to withdraw from the NPT is clearly stated in the Treaty. Article X.1 provides that: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Since it is impossible to deny the right of states parties to withdraw from the NPT, it is all the more important to put in place appropriate preventive measures to dissuade withdrawal from the Treaty. The urgency of dealing preventively with NPT withdrawal increases as more nonnuclear-weapon states are poised to become “nuclear threshold states.”1 As the IAEA reported in 2008: “Much of the sensitive information coming from the [Abdul Qadeer Khan] network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dissemination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge enrichment and, more disturbing, information that relates to nuclear weapon design.”2 and: “a substantial amount of sensitive information related to the fabrication of a nuclear weapon was available to members of the network."3 The widespread dissemination of this type of scientific and technical information raises the prospect that more states will acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thus increasing the
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. Majority of Iranians Oppose Development of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Amir Farmanesh
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Both the United States and Iran have been among the countries worst hit by the coronavirus, but neither country has moved away from mutual confrontation. Nationwide surveys conducted by IranPoll this winter – before the spread of the virus and before the US strike against Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani – show that although Iranians say their country should not develop nuclear weapons, they have lost confidence in the nuclear agreement and think that the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany) have not lived up to their obligations. Chicago Council survey results from January 2020 show that a majority of Americans say they would favor rejoining the agreement if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Disarmament, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

4. Strengthening Global Regimes: Addressing the Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons

Author:
Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The inadequate response to the use of chemical weapons by a state against its own population was an important catalyst leading to the creation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A great deal has been achieved under the CWC, which is an important example of how multilateral cooperation can succeed. Recent cases of confirmed use prove that the task of eliminating chemical weapons is not complete. Chemical weapons are once again being used on the battlefield and as terror weapons. Moreover, their use in targeted attacks against politically exposed persons presents a new challenge to the commitment made by CWC states parties that chemicals will be developed and produced exclusively for peaceful use. When they come together to review the CWC in late 2020, the states parties will have to assess whether their response to the challenges posed by the use of chemical weapons has been proportionate to the threat. If not, then they will have the responsibility to create the new capacities, invent the new instruments and develop the new initiatives that will make their efforts more effective. This SIPRI Policy Paper provides an explanation of the context for some important recent decisions and an analysis of them. It also proposes some actions that CWC states parties could take together in support of the effort to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Weapons, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

5. A Confluence of Crises: On Water, Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Johan Schaar
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) faces simultaneous crises of security, water scarcity and climate change. They are interlinked—the water crisis is exacerbated by climate change and may fuel conflict, while insecurity is an obstacle to dealing with other pressing issues. Together, the three constitute a confluence of crises that need to be addressed together. Authoritarian and militarized governments in MENA countries repress public discourse and action related to water and climate crises, viewing critics as threats to national security. But the elite’s own economic interests and role in the political economy make them vulnerable to the new risks and threats. The water and climate crises are mostly transboundary and require states to act together. But by prioritizing narrow security interests, states accord weak mandates to regional institutions, preventing agreements on shared challenges. A regional security framework is needed, encompassing water, climate and the current conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Water, Disarmament, and Risk
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

6. A New Egyptian Track II Approach to the WMD/DVs-free Zone in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Mona Ahmed Saleh
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue revisits the stalemate in the negotiations of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMD/ DVs-Free Zone) in the Middle East/Gulf, which has been negatively impacted by several regional developments. It starts by highlighting the basic gap in the different conceptions of such a zone by the Egyptian-led Arab states, in addition to Iran, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. Arguing from a comprehensive security perspective in the region, this Policy Forum issue presents a new Track II Cooperative Idea by viewing the establishment of the WMD/DVs-Free Zone as an incremental, multi-stage, long-term process that should take place on different tracks and should combine the traditionally incompatible calls for “Disarmament First!” and “Peace/Recognition First!” of the respective negotiating parties. While emphasizing how important it is to keep (in-)formal talks going – and to be patient – a Preparatory Commission for a WMD/DVs Treaty is proposed whose mandate would include special assignments for Track II actors.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and Gulf Nations

7. Exploring the Transfer Potential of the JCPOA for Zonal Disarmament Arrangements in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Daniel Muller
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue advocates using elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or agreement/accord) in prospective negotiations to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle East. In a stalemated situation resembling efforts to negotiate a zonal arrangement, the JCPOA after more than 12 years of negotiations succeeded in striking a multilateral deal among adversaries with diverging capabilities and agendas who doubted each other’s intentions and were reluctant to make concessions.By establishing an incentive-based mechanism that encouraged and facilitated cooperation, the JCPOA succeeded in trading various issues to reach common ground in an incremental step-by-step approach of carefully sequenced quid pro quos. Framed as an agreement among equals and safeguarded by multiple compliance mechanisms, the JCPOA (or aspects of it) could serve as a toolbox for zonal negotiations on disarmament, help to link hardened actors, and break up entrenched interest structures and dogmatic policy positions.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

8. Why We Need New Communication & Conference Processes and How They Could Come About: the Classical Role of this Track-II Initiative

Author:
Marc Finaud and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This New Publication Series POLICY FORUM is in addition to the Two Expert Panels conducted at the First NPT PrepCom in Vienna on May 8 and 10, 2017 our second Track II tool. Both aim at presenting, discussing, and disseminating the jointly developed Cooperative Ideas as potential rallying points for the most important actors in the entire Middle East/Gulf. The main goal is to help achieving what is most needed: relaunching New Communication & Conference Processes in the disarmament & non-proliferation area; this is seen as the core element of, ultimately all-inclusive, security arrangements for the region consisting of two centers of gravity relevant for our new, comprehensive approach for the entire Middle East/Gulf.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations