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531. The 2016 Failed Coup in Turkey: What Is the Impact on Turkish-African Relations?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The July 2016 failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government not only resulted in a dramatic upheaval in Turkey, it also had a significant impact on the structure of its international relations and its networks of influence abroad. The way this coup affected the political actors who shaped Turkish policy in Africa highlights the extent to which Fethullah Gülen’s movement – accused by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of having organised the coup- shaped those relations up to 2016. Today, Turkish diplomacy in Africa is undergoing a process of reconstruction, as it dismantles functional networks, and supports the new actors championed by Ankara. The destruction of what has been patiently established for 20 years and the creation of new channels of influence is a challenging task for Turkish diplomats and politicians who multiply their visits to Africa. In some countries, Turkish diplomacy sometimes faces difficulties in removing the Gülenist networks, as some are closely linked to high-ranking local leaders.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Fethullah Gülen
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, and Middle East

532. Confessionalism and Electoral Prospects in Iraq

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Ever since Saddam’s regime was toppled in 2003, Iraq has three competitive parliamentary elections in 2005, 2010 and 2014. In all of these, pre-election alliance building and post-election coalition building processes were fairly predictable given the confessional nature of Iraq’s political system. Essentially, the system is centered on a politically conventional power-sharing arrangement among the country’s three main ethno-sectarian powerhouses: Shi’ite Arab Muslims, Sunni Arab Muslims, and the Kurds. This arrangement has prompted small political parties to forge alliances with these confessional powerhouses. This time round, this trend is likely to continue in the upcoming elections scheduled on 12 May 2018, but perhaps on a smaller scale. What gravitates political entities are political expediency and nationalist sentiments. These two factors seem to be shaping and forming some alliances such as between secular and civil-minded parties, the Shiite Sadrist movement via Hizb Istaqama (the Integrity Party), and the Iraqi Communist party. On 22 January 2018, Iraqi legislators ratified a decision to hold much-debated anticipated parliamentary elections on 12 May 2018, thereby ending the stalemate by some lawmakers to postpone it. Iraq is at a crossroads, and much of what is at stake will depend on which of the 27 registered electoral alliances emerge as winners. The large number of alliances suggests that political entities are aware of the competitive advantages inherent to forming these, versus running independently. Indeed, because of Iraq’s particular parliamentarian arrangement, the 24 million eligible voters in the 18 national electoral districts, representing the country’s 18 governorates, will not be electing the next prime minister – they will, instead, be picking an electoral alliance, which will engage in post-election coalition building negotiations to nominate the prime minister and form the next government. While it is still premature to forecast the ultimate composition of the next government, it is most likely to be led by one of four viable options: Eitilaf al-Nasr (Victory Alliance) led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi; Eitilaf al-Wataniya (National Alliance) led by former Prime Minister Ayad Alawi; Eitilaf Dawlat al-Qanun (State of the Law Alliance) led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and Tahaluf al-Fatah (Conquest Alliance) led by al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Units) commander Hadi al-Ameri. However, given the unpopularity of Iraq’s political class, no single alliance is expected to win a majority of parliamentary seats, forcing the formation of a grand-coalition government. This, nevertheless, may help build broad-based support and legitimacy given Iraq’s oversized economic, security, and political challenges. Furthermore, the next election is expected to maintain the status quo due to the existence of potent structural forces inspired by political and electoral confessionalism. However, and encouragingly, the status quo may prove ephemeral in the face of internal divisions within the traditional confessional centers of power, the rising popular discontent with the quality of the existing democratic system and the limited progress it has made over the past fifteen years. It would be safe to say that an inclusive government can increase popular support, reduce the likelihood of ethno-sectarian civil war, minimise the influence of external powers, and bolster the nation’s attractiveness to foreign investors. In the long term, Iraq needs a government that is ambitiously reformist to transform the state’s political, electoral, and economic systems.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nationalism, Religion, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

533. The Rise and Decline of Saudi Overseas Humanitarian Charities

Author:
Jonathan Benthall
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
Abstract:
This paper records and interprets the rise and decline of Saudi overseas humanitarian charities, with special reference to the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO or IIROSA). Founded in 1975, IIROSA grew as a vehicle for a distinctively Saudi version of Islamic humanitarianism. By the mid-1990s, IIROSA was the world’s largest Islamic charity. Following the dismissal of its secretary general in 1996, and the crises of 9/11 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which cast a cloud to varying degrees over nearly all Islamic charities, IIROSA’s activities were reduced but efforts were made to revive them. In 2017, however, the kingdom’s new policy of centralization, and its disengagement from the “comprehensive call to Islam,” resulted in a remodeling of IIROSA’s role in support of the kingdom’s diplomatic interests but marginalized and stripped of religious content.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid, and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Persian Gulf

534. Yemen at the UN – May 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In May, Houthi forces were clearly on the defensive across most of Yemen, in particular losing ground in Hudaydah governorate as various anti-Houthi groups, backed by Emirati airpower, advanced on Hudaydah city. A Saudi-led coalition plan for a military offensive on the city last year was derailed due to a lack of US support and international outcry over the likelihood of massive humanitarian fallout. Last month, however, a Western official confirmed to the Sana’a Center that Washington and London had given the green light for the current offensive to take Hudaydah city, but with the caveat that the ports were not to be attacked (see ‘Coalition-Backed Forces Advancing on Hudaydah Port’ and ‘Anti-Houthi Forces Make Gains in Taiz’). On May 8, United States President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement. Through the rest of the month, his administration significantly increased its bellicose rhetoric towards, and imposed punitive financial sanctions against, Tehran, often citing Iran’s supposed military support of Yemen’s Houthis as among the justifications (see ‘Washington Exits ‘Iran Deal’ and Escalates Tensions With Tehran’). Meanwhile in Europe, it became public that since February the United Kingdom, France and Germany – all co-signatories to the Iran deal – have been pursuing talks with Tehran to help end the Yemen war, with all sides reporting progress (see ‘EU Countries in Negotiations With Iran to End Yemen Conflict’). Media reports last month revealed that US military personnel were playing a more direct and extensive role in the Yemen conflict than the Pentagon had previously admitted, while a high-level Yemeni government official also confirmed to the Sana’a Center that the US was deploying military drones in direct support of anti-Houthi ground operations (see ‘US Special Forces and Military Drones Active in Anti-Houthi Operations’). Simultaneously in Washington, lawmakers in both houses of the US Congress were pursuing legislation to increase transparency and controls on US involvement in the Yemen war (see ‘Congress Scrutinizes US Role in Yemen Conflict and Detainee Torture’). Through the first half of May, the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Abu Dhabi traded barbs in public over the latter’s move to land troops on Socotra island and seize control of the airport and marine terminal. Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher called it “an assault on Yemen’s sovereignty,” while the United Arab Emirates blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for launching a smear campaign against it. By mid-month, Saudi intervention had helped de-escalate the confrontation (see ‘UAE-Yemeni Government Standoff Over Socotra Island‘). In the second half of May, Socotra and parts of eastern Yemen were then hit by two cyclones, with coalition partners heeding subsequent Yemeni government appeals for the rapid deployment of humanitarian aid to assist the affected populations (see ‘Two Cyclones Flood Socotra’). In economic developments, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s March decision to liberalize fuel imports again led to market instability as a three-day fuel crisis gripped Aden (see ‘Fuel Crisis in Aden’). Meanwhile in Sana’a, the CEOs of the country’s largest banks gathered for a meeting, organized by the Sana’a Center at the Yemen Banks Association, seeking to address the country’s financial challenges (see ‘High-Level Banking Sector Meeting in Sana’a’). Also in Sana’a last month, the Saudi-led military coalition bombed the Presidential Office, located in a densely populated area with several schools nearby. The office was occupied by a full staff of civilian personnel at the time. At least six people were killed and 30 injured. A Senior Houthi official, in the building’s basement at the time of the strike, was unharmed (see ‘Coalition Bombs Presidential Office in Sana’a’). In an effort to head off the resurgence of cholera with the start of Yemen’s rainy season, the World Health Organization, the UN Children’s Fund and Yemen’s national health authorities launched a mass cholera vaccination campaign last month (see ‘Cholera Vaccination Campaign’). Also in May, high-level sources in both the Yemeni government and the Houthi leadership confirmed to the Sana’a Center that negotiations were underway for a large-scale prisoner exchange expected to take place at the end of Ramadan (see ‘Prisoner Exchange Slate for Eid’).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economy, Conflict, Houthis, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

535. Yemen at the UN – June 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In June, the Saudi-led military coalition and associated ground forces began their long-anticipated offensive against Houthi-held Hudaydah city. The ports of Hudaydah and nearby Saleef, along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, are the entry point for the majority of the country’s commercial and humanitarian imports. This creates the potential for catastrophic humanitarian fallout from the offensive given that 8.4 million Yemenis are already on the verge of famine. United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, spent most of June engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the belligerent parties to the conflict, and in consultations with the UN Security Council (UNSC), pushing a plan to preempt the attack by having Houthi forces turn control of Hudaydah port over to UN monitors (see ‘The UN Special Envoy’s Plan for Hudaydah Port’). Griffiths also revealed his new proposed framework for wider peace negotiations to the UNSC. While including some elements that differentiate it from previous UN-led peace initiatives, contentious items that led earlier efforts to fail were carried over into Griffiths’ latest proposed framework (see ‘The Special Envoy’s New Peace Framework’). The UNSC itself held three closed-door sessions regarding Yemen in June. The Swedish mission led calls for the UNSC to demand a halt to the Hudaydah attack, while the United Kingdom and Kuwait were at the forefront of pushing back against this effort, with the latter parties largely being successful. Council products regarding Yemen last month thus amounted to generic statements regarding respect for international humanitarian law and the need to protect civilians (see ‘UNSC Discussions on the Hudaydah Offensive’). In the United States, the White House appeared to give tentative approval to the Hudaydah offensive (see ‘White House Position on the Hudaydah Offensive’), while bipartisan opposition to the campaign was notable in Congress (see ‘Congressional Opposition to the Offensive’ and ‘Senate Passes Bill Making US Refueling of Coalition Aircraft Conditional’). In Yemen, the Hudaydah offensive, dubbed ‘Operation Golden Victory’, was launched on June 13, with the United Arab Emirates in primary command of the campaign, supporting and coordinating between various anti-Houthi ground forces (see ‘The Hudaydah Offensive’). These forces managed to take Hudaydah airport from Houthi fighters before Abu Dhabi announced that it would temporarily suspend the attack to allow the UN Special Envoy an opportunity to pursue negotiations (see ‘UAE Announces Pause in Offensive’). The Hudaydah offensive raised widespread humanitarian concerns and concerns regarding the safety of civilians in the city, while also prompting widespread price spikes for basic commodities. In economic developments last month, the Central Bank of Yemen finalized a framework to support the importation of basic commodities, the Austrian firm OMV restarted tests on wellheads in Shabwa governorate, and the Yemeni government launched a new Internet network in an attempt to supplant the Houthi authorities’ control over the national telecommunications. Also in June, Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi visited the UAE and met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Shortly after, Hadi flew to Aden, the Yemeni government’s current capital in the country, for his first visit in more than a year and a half.
Topic:
Security, Development, Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

536. Yemen at the UN – July 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
At the end of July the Yemen conflict seemed poised to take on much broader regional and global dimensions, as Saudi Arabia halted oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Iran declared the sea “no longer secure,” and Israel threatened military intervention if Houthi forces attempted to close the strait to shipping (see ‘Riyadh Halts Bab Al-Mandeb Oil Shipments After Houthi Attacks’). Earlier in July, the Saudi-led military coalition and associated ground forces had temporarily halted their campaign to dislodge Houthi fighters from Hudaydah city and capture Yemen’s busiest port. The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths spent the rest of the month shuttling between the various stakeholders in the conflict in a flurry of diplomatic efforts to stop the campaign from resuming. European diplomats also stepped up their efforts to intervene in the Yemen conflict through July (see ‘European Diplomats Expand Outreach to Houthi Leaders’). By the end of the month, the positions of the warring sides appeared to be irreconcilable: Houthi leaders continued to insist that their forces would remain in the Red Sea city, though they had agreed to hand control of the port to the UN; the coalition and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, however, maintained their demand that Houthi forces unconditionally withdraw from Hudaydah city and governorate. In early August, Griffiths then told the UN Security Council (UNSC) that the situation in Hudaydah could only be addressed through a broader, comprehensive peace deal and announced plans for UN-led consultations between the main warring parties to begin on September 6 in Geneva, Switzerland (see ‘UN Special Envoy’s Shuttle Diplomacy’). The Hudaydah campaign’s wider ramifications became evident last month (see ‘Offensive Displaces More Than 300,000, Red Sea Imports Drop’ and ‘Attacks Against Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure’), while relief agencies readied themselves for the campaign against the city to restart (see ‘UN Prepares for Imminent Siege, Boosts Medical Supplies’). Meanwhile, international opposition to the coalition’s actions continued to build (see ‘US Democrats Pressure Coalition on Hudaydah’, ‘Congress Debates Bill Placing Conditionality on US Refueling of Coalition Aircraft’ and ‘French Parliamentarians, Civil Society Raise Pressure Over Arms Sales’). Elsewhere in Hudaydah governorate military actions continued in July, among them the coalition’s advance on the Houthi-held town of Zabid, a UN World Heritage Site (see ‘Fighting Continues in Hudaydah Governorate’). Houthi forces in turn claim to have deployed hitherto unseen military drone capacities against Yemeni government forces and the coalition (see ‘Houthi Forces Deploy New UAVs’). In southern Yemen, there was a wave of assassinations against high-level security officials in Aden, the Yemeni government faced continued opposition to its political and military authority – particularly from the secessionist Southern Transitional Council – and there were protests over the coalition’s presence in al-Mahra governorate. Also in Aden, scores of detainees were released from detention facilities run by Emirati-backed local forces. In economic developments, the Aden-based Central Bank of Yemen approved an official exchange rate with which to support the import of basic commodities, the Yemeni rial experienced steep depreciation, and oil exports from Shabwah governorate restarted. Also last month, the UNSC discussed the UN Secretary-General’s annual Children and Armed Conflict report. As with last year, every major belligerent party to the Yemen conflict was cited for grievous violations against the rights of children. And for a second last year, the document included an annex for those parties that had taken step to try and address their violations against children. The Saudi-led military coalition and the Yemeni Armed Forces were listed in this special annex.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

537. The Yemen Review – October 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In October, the United Nations warned that Yemen could become the worst famine the world has seen in a century, with some 14 million people – half the population – facing starvation. This crisis is primarily due to the collapsing value of the Yemeni rial: Yemen is overwhelmingly dependent on imports to feed itself and the rial’s depreciation has thus made foodstuffs vastly more expensive. The murder of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul grabbed world headlines throughout the month. This in turn focused world attention on Riyadh’s role in the Yemen war, led the United States and the United Kingdom to call for a ceasefire, and prompted many Western governments to reconsider weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Following a build-up of anti-Houthi forces towards the end of October on the outskirts of the Houthi-held Red Sea city of Hudaydah – a crucial entry point of commercial and humanitarian goods for Yemen’s largest population centers – the battle for the city reignited in earnest at the beginning of November. Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi fired Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher on October 15 and launched an investigation against him for corruption and negligence. Bin Dagher had held the post since the spring of 2016 and was replaced by Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed, who was until then the Minister of Public Works and Roads. A report from Buzzfeed News documented how the United Arab Emirates had paid US mercenaries to assassinate its political opponents in Yemen, primarily individuals associated with the Islah party in the southern Yemeni city of Aden. The internationally recognized Yemeni government’s Economic Committee implemented new fuel import regulations, which would disqualify many Houthi-affiliated traders from importing fuel. The Houthi authorities in Sana’a subsequently threatened the senior staff of Yemen’s commercial banks – almost all of which are headquartered in Sana’a – with imprisonment if they complied with the Economic Committee’s decrees. These developments – along with the Houthi authorities appointing new senior staff to the Sana’a-based branch of the central bank – have likely escalated the war’s economic and financial ramifications for the Yemeni population. Cyclone Luban made landfall in Yemen’s eastern Mahra governorate (picture above), with the UN estimating that 2,200 families were displaced by the storm. Meanwhile, the Islah party continued to consolidate political and military control in Taiz City, a development that began in August and one that threatens to complicate future conflict resolution efforts.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Arms Trade, Conflict, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

538. Shared Responsibility and Comprehensive Security in the MENA Region

Author:
Petra Weyland
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Insecurity in the MENA region has been growing significantly over the last two decades. Much has been done to counter this trend through direct military engagement, procurement of weapons, training, humanitarian and development aid, and engagement in security partnerships. In spite of these tremendous efforts, the regional, national, and especially the human security situation has worsened. Violent extremism is evidence of this. U.S. Special Forces executed Osama bin Laden years ago, but al-Qaida is changing its face and (re-)appearing in many different places. The Isis Caliphate was destroyed, but its survivors are gaining a foothold on both shores of the Mediterranean, conceiving new forms of violent radicalism. Today we have to admit that by and large the efforts to improve security in the region have failed, a fact that is hard to accept, regardless of the reasons for this failure. The current situation not only has a tremendous negative impact on the MENA region and its future but also an increasingly adverse effect on neighboring countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Europe. Obviously, “more of the same thing” is not the correct strategy to apply. But how can the security policy approach to the region and the existing partnerships around the Mediterranean be recalibrated? This is the most crucial, the most pragmatic, and the most reasonable question to ask. The answers require bold, unconventional, out-of-the-box thinking and innovative approaches. It is precisely this question that the Marshall Center’s September 2017 Rome workshop put on the table. The most significant result of the debate was: before any new tools to counter security threats can be devised, efforts must focus on those who are (or should be) responsible for designing and implementing these tools: the security partnerships. The Rome workshop participants agreed that the main reason for the inefficiency of countermeasures lies in the very nature of existing security partnerships, which have many shortcomings and low effectiveness. Therefore, before investing in “more of the same thing,” a serious effort must be made to revise and redesign these partnerships. This is going to be a long and difficult process, not least because of diverging geopolitical interests. It is clear that any input that helps rebuild these partnerships is a contribution to a shared strategic vision. The Rome workshop proposed the concept of “shared responsibility” as a new strategic approach to security partnerships that encompasses the two shores of the Mediterranean as well as for the regional partnerships. It goes without saying that such a strategic vision needs to be developed on the basis of a clear, realistic, and shared situation analysis. The strategic workshop in Rome carved out the contours of both, which now must be fleshed out in a follow-up workshop.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and North Africa

539. A Conservative’s Prescriptive Policy Checklist: U.S. Foreign Policies in the Next Four Years to Shape a New World Order

Author:
Robert D. Blackwill
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As Donald Trump prepares to enter the presidency, many observers at home and abroad seek to anticipate the outlines of his foreign policy. This essay has a different purpose. Based on the rigorous definition of vital U.S. national interests that follows immediately below, [1] it proposes a prescriptive checklist of U.S. policy steps that would strengthen the domestic base of American external actions; reinforce the U.S. alliance systems in Asia and Europe; meet the Chinese and Russian challenges, while improving the quality of diplomatic exchanges with Beijing and Moscow; reshape U.S. trade policy; gradually pivot from the Middle East to Asia (but not from Europe); maintain the nuclear agreement with Iran; and confront international terrorism more aggressively, but with minimal U.S. boots on the ground in ungoverned areas and without nation building. This list attempts to take into account the President-elect’s public statements on foreign policy, but does not assume that all of them will be manifested after January 20. It rests squarely on the application of the Nixon/Kissinger national interest driven conceptual framework that refined American foreign policy five decades ago to current U.S. challenges and opportunities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Terrorism, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

540. The Significance of Erdoğan's Visit to East Africa

Author:
Michael Asiedu
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
On the 22nd of January, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embarked on another tour of three East African countries, Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar. These visits bring his total trips to 10 in Sub Saharan Africa, the most by any Turkish president. Earlier in 2016, he visited Ghana, Guinea, Cote d’ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia. These trips to a much larger extent signify the increasing policy attention Turkey is giving Africa.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, and East Africa