Search

Begin New Search Topic Diplomacy Political Geography Middle East

191. The Ministry of Regional Cooperation and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking

Author:
Nimrod Goren
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Among Israel’s many government ministries, one stands out in particular. It is small, its authority is limited, and many doubt its need. But it is tasked with realizing one of Israel’s greatest aspirations since its founding: Reshaping relations with the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbors through regional cooperation. The Ministry of Regional Cooperation was established in 1999 as a product of political bargaining. Then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak sought to find a job for Shimon Peres, the peace advocate whom he did not want as his foreign minister. Peres used the new ministry as a platform to advance his vision of a new Middle East, while Barak led an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Government, Regional Cooperation, History, Domestic Politics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

192. Starr Forum: Israelis and Palestinians: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Experts discuss the current conflict between Israelis and Palestinians while also providing the historical context and a potential path forward.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

193. Prospects for the Normalisation of Turkish-Armenian Relations

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć and Karol Wasilewski
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The leaders of Turkey and Armenia announce an attempt to establish diplomatic relations and open borders. Success would be beneficial for both countries: it would strengthen Turkey's influence in the Caucasus, and it would enable Armenia to break the regional isolation. However, success remains unlikely due to nationalist sentiment in both countries and the possibility of Russia and Azerbaijan sabotaging the talks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, and Mediterranean

194. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:
Dima Course
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

195. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

196. Triangular Diplomacy: Unpacking Russia's Syria Strategy

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow has repeatedly played actors off each other to secure its own interests and keep the Assad regime in power. Sometime before July 10, the UN Security Council will vote on whether to extend the annual mandate for cross-border assistance into Syria, which now passes through a lone outpost at Bab al-Hawa. Securing this extension is essential from a humanitarian standpoint, but keeping the border open matters equally for reasons of stability, given the fragile ceasefire in Idlib. Looming over the process is the strategic mischief of Moscow, which has repeatedly played various actors in Syria off each other to secure its own geostrategic and economic interests and to keep the Assad regime in power. The Kremlin, to the latter end, has reliably vetoed Security Council resolutions that would check the Syrian regime, claiming falsely that such moves would facilitate Western incursions in the country. In this Policy Note, Russia expert Anna Borshchevskaya and recent State Department senior advisor and NSC Syria director Andrew J. Tabler examine Russian diplomatic technique and subterfuge in Syria. The authors argue that by taking a strong stand and better uniting with partners and allies, the Biden administration can cut through Moscow’s rhetoric and ultimately promote a sustainable future for Syria.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

197. The Legacy of the Iranian Hostage Crisis

Author:
Alex Vatanka and Michael Metrinko
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Alex Vatanka and Michael Metrinko discuss the Iranian hostage crisis, how it’s shaped US-Iran relations, and what that history tells us about the present and potential future of the Islamic Republic. Metrinko also recounts his experience as a political officer at the embassy in Iran in 1979 and being one of the 52 hostages.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Bilateral Relations, and Iranian Hostage Crisis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

198. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

199. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

200. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America