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51. Politics of Nawab of Kalabagh Malik Amir Muhammad Khan (1910-1967)

Author:
Javid Raza Naseem and Abdul Basit Mujahid
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Political ideology of Nawab of Kalabagh Malik Amir Muhammad Khan (1910-67) was based on the perception of a highly educated but conservative feudal. He advocated status quo in almost all the matters including foreign relations. He advised Ayub Khan not to switch over to China because it would antagonise U.S.A. He was not so optimist about the solution of Kashmir issue. His pragmatic approach favoured the peaceful method of negotiation instead of confrontation. General perception portrays him as a typical landlord who was averse to education and freedom of press. Evidences from history reveal that there is a partial truth in it. He liked a responsible press which should not be left unbridled. Bengalis of East Pakistan made the bigger chunk of the total population of Pakistan. He, as a non-Bengali of West Pakistan, was apprehensive of their strength in numbers. Anti-One Unit politicians were secessionists in the eyes of Nawab so were dealt severely. He treated his political rivals according to their strength and ambitions. He was suspicious of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto because he (Bhutto) was too ambitious to be trusted. He allegedly victimized Chaudhri Zahoor Elahi because Chaudhri had desired to replace him. Mawlana A. Sattar Niazi, Habibullah Paracha and Pir of Makhad Sharif used to challenge his supremacy in his native area so Nawab had to deal them harshly. It can be derived that his political outlook reflected the mindset of a typical feudal lord.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Political Activism, Elections, Leadership, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

52. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

53. Enhancing Mediterranean Integration

Author:
Blanca Moreno-Dodson
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Trade liberalization, human capital development, and sectoral reforms can bring Mediterranean countries closer together.
Topic:
Development, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Reform, Human Capital, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

54. Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon”

Author:
Mitvim
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The EU is examining how to respond to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. One of the measures reportedly under consideration is to limit Israel’s participation in the EU’s “Horizon” research and development (R&D) program scheduled for renewal in 2021. This might be a significant blow to Israeli R&D, which has enjoyed substantial EU grants in recent years through the previous phase of the “Horizon” program. This paper provides background about the “Horizon” program and its importance for Israel.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Research, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

55. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum: Cooperation in the Shadow of Competition

Author:
Gabriel Mitchell
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Established in January 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) is the most significant multinational organization in a geopolitical space often associated with conflict and competition. Currently comprised of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Greece, Italy and the Palestinian Authority, the forum’s purpose to advance opportunities for energy development and cooperation between Eastern Mediterranean states in order to maximize the commercial potential of the region’s hydrocarbon reserves. This paper analyzes the diplomatic processes that resulted in the EMGF’s formation, the current challenges the forum faces, and Israel’s capacity to shape this nascent body’s future. If the forum hopes to grow in the postcoronavirus era, then it must commit to seeking pathways towards economic cooperation, enhancing its scope to include renewable energy, while also prioritizing conflict resolution and the establishment of a new maritime order.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Gas, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, Italy, Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus, and Mediterranean

56. China’s Deepening Diplomatic and Economic Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar, which laid out a framework for ending the 18-year old conflict in Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, February 29). Despite skepticism in many quarters regarding the viability of the deal, the negotiations leading to the agreement have been supported by many international actors, to include the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On February 18, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽) commented on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations by stating that “China firmly supports the broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process [and] welcomes the news that the U.S. and the Taliban are expected to reach and sign a deal… China stands ready to step up cooperation with all parties to the Afghan issue and the international community for peace, stability and development in Afghanistan” (PRC Foreign Ministry Briefing, February 18). As the U.S plans to draw down its forces in Afghanistan—a key element of the February 29 deal—China is set to further deepen its involvement in Afghanistan (Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2019). Beijing wishes to achieve at least two key objectives. First, it wants once and for all to block any contact between the Taliban and ethnic Uighur Muslim militants seeking independence from China (China Brief, April 24, 2019). Second, the PRC wants long-term stability in Afghanistan in order to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—to the war-wracked country. Beijing sees Afghanistan as a primary link between the Central Asian republics and the CPEC (China Brief, December 10, 2019). To achieve its objectives, Beijing has pursued positive engagement with the Taliban movement that controls more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. These ties have increased over the past couple of years: for example, in 2019 Taliban representatives paid at least two visits to Beijing (in June and September) for talks with PRC officials (CGTN, June 20, 2019; Al-Jazeera, September 23, 2019).
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

57. Learning Equity Requires More than Equality: Learning Goals and Achievement Gaps between the Rich and the Poor in Five Developing Countries

Author:
Maryam Akmal and Lant Pritchett
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for education include the goal that “all youth...achieve literacy and numeracy” (Target 4.6). Achieving some absolute standard of learning for all children is a key element of global equity in education. Using the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) data from India and Pakistan, and Uwezo data from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda that test all children of given ages, whether in school or not, on simple measures of learning in math, reading (local language), and English, we quantify the role of achieving equality between the richest 20% and the poorest 40% in terms of grade attainment and learning achievement toward accomplishing the global equity goal of universal numeracy and literacy for all children. First, excluding Kenya, equalizing grade attainment between children from rich and poor households would only close between 8% (India) and 25% (Pakistan) of the gap to universal numeracy, and between 8% (Uganda) and 28% (Pakistan) of the gap to universal literacy. Second, children from the poorest 40% of households tend to have lower performance in literacy and numeracy at each grade. If such children had the learning profiles of children from rich households, we would close between 16% (Pakistan and Uganda) and 34% (India) of the gap to universal numeracy, and between 13% (Uganda) and 44% (India) of the gap to universal literacy. This shows that the “hidden exclusion” (WDR, 2018) of lower learning at the same grade levels—a gap that emerges in the earliest grades—is a substantial and often larger part of the equity gap compared to the more widely documented gaps in enrollment and grade attainment. Third, even with complete equality in grade attainment and learning achievement, children from poor households would be far from the equity goal of universal numeracy and literacy, as even children from the richest 20% of households are far from universal mastery of basic reading and math by ages 12-13. Achieving universal literacy and numeracy to accomplish even a minimal standard of global absolute equity will require more than just closing the rich-poor learning gap, it will take progress in learning for all.
Topic:
Development, Education, Sustainable Development Goals, and Language
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Kenya, Africa, Middle East, India, Asia, and Tanzania

58. The State of the Fighting in the Afghan War in Mid-2019

Author:
Anthony H Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Afghan War has entered a critical period in which the U.S. is actively seeking a peace settlement with the Taliban, and doing so in spite of the fact that it is negotiating without the full participation of the Afghan government. Peace is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering a full withdrawal within a year of a ceasefire, and other reports indicate that it is considering a 50% cut in U.S. military personnel even if a peace is not negotiated. As of mid-August 2019, the Taliban has continued to reject any formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and has steadily stepped up its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiates with the United States. Terrorist groups like ISIS-K add to the threat, as do the many splits within the Afghani government and political structure. The Taliban has not encouraged further ceasefires, or shown any clear willingness to accept a lasting peace on any terms but its own. It may well see peace negotiations as a means of negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces and a prelude to a peace that it could exploit to win control of Afghanistan. At the same time, major uncertainties also exist regarding continuing support for the war. Some press reports indicate the Administration is seeking a 50% reduction in active U.S. military manpower in country by the end of 2019 or some point in mid-2020 regardless of whether a peace settlement is reached. Some members of Congress have called for major U.S. force cuts and shown only a limited willingness to keep up U.S. support of the Afghan government and forces if peace negotiations do not succeed. Much depends on current trends in the war, and the extent to which the Afghan Government or the Taliban are winning control and influence over the country. Much also depends on the degree to which the Afghan government forces can stand on their own if a peace negotiation leads to the withdrawal of U.S. and Resolute support forces, or if the U.S. makes major further force cuts.
Topic:
Development, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

59. The Oil Market Swings: Shale and Geo-politics

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Paul Rivlin analyzes possible future directions for the global oil market, against the backdrop of ongoing geopolitical developments in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Topic:
Development, Energy Policy, Oil, Global Markets, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Middle East

60. Middle East Demographics to 2030

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this edition of Iqtisadi, Paul Rivlin examines the "MENA Generation 2030" UNICEF report, and its implications. According to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) the population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA: the Arab countries and Iran) will increase from 484 million in 2018 to 581 million in 2030 and 724 million in 2050.[1] (See Table 1) Between 2018 and 2030, the population is forecast rise by almost 1.7 percent annually and between 2030 and 2050 by just over 1.2 percent annually. By far the largest country demographically is Egypt, and its population is forecast to rise by almost 1.8 percent annually between 2018 and 2030 and by almost 1.4 percent annually between 2030 and 2050. This edition of Iqtisadi examines the report and its implications.
Topic:
Demographics, Development, Economy, and Population Growth
Political Geography:
Middle East