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121. Women in the Middle East and North Africa: A Divide between Rights and Roles

Author:
Michael Robbins and Kathrin Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), most publics surveyed believe women should have equal rights to men in a variety of areas including access to university education (75 percent), employment (84 percent), and political oce (62 percent). • Yet, despite widespread support for women’s rights, majorities in many Arab publics favor limiting the roles women play in society. For example, one third believe women are as effective in public leadership compared with men. Six-in-ten believe that the husband should have the final say in decision making within the family. • Unsurprisingly, men are, in general, less supportive of women’s rights and more restrictive in their desired roles for women. Additionally, citizens with lower levels of education are often more likely to hold unequal views, suggesting that as educational attainment increases across MENA, attitudes toward women may also shift. • Overall, these results from nationally representative public opinion surveys carried out by the Arab Barometer imply that exports to improve women’s equality need to move beyond ensuring equal rights to focus on attitudinal shifts about the roles women should play in society.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Politics, Public Opinion, Women, Democracy, Equality, and Political Rights
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

122. Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa: Five Years after the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Natalya Rahman
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), eight-in-ten Arabs believe that democracy is the best system of government, even though it may have problems. This perception seems to have increased in most countries from 2013 to 2016. • There also appears to be consensus regarding the economic performance under democratic government: Less than one third across the region believe that economic performance is weak under democratic governance. • However, Arab views on the flaws of democracies are mixed: One third believe that democracy is ineffective in maintaining stability; four-in-ten think that democracy is indecisive; almost every other person says that the people of their country are not ready for democracy. • With the exception of Palestinians and Algerians, Arab publics predominantly evaluate their countries as more democratic in 2016. They seem to be more skeptical regarding the suitability of democracy to their countries in 2016.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Public Opinion, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Arab Spring
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

123. Civic Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Kathrin Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Overall, approximately six-in-ten across the MENA region believe that freedom of expression, freedom of association in parties and organizations as well as the freedom of the press is guaranteed in their countries. However, only every other person thinks they also have a guaranteed right to protest. • Two thirds of Arabs also believe they have the ability to criticize their government without fear. • However, turnout is in decline – only every other person reports they have turned out in the last legislative election in their country. Only 15 percent across MENA report they attended a rally in the run-up to the last election. • Formal non-electoral participation also appears at to be at a low point with only one-in-ten stating they have taken part in protest action or attended a meeting and signed a petition at last once during the three years. • Disenchantment with politics may have a new outlet, however: Approximately four-in-ten Internet users across MENA say they use online channels and social media to obtain information about political events. Two-in-ten Internet users also state that they use the online channels to express their opinions about politics and society. • While seemingly disillusioned with politics, Arab publics have a heart for those not so well off: Almost 95 percent across the region say they help the poor even if it comes at a cost to themselves.
Topic:
Government, Public Opinion, Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Internet, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

124. Nuclear Governance and Legislation in Four Nuclear-Armed Democracies

Author:
Avner Cohen and Brandon Mok
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The report presents a set of comparative raw data on the question of how four Western democratic nuclear-weapon states— the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel—handle the essential tension between nuclear weapons (which require secrecy) and liberal democracy. The initial intent of this work was to assist Dr. Cohen in his preparations for an unprecedented hearing at the Israeli High Court of Justice in September 2017, whereby the Court would hear a petition, signed by over 100 Israeli citizens, calling for regulation and oversight of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. The petitioners cited the legal lacuna under which Israel’s nuclear activities operate, devoid of oversight and beyond the realm of law, in violation of fundamental democratic principles. In particular, the study assesses the comprehensiveness—the breadth and depth—of the legislative, regulatory, scientific, and policy mechanisms that each of these four democratic states have created to govern its nuclear affairs in the following categories or parameters: legislation, organizations (directly responsible for either civilian and military applications of nuclear materials or both), regulation, oversight, secrecy, and policy making. Such material has never before been publicly available in a condensed form in one location, making this study of use to anyone interested in the problem of governing the atom. It will be updated as structures and policy change.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, Israel, France, North America, and United States of America

125. Comparative Continuismo: Presidential Term Limit Contravention Across Developing Democracies

Author:
Kristin McKie
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Since presidential term limits were (re)adopted into many constitutions during the third wave of democratization, 207 presidents across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have reached the end of their terms in office. Of these, 30% have attempted to contravene term limits whereas 70% have stepped down in compliance with tenure rules. Furthermore, of the presidents who have attempted to alter tenure restrictions, some have succeeded in fully abolishing term limits, others have only managed a one-term extension, while a minority have failed in their bids to secure any additional terms in office. What explains these divergent trajectories? On the basis of a series of statistical analyses, I argue that trends in electoral competition over time are the best predictor of the range of term limit contravention outcomes across the board, with the least competitive elections permitting full term limit abolition and the most competitive elections saving off attempts at altering executive tenure rules. Furthermore, results show that failed contravention attempts are true borderline cases, rather than instances gross miscalculations of success by the president and her party, in that they feature less competitive elections than non-attempt cases but more competitive elections than successful contravention cases. These findings suggest a linkage between political uncertainty and constitutional stability more generally.
Topic:
Democratization, Democracy, Institutions, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Latin America

126. Authoritarian Backlash: A Comparison of Turkey & Venezuela

Author:
Robert Pearson
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” This famous opening line from Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina is important also for democracies. While Turkey and Venezuela are each unhappy in their own way, they also may share some common elements in their struggles for democracy that provide lessons.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

127. The Kurds in a Volatile Middle East

Author:
Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The Kurds challenge the self-perceptions of the nation-states in which they reside: Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq; and they have played a crucial role in combatting Islamic State. This study analyzes the rivalry and interdependence among the four parts of Kurdistan as well as the dynamics of their relations with regional countries and the international community. With the entire region in a state of flux, will the Kurds fulfill their dream for a state or autonomous existence of their own?
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Self Determination, Authoritarianism, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Middle East

128. Laboratory of Democracy? Turkey’s Scientific Institutions After the July 15 Coup

Author:
Reuben Silverman
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since Turkey experienced a failed coup attempt a year ago, hardly a week goes by without news of new firings, suspensions, detentions, and arrests. By the end of June 2017, over 138,000 government employees had been removed from their jobs and over 110,000 citizens had been detained—with nearly half of these detentions leading to formal arrests. Numbers of this size are daunting. To put them in perspective and to give some sense of how the post-coup purges have affected institutions and lives in Turkey, consider the case of TÜBİTAK.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Economy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Coup
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

129. Competing Interests in Shingal District: Policy Recommendations for Defusing Tensions

Author:
Tomáš Kaválek
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
This report concerns the political and security situation in the district of Shingal after the summer of 2014. Specifically, it focuses on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) presence in the area. In August 2014, the Peshmerga forces hastily withdrew from Shingal district due to the IS (Islamic State) advance. The Yazidi population of the district was then exposed to atrocities at the hands of IS. These events damaged trust between the Yazidi population and the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government). The PKK entered the stage in Shingal district and aided Yazidis at the onset of IS’ advance. It capitalised on its image of being the saviour of Yazidis and promptly began to build governance and armed structures in the district. The area has thus become an arena of competition between the KRG (especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party– KDP) and Baghdad. PKK’s increasing presence challenges the KDP’s strong influence in the district. The ongoing power struggle in Shingal district also takes place against a background of wider regional competition. The report utilises Zachariah Mampilly’s theoretical framework in order to analyse the effectiveness of rebel governance. It is argued that the model used for PKK-linked political and armed structures in Shingal district follows the PKK’s governance model as it is established in PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological works and is currently in place in Rojava, run by PKK-affiliated actors. Furthermore, building upon Anna Arjona’s typology of rebel governments, it is asserted that the PKK-linked governance in Shingal district has become, since the summer of 2014, increasingly effective and entrenched despite certain shortcomings stemming mainly from lack of resources to satisfy all the needs of the population. Ultimately, the PKK-linked civilian governance structures represented by the Self-Administration Council and the armed structures of the Sinjar Protection Units find fertile ground among the Yazidi population for their project of self-administration and self-defence for Yazidis in Shingal district. The PKK-linked forces’ influence goes beyond a mere military presence and thus poses a new reality in which the PKK-linked forces are indeed actors which must be taken into consideration in future political arrangements in Shingal district. While outlining the competing interests in the district of Shingal, the paper provides a set of recommendations to the PKK, the PKK-linked actors in the district, the KRG, the GoI, Turkey, and the US with an aim of promoting stabilisation and the well-being of the local population. The best case scenario would include at least partial demilitarisation of the situation in the district while shifting the competition for the population between the GoI, the PKK-linked forces and the KRG into a non-violent domain, instead focusing on trying to win the hearts and minds of the population. Competition within the scope of Iraqi law with an aim of generating as much genuine popular support as possible in the upcoming elections in Iraq is the way forward. In the long-term, the PKK-linked forces should engage in democratic electoral competition with the KRG and aim for integration into governance and administrative structures as per Iraqi law. Both sides could then work on improving their standing electorally.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

130. After the Kurdistan Referendum: Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation

Author:
Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a historic, if contentious, referendum in the three Kurdistan Region’s provinces (Erbil, Duhok, and Sulimanyiah) and disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Notwithstanding the moral grounds for Kurdish self-determination, and despite the Kurds having voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, the unilateral move was met with strong backlash form varied opponents, for varied reasons. The Iraqi government, parliament and Supreme Court in Baghdad come out against the referendum calling it “illegitimate,” “unconstitutional,” “destabilizing” and “untimely”, as did Turkey, Iran, many western countries and international institutions including the United Nations and European Union. In a retaliatory response, Baghdad moved to impose a host of punitive measures against the KRG. These included the decision by the civil aviation authority of Iraq to halt international flights to and from Erbil and Sulimanyiah airports on September 29, 2017. Now a month into the referendum, Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, a perceived moderate Shiite, continues to face a mounting pressure from Iraq’s parliament and political parties to take tougher measures against the KRG. In exact, the issue of disputed territories took a center stage as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), backed by the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU), moved to reinstitute federal authority in Kurdish-held areas in Kirkuk, Nineveh, Salahddin, and Diyala governorates. The referendum and post-referendum events grew fast over the past few weeks, and it is difficult to undo them for a host of legal and political considerations. Playing the blame game now is not only frustrating, but also impeding to progress. Therefore, it is more constructive that Baghdad and Erbil take steps to calm down emotions and pave the path for meaningful dialogue. Irrespective of what Baghdad leaders think of the referendum or its legality, they cannot take away from the fact that millions of Kurds cast their votes in favor of independence. The Kurds have legitimate fears about the sectarian direction in which the country is heading, a view that is also shared by non-Kurdish Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs and many Shiite Arabs, including Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Such fears need to be acknowledged and dealt with, not dismissed. Baghdad should also take measures to improve communications with the KRG, to mitigate future fears by Kurds. Certainly, a drive behind the timing of the referendum was the fear, real or perceived, by some Kurds that with the defeat of IS, Baghdad will turn focus to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to deprive it of its gains. Erbil must recognize that Iraq’s constitution of 2005, which Kurdish voters have largely backed, gave a broad autonomy to Kurdistan Region and unequivocally affirmed that federal authorities have the constitutional duty to “preserve the unity [and] integrity…of Iraq and its federal democratic system.” Kurdish leaders, and many Iraqis too, have issues with the constitution and the political process it stipulated, but in the absence of a better framework, it remains the law of the land. Erbil should also take a leading role in mitigating the fallout from the referendum. The KRG leaders should accept that the referendum has backfired where the best outcome, for the short term at least, is negotiations with Baghdad for a democratic and federal Iraq. Therefore, the KRG might choose to publically demand the implementation of Iraqi constitution. This does not take away from the strategic and aspirational value of the referendum, which is expedient for pushing Kurdish demands over disputed areas, broader autonomy, and other issues. Meanwhile, the KRG leadership would benefit form focusing on its internal challenges including the need to address intra-Kurdish rivalries among political parties, empowering institutions, strengthening the rule of law, and initiating economic reforms. Such political and economic reforms will improve KRG’s negotiating positions with Baghdad. The referendum has given rise to unprecedented political and military tensions between the federal government of Iraq and the KRG. With the mobilization of the ISF, backed by the PMUs, to reclaim federal control over disputed territories, the situation risks igniting an armed confrontation between the two sides in one disputed area or another, especially if Baghdad decides to swing the pendulum too far. Given these developments, the only sensible way forward is for Baghdad and Erbil to make negotiations a priority. It is essential that talks focus not only on procedural and technical issues such as budget, oil sales, and fair distribution of resources, but, more importantly, on the primary issue that divided Baghdad and Erbil and helped trigger the referendum: corruption and sectarianism in the Iraqi state. Iraq’s political system is increasingly turning into an ethno-sectarian battle, which has been the feature of post-2003 Iraq except that it has become much more abrasive in recent years. Political parties throughout Iraq are structuring themselves to whip up sectarian and ethnic divisions to varying extents of extremism. Under the system, each party has become associated with its identity where there is little to no space to an overarching Iraqi national identity. Parties have become accustomed to not only make their constituents polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines, but also make them fearful of fellow countrymen. This state of affairs calls for an urgent action; else cycles of disputes and violence are likely to resurface. Interestingly, the fallout from the referendum has also provided opportunities for dialogue between the KRG and Baghdad. Indeed, the KRG Cabinet in its meeting of 19 October reemphasized the need for negotiations without pre-conditions and that the KRG is ready for dialogue. If and when reconciliations efforts take place, it is critical they address revising the constitution and structure of government. Negotiations are far better when they are outcome-driven with defined timelines, addressing the need for a non-sectarian and non-divisive arrangement. Prime Minister Abadi must seize on his successes to steer the country’s ship toward a unified vision that can bring about the will to address problems rooted in the political system, which feeds on ethno-sectarian divisions and is the greatest barrier to development. The international community, particularly the United States, has historic opportunities to positively influence the future of Iraq by articulating a peaceful settlement to the crisis and encouraging meaningful negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG. Furthermore, the U.S. should promote dialogue within the major political parties in the KRI while leveraging its influence to redirect attention toward liberating remaining IS strongholds in western Iraq. The U.S is also encouraged to provide Iraq with legal and technical assistance needed to launch reforms and national reconciliations initiatives. The U.S and Iraqi leaders need to work together to dispel fears held by minorities, encouraging them to integrate into a better version of federal and democratic Iraq. Being part of the coalition government in Baghdad, Kurds have a key role to play in making progress toward national reconciliations and reforms.
Topic:
Self Determination, Democracy, Independence, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan