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Begin New Search Topic Counterinsurgency Political Geography Middle East

1. Slow and Steady: Improving U.S.-Arab Cooperation to Counter Irregular Warfare

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Since 9/11 the United States has struggled with how to respond to the challenges posed by ungoverned spaces in the Middle East, from which terrorist attacks and destabilizing mass refugee flows emanate. The collapse of state authority in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya has created security vacuums that extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda have used to develop local presence, to organize, and eventually to conduct attacks both inside these countries as well as in Europe and the United States. Meanwhile, the refugee flows that have resulted from these conflicts have put tremendous pressure on neighboring countries and also caused a massive wave of refugees into Europe. The question facing the United States and other Western allies is how to deal with these challenges without getting sucked into complex and costly civil wars that the United States has little ability to end on its own. Full-scale American-led counterinsurgency, stabilization campaigns, or other resource-intensive nation-shaping interventions attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven to be unsustainable models given the high costs, indecisive outcomes, and lack of political support at home. However, completely withdrawing U.S. forces and counting purely on intelligence collection to monitor threats and local partners to address them has been ineffective, as this approach leaves the United States vulnerable to attacks. The most successful effort the United States has launched to deal with these challenges in recent years has been the counter-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria, where it has succeeded in protecting U.S. interests at a reasonable cost by working “By, With, and Through” local actors. In this model the United States generally: (1) uses a comparatively small number of troops to train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany local forces with legitimacy on the ground; (2) provides airpower and some enablers and logistics; (3) uses its limited military investment as leverage for a broader diplomatic effort; or (4) invests in building local governance and providing aid on the ground.
Topic:
Civil War, International Cooperation, Counterinsurgency, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arab Countries, Syria, North America, and United States of America

2. Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State, by Seth G. Jones

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Polina Beliakova
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Insurgencies are often thought of as domestic conflicts between state and non-state actors seeking to challenge governmental legitimacy, overthrow the government, or take territorial control from the state. However, thinking about insurgency merely in terms of domestic affairs substantially limits our perspective, and might be misleading both in terms of theory and policy. In addition, the tendency of policymakers and scholars to focus their attention on counterinsurgency bears the risk of considering the solution before understanding all nuances of the problem. Seth G. Jones’ Waging Insurgent Warfare is truly a book about insurgency. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, Jones analyzes how insurgencies start, strategies and tactics used by insurgent groups, their organizational structures, and their informational campaigns. The author devotes particular attention to the role of outside support for insurgencies from various types of actors including great power states. Finally, he addresses the issue of how insurgencies end. Only in the concluding chapter does Jones discuss the implications of the key findings of the book for counterinsurgency.
Topic:
International Relations, History, Counterinsurgency, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War

Author:
Andrew Shaver and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their state enemies incur costs for the collateral damage they cause. We provide the first direct quantitative evidence that wartime informing is affected by civilian casualties. Using newly declassified data on tip flow to Coalition forces in Iraq we find that information flow goes down after government forces inadvertently kill civilians and it goes up when insurgents do so. These results have strong policy implications; confirm a relationship long posited in the theoretical literature on insurgency; and are consistent with a broad range of circumstantial evidence on the topic.
Topic:
War, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Information Age, Civilians, and Casualties
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

4. Islamic State Primer

Author:
Robert Sedgwick
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia International Affairs Online
Abstract:
A brief overview and timeline examining the origins and trajectory of the little known terror group that was initially shunned and finally disowned by al-Qaeda as it developed into the world's most feared militant Muslim organization.
Topic:
Islam, Post Colonialism, Terrorism, War, Counterinsurgency, ISIS, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

5. From 9/11 to Da'esh: What Role for the High Representative and the External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Policies?

Author:
Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Under certain conditions, such as security crises, an integrated external EU counter-terrorism policy can emerge without leading to the supra-nationalisation of policy-making. This paper analyses the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the objective of assessing the influence that such figure can have on the governance of EU counter-terrorism policies. It does so by assessing the EU’s response to three security crises, namely: the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005); the Arab Spring and the following destabilisation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and the emergence and spread of Da’esh.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East
Publication Identifier:
978-88-98650-53-8
Publication Identifier Type:
DOI

6. ISIS War Game III: The Final Phase

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
September 2015 marked the one-year anniversary of President Barack Obama's speech outlining the administration's strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Yet, ISIS celebrated in June its own first-year anniversary of setting up a state by conducting three nearly simultaneous terrorist operations in three different countries—France, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Just this past month, ISIS also shocked the world with its attacks in Paris and Beirut and its downing of a Russian airliner in Egypt, killing more than 400 people combined and injuring hundreds more. While nobody expected the destruction of a resilient and agile foe such as ISIS within a couple of years, it is deeply troubling that the coalition is having such a hard time even disrupting its activities.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, War, Counterinsurgency, Fragile/Failed State, and ISIS
Political Geography:
Middle East

7. Nip It in the Bud: Disrupting Insurgent Financial Networks Before They Take Root

Author:
Tom Keatinge
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The rapid rise of Islamic State[1] has galvanised the international community to take action to contain it. One issue in particular – financing – has drawn increasing attention from policy-makers. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in August 2014, "ISIL is as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen. They’re beyond just a terrorist group…they are tremendously well funded."[2] He elaborated on this further in a September testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, stating that the United States would work with international partners "to cut off ISIL’s funding" and that "the Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working to disrupt ISIL’s financing and expose their activities."[3] This decision by international partners to jointly focus on finance disruption has resulted in a bombing campaign partly targeting oil refineries (a major source of funds for Islamic State) and in a UN Security Council Resolution that exhorts the international community to inhibit foreign terrorist fighter travel and otherwise disrupt financial support.[4] ​ But will it work? This article will give necessary broader context on this key question by exploring in more general terms the importance of financing for terrorist and insurgent groups and the extent to which disrupting their funding can reduce the security threat posed by such groups. Specifically considering the evolution of Islamic State, this article will first review the importance of financing in conflict, then assess the way in which funding models develop. It will argue that, once groups move from a reliance on externally sourced funding to generating sufficient internal financing – a path several groups have now followed – disruption becomes significantly more challenging and complex. The international community consistently fails to prioritise the early disruption of terrorist and insurgent financing – an attitude that needs to change...
Topic:
Defense Policy, Counterinsurgency, Finance, Islamic State, and Financial Crimes
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and Global Focus

8. TSG IntelBrief: Responding to the Islamic State

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
The Islamic State's murder of Jordanian hostage Lt Moaz al-Kasasbeh was both a message to the group's fighters that it can counter the coalition's relentless airstrikes as well as an offensive move designed to provoke a high-profile overreaction The air campaign against the Islamic State has been relentless while at the same time has receded from the headlines-a double blow to the group in that it suffers the losses but doesn't benefit from the attendant spectacle The drawn-out 'negotiations' over this past month-while the hostage was already dead-were likely intended to sow division and tension in Jordan, and draw attention to the issue as long as possible before the gruesome finale While Jordan is understandably enraged and will have to strike back, the most effective response might be an escalation that continues to kill the group's fighters away from the headlines.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

9. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State and Savagery

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Like a page out of the 2004 extremist manifesto "Management of Savagery," the Islamic State has tried to goad the international community into near-sighted reactions without long-term approaches by highlighting the barbarity of its executions of hostages This tactic has thus far failed to ignite the overreaction (outside of press reporting) of Western powers, leaving the group without an important recruitment and incitement tool The Islamic State needs consistent replenishment of fear to overcome its inherently terrible local governance, and so it depends on shocking savagery to serve as both its recruitment magnet and opposition suppression As the group encounters less and less Westerners, given the danger of their presence in the region, it will find increasingly fewer ways to incite the 'us-versus-them' battle it needs to survive.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

10. Hizballah, Iran, and Israel: Out of the Shadows

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
While the threat of an immediate escalation between Israel and Hizballah appears to have subsided after deadly tit-for-tat attacks, the trend lines suggest greater conflict ahead In an important and ominous speech on January 30, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah created, in effect, one long front against Israel that now includes Syria and the Golan Heights as well as Lebanon, increasing the potential for conflict with Israel Iran is no longer moving in the shadows but rather is openly coordinating strategy with its proxy Hizballah as the two seek to strengthen and expand 'the resistance' against Israel All parties involved have specific reasons to avoid a near-term conflict-the upcoming Israeli elections, ongoing Iranian nuclear negotiations, Hizballah's commitments in Syria-but shifting regional power dynamics will only increase the likelihood of serious fighting between them.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia