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241. Iraq in the Obama Administration

Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The following U.S. interests underlie any U.S. consideration of policy toward Iraq and should guide the Obama administration: Restore U.S. credibility, prestige and capacity to act worldwide. Improve regional stability. Limit and redirect Iranian influence. Maintain an independent Iraq as a single state. Prevent Iraq from becoming a haven or platform for international terrorists. These interests cannot be fully achieved without continued U.S. engagement, even as the level of American forces needed to maintain security declines. Iraq is important to the U.S. Ignoring or hastily abandoning Iraq could risk a collapse with catastrophic humanitarian and political consequences that the new Administration would not be able to ignore.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Aid, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

242. Syrian–Israeli Peace: A Possible Key to Regional Change

Author:
Paul Salem
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Peace between Syria and Israel is a real possibility—it was almost achieved twice before in 1995–1996 and 1999–2000. Both sides have indicated their interest through indirect talks hosted by Turkey. Syrian–Israeli peace would have positive effects on U.S. interests in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Iraq, and other tracks of the Arab–Israeli peace process. The downsides of U.S. mediation are limited. The two sides cannot and will not reach a peace treaty without U.S. leadership. The Obama administration should develop an integrated policy including pressure, incentives, and robust diplomacy to make this possibility a reality. The pressure would be to keep Syria out of Lebanon and Iraq. This would mean continued support for UN Security Council resolutions on Lebanon and the International Hariri Tribunal, as well as continued U.S. sanctions as long as Syria violates its neighbors' sovereignty. The incentives should include the return of the Golan Heights, ending Syria's political isolation, U.S. help in securing World Trade Organization accession, and encouraging foreign direct investment.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Arab Countries, Lebanon, and Syria

243. Special Report No. 213: Reconciliation Strategies in Iraq

Author:
David Steele
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A Window of opportunity now exists for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq despite the resurgence of violence in the spring of 2008. The creation of Sunni Awakening Councils, the ongoing presence of sufficient U.S. troops, and the decrease in combat activity by the Mahdi Army provide a real, though tenuous, opportunity to continue building on the gains of the past year. In all societies emerging from conflict, reconciliation efforts are the glue that holds the post-conflict reconstruction process together. Reconciliation must be pursued not only on national but also on local levels and not only in the political but also in the social domain. At all points within a society, people and groups must be encouraged to work together constructively for the common good. Reconciliation in Iraq must be approached with sensitivity to its shame-oriented culture, which emphasizes community, authority, honor, and hospitality. Reconciliation must also be approached with an awareness of the importance of primary identity markers—religion, ethnicity, tribe, and family—and the possibilities for creating bonds based on secondary markers—class, profession, internally displaced persons (IDP) status, and so forth. Moving toward reconciliation in the context of slevere and widespread violence requires that special attention be given to steps one can take to break the pattern of revenge and transform relationships. These steps include mourning, confronting fears, identifying needs, acknowledging responsibility, envisioning restorative and operational justice, and choosing to forgive. When good groundwork has been laid in relationship building, then groups in conflict are better able to engage in constructive dispute resolution. Seven elements form the basis for this process of negotiation or problem solving: identifying interests, alternatives, options, and criteria, and working on relationships, communication, and commitments. Internationals need to develop programming that focuses on process, rather than substance, to train and equip local Iraqis to be more effective mediators and facilitators. This programming should include conflict assessment, psychosocial and spiritual healing, conflict resolution training, facilitated dialogue, and problem solving.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Civil Society
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

244. Special Report No. 215: Whither Peace Operations?

Author:
Donald C. F. Daniel
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Much progress has been achieved over the last decade and a half in the development and use of peace operations as a tool to quell conflicts, but there are limits to how much more progress can be expected. The number of troop contributors and troops deployed to peace operations has recently reached unprecedented highs, but the bulk of troops came from a limited number of states. The relationship between the United Nations and non-UN peacekeepers seems for the most part complementary. Nonetheless, the rise in non-UN peace operations has probably led to the United Nations becoming too dependent on too small a base of lesser-developed states. The characteristics of most troop contributors (e.g., type of governance, national quality of life, ground-force size) correlate with their level of contribution, but even politically willing nations with the “right” characteristics can likely deploy only a small percentage of their troops to operations at any one time. While Europe and Africa have achieved the most progress in developing institutional capacities, each continent confronts problems of interinstitutional relations and resource shortages. Russia's hegemonic role in Eurasia and the United States' historical legacy in Latin America have hindered development of comprehensive institutional capacities for peace operations in each region. East Asia may slowly be moving beyond ideational strictures that crippled efforts to develop regional capacities. Institutional progress is not expected in South Asia and the Middle East, and states of each region should not be expected to send military units to intraregional operations. Nearly all South Asian countries, however, will be major players in UN operations. A few exceptions aside, Mideast states will remain bit players on the world scene. Demand for easy or moderately challenging operations will generally be met, but the hazardous missions most apt to occur will be called for by states possessing the wherewithal to take them on and bring others along.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, International Cooperation, Peace Studies, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, United States, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia, Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America

245. Iraq Trip Report

Author:
Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack
Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and nor thern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President's Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the senior most members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President 'Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

246. A Diplomatic Offensive for Iraq

Author:
Larry Diamond and Carlos Pascual
Publication Date:
06-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
U.S. policy on Iraq must address both diplomatic and military strategy together to realize any chance for sustainable peace. That was one of the central themes of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group report, yet the need for a diplomatic strategy to achieve a political settlement among warring Iraqis has largely been ignored in the debate on whether to “surge” or “withdraw” troops.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

247. Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families

Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Throughout Gaza's history, its powerful clans and families have played a part whose importance has fluctuated with the nature of central authority but never disappeared. As the Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually collapsed under the weight of almost a decade of renewed confrontation with Israel, they, along with political movements and militias, filled the void. Today they are one of the most significant obstacles Hamas faces in trying to consolidate its authority and reinstate stability in the territory it seized control of in June 2007. Although they probably lack the unity or motivation to become a consistent and effective opposition, either on their own or in alliance with Fatah, they could become more effective should popular dissatisfaction with the situation in Gaza grow. There are some, as yet inconclusive, indications that Hamas understands this and is moderating its approach in an attempt to reach an accommodation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, and War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Haiti

248. After Gaza

Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Hamas's takeover of Gaza and President Abbas's dismissal of the national unity government and appointment of one led by Salam Fayyad amount to a watershed in the Palestinian national movement's history. Some paint a positive picture, seeing the new government as one with which Israel can make peace. They hope that, with progress in the West Bank, stagnation in Gaza and growing pressure from ordinary Palestinians, a discredited Hamas will be forced out or forced to surrender. They are mistaken. The Ramallah-based government is adopting overdue decisions to reorganise security forces and control armed militants; Israel has reciprocated in some ways; and Hamas is struggling with its victory. But as long as the Palestinian schism endures, progress is on shaky ground. Security and a credible peace process depend on minimal intra-Palestinian consensus. Isolating Hamas strengthens its more radical wing and more radical Palestinian forces. The appointment of Tony Blair as new Quartet Special Envoy, the scheduled international meeting and reported Israeli-Palestinian talks on political issues are reasons for limited optimism. But a new Fatah-Hamas power-sharing arrangement is a prerequisite for a sustainable peace. If and when it happens the rest of the world must do what it should have before: accept it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gaza

249. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After

Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The process that will be launched shortly at Annapolis may not quite be do-or-die for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process but at the very least it is do-or-barely-survive. Positively, a U.S. administration that neglected Middle East peacemaking since taking office appears committed to an intensive effort: it has persuaded both sides to agree to negotiate final status issues – no mean feat after years of diplomatic paralysis and violent conflict. But pitfalls are equally impressive. The meeting, like the process it aims to spawn, occurs in a highly politicised context, with sharp divisions in the Palestinian and Israeli camps. These will make it hard to reach agreement and to sell it to both constituencies and, for the foreseeable future, virtually impossible to implement. Moreover, failure of the negotiations could discredit both leaderships, while further undermining faith in diplomacy and the twostate solution.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and International Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

250. From Beirut to Baghdad?

Author:
Richard Gowan
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
Late last summer, I was looking for photos to illustrate an article on the influx of European peacekeepers into Lebanon. Amid the standard shots of armoured cars, one image was distinctly different. It showed a group of blue-helmeted troops striding purposefully up a beach – and being completely ignored by a nonchalant sunbather.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Lebanon