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11. Fighting Fire with Fire: The Growing Nexus between Atrocity Prevention and Counterterrorism and Its Implications for the Use of Force to Protect Civilians

Author:
Colin Thomas-Jensen
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
By the fall of 2014, before the United States and its partners began the military campaign to erode the territory held by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, the international community understood the horrors endured by civilians living under IS control. While IS leadership plotted politically motivated attacks against its enemies in the region and in the West, reports trickling out from areas under the group’s merciless grip and IS’s own online propaganda clearly indicated a grave pattern of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including violence targeted at ethnic and religious minorities; women; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community; and other vulnerable groups. As the United States considered its response to the rise of IS, the duality of the group’s threat—an external one to Americans and American interests and an internal one to civilians living in IS-held areas—animated two communities of US policy makers that had rarely interacted with one another: those focused on counterterrorism and atrocity prevention. The US-led military operation to prevent genocide by IS against the Yazidi community on Mount Sinjar, Iraq, that President Barack Obama announced on August 7, 2014, included the first volley of airstrikes in the more-than-three-year counterterrorism campaign to defeat IS in Iraq and Syria. Important for the atrocity-prevention community, the airstrikes and deployment of Special Operations Forces (alongside humanitarian experts) to help coordinate the evacuation of civilians demonstrated an openness on the part of senior US policy makers to use counterterrorism capabilities to prevent a mass atrocity. In hindsight, however, US-led lethal action against IS fighters who threatened thousands of Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar was more the outcome of a unique set of circumstances than a harbinger of a more collaborative relationship between the counterterrorism community and policy makers focused on preventing atrocities committed by state actors, such as the governments of Syria, South Sudan, and Myanmar, and nonstate actors, including militia groups with little to no connection with international terrorist networks. With terrorist groups such as IS, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa almost certain to continue atrocities against local populations in areas in which they operate, a fundamental question for policy makers arises. Did the extreme circumstances under which the United States and its partners decided to intervene on Mount Sinjar necessarily represent a threshold for action, or can a more normalized relationship between the atrocityprevention and counterterrorism communities be advanced—a relationship that would seek to leverage counterterrorism tools and resources to take decisive action to protect non-US citizens from atrocities while improving measures to avoid civilian casualties, including civilians killed during actions taken by US counterterrorism partners? Drawing from interviews with nearly 40 former and current US policy makers and outside experts1 , as well as a convening of 20 experts at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in June 2017, this paper explains the increasing relevance of the counterterrorism–atrocityprevention nexus and defines some of the significant challenges of closer collaboration between those communities, with a specific focus on preventing imminent atrocities. Defining when (including clearly articulated criteria for what constitutes “imminent” in this scenario), how, and under whose authority to use force to prevent atrocities against civilians is only one element of broadening a counterterrorism strategy that also includes diplomacy and countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. 2 This paper is narrowly focused on the use of force and argues that in some circumstances, the atrocity-prevention agenda can be advanced by using counterterrorism tools—including lethal strikes—to prevent imminent atrocities against civilians in areas where terrorist groups operate.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Civilians, Atrocity Prevention, and Protection
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America

12. Is the Worst Yet to Come? Ongoing Mass Atrocity Risks in Syria

Author:
Naomi Kikoler and Janelle Roberts
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The Syrian crisis is not coming to a definitive end. Rather, it is entering a new phase in which civilians will face heightened risks of mass atrocities as the government intensifies its perpetration of atrocity crimes against Syrian civilians living in areas held by the armed opposition, in particular the besieged area of Eastern Ghouta and Idlib province. Furthermore, new scenarios of risks outside of these areas may develop as dynamics on the ground change. These new dynamics will pose risks to civilians for years to come. After seven years of assaults and more than 470,000 Syrians killed,1 an estimated 6.1 million Syrians internally displaced, and 5.5 million having fled the country,2 it is hard to imagine that conditions could worsen for civilians, but indicators point in that direction.
Topic:
Syrian War, Risk, Civilians, Atrocities, Armed Conflict, and Siege
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

13. Insight on Syria: Documenting the "Burden of War" on Syrians

Author:
Michelle Nicholasen
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The war in Syria is remarkable in its cumulative destruction of a society in a short six years. The toll on human life has been heavy; the involvement of multiple states, factions, and terrorist groups undermines resolution; the instigation of forced migration unprecedented; and the unfettered aerial bombardments against civilians—and perhaps most viciously, the deliberate destruction and targeting of health care facilities, health care workers, and patients—have defied all norms of war. Achieving an accurate picture of the human cost of this conflict has been an extraordinary challenge for aid agencies and health officials. In an effort to understand the impact of the war thus far, last winter the British medical journal the Lancet convened a commission of medical professionals to investigate and report on this conflict through the lens of public health. In Lancet parlance, a commission is always anchored at an elite university; in this case the American University of Beirut (AUB). In an early publication to set the stage, The Lancet-AUB Commission on Syria (the Commission) has called Syria “the most dangerous place on earth for health care providers,” and notes that the many reported atrocities “undermine the principles and practice of medical neutrality in armed conflict.” One of the three co-chairs leading the Commission is Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Jennifer Leaning, François-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of the Practice of Health and Human Rights at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, who has studied war and its long-term effects on societies in many parts of the world, including in the Middle East. Her fellow Commission co-chairs are Professor Iman Nuwayhid, Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences at AUB, and Dr. Samer Jabbour, a cardiologist on the AUB faculty. The Weatherhead Center sat down with Jennifer Leaning to discuss the Commission’s work, its goals, and the scope of the devastation in Syria.
Topic:
Civil War, Displacement, Civilians, Public Health, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

14. Protecting Syrian Civilians: The Road Not Taken

Author:
Frederic C. Hof
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
During 70 months of chaos in Syria, the United States had protected not one Syrian civilian from the homicidal rampages of Bashar al-Assad and his remorseless regime. Yes, America had come militarily to the aid of Syrian Kurds besieged by ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State). Yet the United States had protected no one in Syria from an Iranian client regime’s campaign of civilian mass homicide. The consequences were profoundly negative for Syrians, their neighbors, Western Europe, and the United States. And they were avoidable. The road taken by the Obama administration unintentionally but inevitably facilitated a humanitarian and geopolitical disaster. The road not taken would have required complicating, frustrating, slowing, and perhaps even stopping the mass murder of defenseless civilians. To be sure: it would not have been easy. But its avoidance has been catastrophic. Indeed, nothing about Syria has been easy: no silver bullets to fire, no fairy dust to sprinkle, and no magic potions to ingest. Choices between bad and worse have dominated from the beginning. They have grown starker and uglier over time largely because of the road taken.
Topic:
Islamic State, Syrian War, Civilians, Atrocities, and Protection
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

15. A Survey of Expert Judgments on the Effects of Counterfactual US Actions on Civilian Fatalities in Syria, 2011 - 2016

Author:
Lawerence Woocher
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The survey focused on four “minimal rewrite” counterfactuals: (a) President Obama’s not calling publicly for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to “step aside” in 2011, (b) the vetting and arming of moderate rebels in 2012, (c) the use of airstrikes to enforce the “red line” against chemical weapons use in 2013, and (d) the choice of an “Assad first” strategy instead of an “ISIS first” strategy in 2014.1 Respondents were asked to make probabilistic assessments on whether the counterfactual actions would have resulted in fewer civilian fatalities over the subsequent 12 months. They were also asked to cite the most important factors that led to their assessments and to identify other US government actions that would have been more effective in reducing civilian fatalities at the time. The clearest findings are (a) on average, respondents did not rate any of the four main counterfactuals very highly: neither the median nor the mean response on any of the four key counterfactual estimates was as high as 50 percent; and (b) very little consensus existed among respondents about the effect of the counterfactual actions on civilian fatalities over the subsequent year. The data reveal greater consensus on what the “most important factors” were, yet some striking disagreement on key analytical points. Finally, the most frequently cited ideas of other actions that would have helped reduce civilian fatalities were various types of (direct or indirect) military actions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Civilians, Atrocities, Counterfactuals, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

16. The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War

Author:
Andrew Shaver and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their state enemies incur costs for the collateral damage they cause. We provide the first direct quantitative evidence that wartime informing is affected by civilian casualties. Using newly declassified data on tip flow to Coalition forces in Iraq we find that information flow goes down after government forces inadvertently kill civilians and it goes up when insurgents do so. These results have strong policy implications; confirm a relationship long posited in the theoretical literature on insurgency; and are consistent with a broad range of circumstantial evidence on the topic.
Topic:
War, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Information Age, Civilians, and Casualties
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

17. Nonviolent Struggle Versus the Islamic State: A Strategic Perspective

Author:
Alia Braley and Srdja Popovic
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Attacking terrorism at its root, through slow and incremental cultural change, will pay off in the end, but this process is a difficult sell to those facing IS now. Such a long-term view neither benefits the people struggling to survive each day under IS’s murderous and authoritarian reign, nor does it equip the international security community concerned about IS’s immediate threat to regional stability. There is another solution. If what is needed is a relatively rapid rearrangement of social conditions that would cut off IS’s critical sources of power, then there may be no better route than collective nonviolent action undertaken by Iraqi and Syrian civilians. Collective nonviolent movements have been shown to be more effective than violent movements, even against highly violent or authoritarian opponents. Such a movement might take a page from IS’s own book, and tap into the same sources of power that have been indispensible to its success. After all, IS did not attract an army of nearly 30,000 fighters and capture a cumulative swathe of land larger than the United Kingdom merely because it had weapons. IS has flourished by successfully filling at least two critical power vacuums within Iraqi and Syrian society. It has seized upon a powerful narrative during a time of turbulence and confusion, and it has delivered necessary human services in places where the state has proved incompetent. However, a nonviolent collective movement of Syrian and Iraqi citizens could fill these power vacuums much more convincingly than IS, and in so doing, cripple IS’s power in the short term and impede the growth of new terrorist movements in the long term...
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Authoritarianism, Islamic State, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

18. The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq

Author:
Radha Iyengar, Luke N. Condra, Joseph Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
A central question in intrastate conflicts is how insurgents are able to mobilize supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. A common explanation is that violence committed by counterinsurgent forces mobilizes certain segments of the population through a range of mechanisms. We study the effects of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to quantify the effect of such casualties on subsequent insurgent violence. By comparing uniquely detailed micro-data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we can distinguish short-run 'information' and 'capacity' effects from the longer run 'propaganda' and 'revenge' effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the 'revenge' effect. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. There is no evidence that out-of-area events—errant air strikes for example—lead to increased violence, nor is there evidence of short run effects, thus ruling out the propaganda, information, and capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting the constraints on insurgent production of violence may be quite conflict-specific. Our results imply that minimizing harm to civilians may indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan to reduce insurgent recruitment.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Conflict, Violence, War on Terror, Civilians, and Casualties
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Middle East

19. Killing Civilians Intentionally: Double Effect, Reprisal, and Necessity in the Middle East

Author:
Michael L. Gross
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
MICHAEL L. GROSS examines the arguments that Palestinians and Israelis offer when innocent lives are taken. He challenges Palestinian claims that existential threats (supreme emergency) or reprisals for past wrongs can justify terror attacks on noncombatants. At the same time, he objects to Israeli explanations that invoke the doctrine of double effect and claim that noncombatants are not killed intentionally but die as an unintended side effect of necessary military operations.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Conflict, Civilians, and Casualties
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine