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1. Iran's Nuclear Policy: Nature, Ambition, and Strategy

Author:
Violet B. Eneyo, Jihad Talib, Frank Mbeh Attah, and Eric Etim Offiong
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons represent the biggest danger to humanity. During the Cold War, the US and USSR provided ‘umbrella protection’ to convince allies not to acquire nuclear weapons. Most ‘newly’ independent nations never had such security during the Cold War since they were not part of a power bloc. During the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988), the Islamic Republic of Iran was attacked with chemical weapons. Since Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian exile organization, exposed Iran's hidden nuclear program in 2002, the topic has gained worldwide attention. Iran's nuclear agenda has produced a worldwide catastrophe despite its NPT membership. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful and respects Islamic values. Most US politicians and academics consider Iran a rough nation with political and strategic concerns, including regional hegemony, human rights, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and military operations beyond the border. This study examines Iran's nuclear policies to demonstrate its essence, goal, and strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Chemical Weapons, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

2. Strengthening Global Regimes: Addressing the Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons

Author:
Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The inadequate response to the use of chemical weapons by a state against its own population was an important catalyst leading to the creation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A great deal has been achieved under the CWC, which is an important example of how multilateral cooperation can succeed. Recent cases of confirmed use prove that the task of eliminating chemical weapons is not complete. Chemical weapons are once again being used on the battlefield and as terror weapons. Moreover, their use in targeted attacks against politically exposed persons presents a new challenge to the commitment made by CWC states parties that chemicals will be developed and produced exclusively for peaceful use. When they come together to review the CWC in late 2020, the states parties will have to assess whether their response to the challenges posed by the use of chemical weapons has been proportionate to the threat. If not, then they will have the responsibility to create the new capacities, invent the new instruments and develop the new initiatives that will make their efforts more effective. This SIPRI Policy Paper provides an explanation of the context for some important recent decisions and an analysis of them. It also proposes some actions that CWC states parties could take together in support of the effort to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Weapons, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

3. The EU's Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime: Upholding a taboo under attack

Author:
Clara Portela and Erica Moret
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Marking a worrying turn for international policymakers, the use of chemical weapons has increased in recent years in spite of the robust disarmament regime seeking to curb their use. In October 2018, the EU adopted a sanctions regime against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The 2018 sanctions regime constitutes the EU’s first coercive instrument against chemical weapons. Even though the EU had previously employed sanctions to halt nuclear proliferation, in accordance with its 2003 Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), it had never applied sanctions to chemical weapons activities. Also, previous EU non-proliferation sanctions had taken place against the background of a pre-existing mandate agreed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both Pyongyang and Tehran had been under UN sanctions before Brussels enacted its own restrictions. By contrast, the EU sanctions regime against chemical weapons is not based on a UNSC mandate. Finally, the sanctions regime takes the form of a ‘horizontal’ or thematic list, in contrast to classical sanctions regimes that address specific country crises. The chemical weapons sanctions regime was only the second thematic sanctions regime ever adopted by the EU after the UNSC-inspired 2001 terrorism list. It was the first in a series of EU autonomous horizontal regimes adopted in close sequence: a sanctions regime against cyberattacks was agreed in 2019, and another against human rights violations is currently under preparation. The sanctions regime against chemical weapons is also exceptional in that it originated in the European Council, rather than in a working group of the Council of the European Union. When the sanctions regime was first adopted, it was accompanied by a blacklist addressing two vastly different uses of chemical weapons: it combined three individuals and one entity involved in chemical attacks on civilians in the Syrian war with the two suspects in the assassination attempt on a former Russian military intelligence officer and his daughter in Salisbury in the United Kingdom. A second round of designations in January 2019 followed a similar pattern. What accounts for this unusual combination of targets? What compelled the EU to agree on this novel form of sanctions regime? And what objectives is the EU pursuing with it? The present Brief situates the EU sanctions regime in the context of the recent attacks in Syria and the UK and international efforts employed to limit the proliferation and use of chemical arsenals. It then explores why sanctions are emerging as a supplementary policy tool in tackling this shifting security challenge. A fourth section analyses the implications for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before the final section concludes with recommendations for further action.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, European Union, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and North Africa

4. Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

Author:
Dr. Robert J. Bunker
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph focuses on an understudied, but yet a critically important and timely component of land warfare, related to the battlefield use of chemical weapons by contemporary threat forces. It will do so by focusing on two case studies related to chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Initially, the monograph provides an overview of the chemical warfare capabilities of these two entities; discusses selected incidents of chemical weapons use each has perpetrated; provides analysis and lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons incidents, their programs, and the capabilities of the Assad regime and the Islamic State; and then presents U.S. Army policy and planning considerations on this topical areas of focus. Ultimately, such considerations must be considered vis-à-vis U.S. Army support of Joint Force implementation of National Command Authority guidance.
Topic:
War, Islamic State, Conflict, Syrian War, Army, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

5. Enhancing chemical security in Kurdistan Region

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen and Goran Zangana
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Chemicals are widely used in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region (KRI) for various civilian purposes. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated their intention, know-how and capacity to convert chemicals of civilian use to chemical weapons. Without an urgent and comprehensive policy response, the KRI can face significant breaches in chemical security with immeasurable risks to the population and the environment. This report follows a special MERI workshop on chemical security, where major challenges were identified and a number of policy recommendation made.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6. The Attack on the Chemical Weapons Targets in Syria: Doing the Minimum

Author:
Udi Dekel and Carmit Valensi
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Besides the operational success, the attack in Syria earned the United States a clear political achievement, with the enforcement of American red lines by way of a coalition with Britain and France. However, this ad hoc coalition is focused solely on preventing the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and as Trump administration spokesmen clarified, there is no change in the US policy toward Syria. As such, the United States is threatening neither the Assad regime, nor the growing Iranian presence or Russian dominance in Syria. This attack was also not enough to address definitively the violations of the rules of war and the wide-scale attacks on civilians by Assad forces, including the use of conventional weapons, such as massive bombings from the air and barrel bomb attacks from helicopters. The United States and its partners did not present a plan to guarantee that the targeted attacks against civilians – and not just chemical attacks – on the part of Assad and the coalition that supports him will not continue. However, after seven years of war, in which more than a half a million people have been killed and millions have been displaced or have become refugees, the Syrian civilian population deserves more committed international support. For its part, Israel remains alone in the campaign against the consolidation by Iran and its proxies in war-torn Syria.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hezbollah, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and North America

7. The Attack on Syria in Response to the Use of Chemical Weapons: The Legal Dimension

Author:
Pnina Sharvit Baruch
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The combined attack by the United States, Britain, and France on Syrian targets following the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons has sparked extensive debate on the strike’s strategic aspects, and how, if at all, the offensive will affect the situation and the balance of power in Syria. The attack has also aroused a legal discussion, which once again highlights the limitations of the existing rules of international law when it comes to dealing with situations where the use of force is not based on the authorization of the Security Council or derived from the right to self defense. In this context, the forceful response, in and of itself, particularly being a combined attack by a number of key states, could have an impact on the development of international law with regard to the rules regarding possible legal justifications for the use of force between states.
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, UN Security Council, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, France, Syria, and North America

8. Building a WMD-Free Zone on the Two Existing Conventions

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue analyses both progress made by and challenges facing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It does so in order to explore under what conditions and to what extent these two conventions might help build a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs). Finally, the issue presents some options for the future and a major long-term initiative towards this ambitious goal.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

9. October 2017 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Derek Henry Flood, John Mueller, Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann, Andrew Zammit, and Columb Strack
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our October cover article, Rajan Basra and Peter Neumman explore the strong nexus between crime and jihadism in Europe. With a significant proportion of European foreign fighters having criminal backgrounds, they outline how the Islamic State is going out of its way to depict crime as helpful to its cause and to recruit criminals for terrorist enterprises. Our interview this month is with Lisa Monaco, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor during his second term. In July, police in Sydney, Australia, discovered alleged plots by two brothers to detonate a bomb on a passenger jet and release poison gas on a target such as public transportation. Andrew Zammit outlines why it set off alarm bells in counterterrorism agencies worldwide. An Islamic State cybercoach in Syria allegedly arranged for a partially constructed bomb with military-grade explosives to be air-mailed to the plotters from Turkey and provided sufficient instructions for them to build a fully functioning device. This ‘IKEA-style’ approach to terrorism could be a game-changer because untrained Western extremists have hitherto found it difficult to make high explosives. The Islamic State cybercoach also transmitted know-how on making a poison gas dispersal device to the Australian cell. Columb Strack looks at the evolution of the Islamic State’s chemical weapons efforts in Syria and Iraq and the possibility that the group could export chemical terror to the West. John Mueller examines the degree to which the cybercoaching of terrorists should be cause for concern, arguing that in many cases cybercoaches have little control over their amateurish charges. Finally, Derek Flood, recently back from the frontlines, outlines how the capture of Hawija, the Islamic State’s last remaining urban stronghold in northern Iraq, exposed faultlines between Baghdad and Erbil, which set the stage for the dramatic events unfolding in the Kirkuk area.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Jihad, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

10. Critical Junctures in United States Policy toward Syria: An Assessment of the Counterfactuals

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
More than any other foreign policy crisis during the Obama administration’s eight years, the Syrian conflict has engendered enormous debate about what the United States might have done differently: Could this catastrophe have been avoided? In particular, might different decisions at critical junctures in US policy debates have diminished the level of killing and atrocities? This paper explores these questions based primarily on interviews with former US officials and nongovernmental Syria experts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Atrocities, Chemical Weapons, Bashar al-Assad, Containment, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America